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THE PROPERTY/CONTRACT INTERFACE
Thomas W. Merrill*
Henry E. Smith**
This Article explores the distinction between in personam contract rights
and in rem property rights. It presents a functional explanation for why the
legal system utilizes these two modalities of rights, grounded in the pattern of
information costs associated with each modality. To test this theory, the Arti-
cle examines four legal institutions that fall along the property/contract in-
terface-bailments, landlord-tenant law, security interests, and trusts-in
order to determine how the legal doctrine varies as the underlying situation
shifts from in personam, to in rem, to certain relations intermediate between
these poles. With respect to each institution, we generally find that in per-
sonam relations are governed by flexible default rules; in rem relations are
governed by bright-line rules that impose immutable and standardized obliga-
tions; intermediate relations, as befits their intermediate level of information
costs, feature a type and degree of standardization beyond pure contract but
short of pure property.
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INTRODUCTION
Property and contract are bedrock institutions of the legal system,
but it is often difficult to say where the one starts and the other leaves off.
In constitutional law, property rights have been characterized as contracts
in order to take advantage of the Contracts Clause, while contracts have
been characterized as property in order to seek shelter under the Takings
Clause.' Tenants' rights lawyers have advocated replacing rules based on
property with rules grounded in contract, while welfare rights lawyers
have urged that government promises of benefits be deemed a species of
property.2 For their part, corporate lawyers have helped create new fi-
nancial markets by bundling together contract rights as "securitized"
property, while extending the scope of protection for intellectual prop-
1. See E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 528-38 (1998) (plurality opinion) (assessing
retroactive impairment of employment contract under the Takings Clause); Fletcher v.
Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 135 (1810) (holding that a completed grant of real property
is protected by the Contracts Clause).
2. CompareJohn Forrester Hicks, The Contractual Nature of Real Property Leases, 24
Baylor L. Rev. 443, 446 (1972) (developing the case for treating residential leases as
contracts), with Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 Yale LJ. 733, 778-79 (1964)
(urging that government promises of benefits be treated as a form of new property).
Contract rights are also often regarded as property rights for procedural due process
purposes. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 Va. L.
Rev. 885, 991-92 (2000) [hereinafter Merrill, Landscape] and sources cited therein.
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erty through the creative use of "shrinkwrap" contracts.3 Meanwhile, le-
gal academics carry on debates about whether institutions like corpora-
tions, bankruptcy, and trusts should be conceived of as being a nexus of
contracts or a specialized type of property regime. 4
All this effort at repackaging and relabeling suggests that the distinc-
tion between property and contract has important legal consequences,
but also that there is considerable uncertainty about the boundary be-
tween the two bodies of law. Given the high stakes and the contested
terrain, it is surprising how little attention has been given to the funda-
mental characteristics that distinguish property and contract as legal insti-
tutions. The foremost effort by a legal academic to understand the un-
derlying distinction is that of Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, 5 who died at the
age of 38 in 1918 before his project could be completed. 6 Since then, few
legally trained scholars have sought to build on this aspect of Hohfeld's
work. Economists have been, if anything, even more casual, and are
prone to make statements such as "[a] t the heart of the study of property
rights lies the study of contracts." 7 When confronted with evidence that
such notions may be incomplete, economists often retreat by saying that
3. On securitization, see Claire A. Hill, Securitization: A Low-Cost Sweetener for
Lemons, 74 Wash. U. L.Q. 1061, 1066-77 (1996) (describing securitization of receivables
and other contractual claims). On shrinkwrap licenses, see ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86
F.3d 1447, 1453-55 (7th Cir. 1996) (upholding a shrinkwrap licensing agreement against
copyright preemption claim); Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property and Shrinkwrap
Licenses, 68 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1239, 1241-48 (1995) (describing historical background of
shrinkwrap licenses).
4. See, e.g., Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Conception That the Corporation is a Nexus of
Contracts, and the Dual Nature of the Firm, 24J. Corp. L. 819, 825-27 (1999) (outlining
debate over whether corporations should be regarded in terms of property rights or
contract rights); John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 Yale
L.J. 625, 627 (1995) [hereinafter Langbein, Contractarian Basis] (arguing that trusts are a
form of third-party beneficiary contract); Alan Schwartz, A Contract Theory Approach to
Business Bankruptcy, 107 Yale L.J. 1807, 1812 (1998) [hereinafter Schwartz, Contract
Theory] (urging that bankruptcy be reconceived as a system of default rules subject to
contractual modification).
5. Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 26 Yale L.J. 710 (1917). This article was reprinted in a collection of Hohfeld's
essays, which in turn was reprinted in several editions. Throughout our Article, we will cite
to the article as it appears in the readily available 1964 edition, Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld,
Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning [hereinafter Hohfeld,
Fundamental Legal Conceptions], in Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal
Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning 65-114 (Walter Wheeler Cook ed., 3d prtg.
1964) [hereinafter Hohfeld, Essays] (describing distinction between in personam and in
rem rights and arguing that due to "linguistic contamination," the distinction between the
two has been blurred and misunderstood).
6. See Arthur L. Corbin, Foreward to Hohfeld, Essays, supra note 5, at xiv.
7. Yoram Barzel, Economic Analysis of Property Rights 33 (2d ed. 1997) [hereinafter
Barzel, Economic Analysis]. For example, Steven Cheung has argued that the principal
significance of property is that it establishes the right to contract. See Steven N.S. Cheung,
The Structure of a Contract and the Theory of a Non-Exclusive Resource, 13 J.L. & Econ.
49, 67 (1970) [hereinafter Cheung, Structure].
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the "economic" definition of property is different from the "legal" defini-
tion,8 with the implication being that they are absolved of any obligation
to explain the function of the legal institution.
In a recently published article,9 we explore one pervasive difference
in the legal doctrine associated with contract rights and property rights.
Contract law typically permits free customization of the rights and duties
of the respective parties to any contractual agreement; in other words,
contract rules are generally default rules.' 0 Property law, in contrast, re-
quires that the parties adopt one of a limited number of standard forms
that define the legal dimensions of their relationship; generally speaking,
these are mandatory rules that may not be modified by mutual
agreement. 1
Our explanation for this difference is based on the different costs
and benefits associated with different types of rights. On the one hand,
contract rights are in personam; that is, they bind only the parties to the
8. See Barzel, Economic Analysis, supra note 7, at 3.
9. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of
Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 Yale L.J. 1 (2000).
10. See, e.g., E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts § 1.10, at 36 (3d ed. 1999) (stating under
heading, "Most contract rules are default rules," that "[i]t is important to understand in
this connection that the great bulk of the general rules of contract law, including those of
the Uniform Commercial Code and the Vienna Convention, are subject to contrary
provision by the parties"); Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete
Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 Yale LJ. 87, 87 (1989) [hereinafter
Ayres & Gertner, Filling Gaps] (describing functions of larger class of default and smaller
class of mandatory rules in contract); Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default
Rules and Contractual Consent, 78 Va. L. Rev. 821, 825 (1992) (arguing that default rules,
in the sense of rules subject to contractual modification, predominate both under Article 2
of the U.C.C. and in the common law of contract); Alan Schwartz, The Default Rule
Paradigm and the Limits of Contract Law, 3 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 389, 390-92 (1993)
[hereinafter Schwartz, Default Rule] (describing the various types and functions of default
rules in contract law). Mandatory rules in contract law are mainly found in the areas of
fraud, duress, and unconscionability, see, e.g., Barnett, supra, at 825-26, in areas of
particular regulatory concern such as insurance, see, e.g., Farnsworth, supra, § 1.7, at 21,
and in the higher-order rules for what counts as contracting around a default, see, e.g.,
Ayres & Gertner, Filling Gaps, supra, at 119-20; Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from
Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law Through Arbitration, 83 Minn. L. Rev. 703, 750 &
nn.198-99 (1999) (discussing mandatory nature of rules about contracting around
defaults). Moreover, some defaults are in effect closer to being mandatory in that they are
difficult to contract around. See, e.g., Ayres & Gertner, Filling Gaps, supra, at 120-24
(noting that default rules in contract law range in strength according to how explicit one
must be to contract around the default); Eyal Zamir, The Inverted Hierarchy of Contract
Interpretation and Supplementation, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 1710, 1738-50 (1997) (describing
areas in which defaults are not easy for parties to contract around).
11. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 9, at 9-24 (describing the numerus clausus
principle and its application in American common law). The numerus clausus is a civil law
principle limiting the number of types of estates. In the common law, this principle is
mostly implicit. Id. at 20-23. To the extent that there is a leading case, it is Johnson v.
Whiton, 34 N.E. 542, 542 (Mass. 1893) (Holmes, J.) (holding that a will devising an estate
to plaintiff "and her heirs on her father's side" conveyed an unqualified fee simple title
because new forms of inheritance cannot be created).
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contact. The contracting parties are in the best position to evaluate the
costs and benefits of adopting novel legal terms to govern their relation-
ship, and in the typical bilateral contract there are no significant third-
party effects associated with the adoption of idiosyncratic terms. Property
rights, on the other hand, are in rem-they bind "the rest of the world."
Thus, the adoption of novel forms of property has implications not only
for the immediate parties to the transaction but also for third parties,
who must incur additional costs of gathering information in order to
avoid violating novel property rights or to decide whether to seek to ac-
quire these rights. Indeed, even if third parties want nothing to do with
novel property rights, the very possibility that such rights exist would re-
quire them to engage in more scrutiny of the property rights they en-
counter in order to make sure they are not infected with unwanted nov-
elty. Thus, free customization of property forms would create an
information-cost externality; mandatory standardization is the legal sys-
tem's way of reducing these external costs to an acceptable level. 12
In this Article, we seek to refine and extend our thesis about the
differences in legal doctrine between property rights and contract rights
and the importance of information costs in explaining those differences.
Our previous article proceeds as if there were a neat division within legal
institutions between the regimes of contract and property, such that one
can point to any particular legal relationship and say "this is a contract"
or "that belongs in the world of property." But although it is possible to
identify pure types of contract and property regimes, we also find numer-
ous examples of legal institutions that are mixed or Janus-faced, partak-
ing of characteristics that are more "contract-like" in some situations and
more "property-like" in others.
The present Article focuses its investigation upon institutions that lie
along this property/contract interface. Specifically, we examine the law
of bailment, landlord-tenant, security interests, and trusts. Historically
speaking, each of these institutions has been the subject of debate over
whether it is more appropriately classified as the conveyance of a prop-
erty right or an exchange of contractual promises. We are not interested
in resolving these debates by establishing the "true" classification of these
institutions. Rather, we take these historical debates as evidence that
each of our four legal institutions is a hybrid partaking of some of the
features of property rights and some of the features of contract rights.
What we are interested in examining is how the legal doctrine associated
with these institutions shifts as relations within each institution create in-
formation-cost patterns more like those of in personam or in rem rights.
12. We do not observe complete standardization because this would frustrate the
ability of owners to do different things with their property. The restriction to a finite
number of standard forms reflects a compromise between reducing third-party
information costs and avoiding excessive frustration costs. See Merrill & Smith, supra note
9, at 38-40.
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In order to undertake this study, it is necessary to push beyond our
previous article in a number of respects. First, we need to develop a more
sophisticated understanding of the in personam/in rem distinction that
will allow us to analyze how the legal system adopts different structures of
rights and duties in different circumstances. The in personam/in rem
distinction is not limited to what are conventionally regarded as contract
and property rights, but applies far more generally. For example, in per-
sonam obligations can be created by judicial judgments as well as by con-
tracts, and in rein rights apply to interests such as bodily security as well as
property. Nevertheless, the paradigmatic contract right adopts the in
personam structure of rights and duties, and the paradigmatic property
right corresponds to the in rem structure of rights and duties. In Part I,
we draw upon the (relatively sparse) analytical literature on the distinc-
tion between in personam and in rem rights, starting with Hohfeld's dis-
cussion of "paucital" rights (i.e., primary rights in personam) and "mul-
tital" rights (i.e., primary rights in rem), in an effort to specify the
distinction more precisely. Using Hohfeld's definitions as a starting
point, we identify four ideal-typical forms of rights: pure in rem rights,
availing against a large and indefinite class of persons; pure in personam
rights, availing against singular, identified persons; compound-paucital
rights, availing against numerous identified persons; and quasi-multital
rights, availing against singular, unidentified persons.
Having clarified the differentiating features of in personam and in
rem rights, we turn in Part II to two further questions anticipated but not
fully addressed in our prior work. The first is why the legal system de-
ploys two different structures of rights-in personam and in rem-in de-
termining who can use scarce resources and for what purposes. Our an-
swer is that each of these modalities does better in conserving on
information costs, depending on the circumstances. Generalizing
broadly, in personam rights conserve on information when it is cheaper
to define permitted uses of resources directly; in rem rights conserve on
information when it is cheaper to define the resource itself and appoint a
single manager (the owner) who has the discretion to choose among
multiple permitted uses.
The second question is what type of legal doctrine is likely to be asso-
ciated with each structure of rights. Our previous article identified one
important pattern: In personam rights give rise to a legal doctrine that
makes heavy use of default rules while in rem rights are typically gov-
erned by the numerus clausus principle, that is to say, by a legally man-
dated list of immutable forms.1 3 Expanding on this, we would expect the
legal doctrine associated with in personam rights to feature highly flexi-
ble rules designed to minimize the costs of specifying and enforcing rules
for the use of resources as between identified parties, whereas in rem
rights will be governed by bright-line rules designed to identify the re-
13. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 9, at 9-42; supra note 11.
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sources subject to such rights in a way that permits coordination among a
large and indefinite number of persons. Compound-paucital or quasi-
multital relations represent intermediate cases, and here we would expect
the law to adopt rules designed to compensate for the incomplete infor-
mation of one or more of the parties. Depending on the context, this
would include both rules that encourage disclosure of additional infor-
mation to such parties and rules that standardize particular features of
the relationship where one party is especially vulnerable due to incom-
plete information. We would also expect that as coordination is required
among large and more indefinite groups, these rules will approach the
standardization characteristic of in rem rights.
In Part III, we examine four institutions that exist along the prop-
erty/contract interface: bailment, landlord-tenant law, security interests,
and trusts. Our general theory about the information-cost differences be-
tween in personam and in rem rights generates one of two predicted pat-
terns with respect to these institutions. One possibility is that, insofar as
these institutions reflect a mixture of in personam and in rem rights, they
will adopt legal rules that reflect a kind of muddled blend of principles
associated with contract systems and property systems. In other words,
the law will borrow legal concepts associated with both pure types of
rights-structures, but will do so in an irregular fashion that corresponds to
no clear pattern. This prediction is what one would expect to find if our
theory has weak explanatory power-enough perhaps to reveal itself in
the pure in personam and pure in rem situations, but not enough to
reflect a decisive or consistent influence in these borderline institutions.
Another possibility is that these institutions will disclose a more con-
sistent internal pattern. Insofar as such institutions create in personam
obligations with information costs concentrated on a small number of
parties, the institutions will adopt freely modifiable default rules; insofar
as such institutions impose in rem obligations with more widespread in-
formational demands, they will adopt standardized bright-line rules. In-
termediate situations-what we have called compound-paucital and
quasi-multital-will adopt rules that encourage disclosure of information
where contracting over the rule remains a realistic option, or immutable
rules designed to protect parties with incomplete information where con-
tracting over the rule is not perceived to be a realistic option. These in-
termediate rules will impose more standardization as the informational
demands on third parties increase. As we shall see, we find significant
evidence of just such a pattern repeated across the legal doctrine of dif-
ferent institutions along the property/contract interface. This suggests
that our theory has strong predictive power. It also tends to confirm our
central claim that information costs are critical to understanding the dif-
ference between property and contract.
2001]
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I. THE DISTINCTIVE NATURE OF IN REM RIGHTS
Both civil law and common law jurisdictions have long recognized
that certain legal rights are good "against the world" while others apply
only against named persons or entities. 14 This distinction, which has long
endured across different legal systems, 15 cannot be dismissed as arid con-
ceptualism or as a matter of attaching arbitrary labels to underlying phe-
nomena that are really the same. 16 But what precisely are the differences
between what we call in rem and in personam rights? Perhaps more im-
portantly for our purposes, what are the implications of these differences
in terms of the information costs that parties must incur in order to iden-
tify these rights and avoid violating them?
A. Hohfeld's Contribution
We take as our point of departure Hohfeld's pioneering article,
"Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning," pub-
lished in the Yale Law Journal in 1917.17 This is the second, and less
familiar, of Hohfeld's two similarly titled articles. The 1917 article, which
has received relatively little attention from modern scholars, 18 builds on
14. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions, supra note 5, at 68-70 (describing in
personam rights as enforceable against a person or entity and in rem rights as enforceable
against the world); Albert Kocourek, Rights in Rem, 68 U. Pa. L. Rev. 322, 322 (1920)
[hereinafter Kocourek, Rights in Rem] (noting influence in both civil law and common
law traditions of John Austin's definition of in rem rights as "'rights residing in persons
and availing against other persons generally"' and related formulations including the
familiar phrase "against the world").
15. Civil law systems distinguish between absolute rights and relative rights, which is
similar in content to the distinction in Anglo-American law between in rem and in
personam. See A.M. Honor6, Rights of Exclusion and Immunities Against Divesting, 34
Tul. L. Rev. 453, 454 (1960). See also Barry Nicholas, An Introduction to Roman Law
99-100 (1962) (explaining that modern dichotomy between in personam rights and in
rem rights may have Roman origin); Fritz Schulz, Classical Roman Law 32-34, 334-35, 456
(1951) (noting that Roman law did not have modern distinction between in rem and in
personam rights and that Roman law distinction between actions in rem and in personam
does not exactly correspond to actions that protect these types of rights); Reinhard
Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition 6-7
(1990) (same).
16. The distinction makes an explicit appearance only rarely in modern American
legal doctrine. The particular application of the general in rem/in personam contrast that
is probably best known to most lawyers is the distinction in the law of personal jurisdiction
between actions in personam and actions in rem and quasi in rem. See Shaffer v. Heitner,
433 U.S. 186, 207-08 (1977) (distinguishing in personam, in rem and two types of quasi in
rem actions).
17. See supra note 5.
18. Hohfeld continues to exert fascination for legal scholars, philosophers,
anthropologists, and occasionally even economists. But with the few exceptions noted in
this Part, the only features of Hohfeld's system that receive much comment today are
drawn from his theory ofjural "opposites" and "correlatives," set forth in his 1913 article.
See, e.g., Robert C. Hunt, Properties of Property: Conceptual Issues, in Property in
Economic Context 7, 8-9 (Robert C. Hunt & Antonio Gilman eds., 1998) (urging
anthropologists to devote more attention to conceptual understandings of property
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and cuts across Hohfeld's familiar scheme of 'jural opposites" and 'jural
correlatives" set forth in the earlier piece.19 Thus, for example, the no-
tion that the concept of a legal "right" (in the sense of a right-claim) has
as its necessary correlative the existence of a legal "duty" in someone else,
is for Hohfeld one key to understanding the different nature of in rem
and in personam rights. 20
Hohfeld's first article largely eschewed invented terminology, using
familiar terms like "right," "duty," "privilege," "power" and so forth, albeit
with carefully specified definitions. 21 When he turned his attention to
explicating the differences between in personam and in rem rights, how-
ever, Hohfeld concluded that legal meanings varied greatly depending
on context and had led to sloppy reasoning.22 In order to achieve the
precision he desired, he found it advisable to adopt new terms to reflect
the distinction in the context with which he was most interested, what he
called the level of "primary rights," that is, rights that do not arise from
the violation of other rights. 23 Accordingly, Hohfeld coined the term
"paucital" to refer to primary rights in personam, and the term "multital"
to refer to primary rights in rem. We will for the most part avoid using
these unfamiliar terms, although in discussing the possibility of certain
institutions, and in particular to recognize contributions of anthropologists who draw
upon Hohfeld's correlatives); Madeline Morris, The Structure of Entitlements, 78 Cornell
L. Rev. 822, 825 (1993) (integrating Hohfeld's theory ofjural correlatives and Calabresi
and Melamed's theory of entitlements); Thomas D. Perry, A Paradigm of Philosophy:
Hohfeld on Legal Rights, 14 Am. Phil. Q. 41, 41 (1977) (discussing Hohfeld's analysis of
conceptual relations among legal rights).
19. In the more familiar 1913 piece, also published in the Yale Law Journal Hohfeld
set forth his famous theory of jural "opposites" and "correlatives." Wesley Newcomb
Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 Yale
LJ. 16 (1913) [hereinafter Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions], reprinted in
Hohfeld, Essays, supra note 5, at 23-64.
20. By the same token, the opposite of a right is a no-right, whose correlative in turn is
a privilege. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions, supra note 19, at 38. All the
variousjural relations can theoretically be in rem or in personam; thus one could have in
personam (Hohfeld's paucital) or in rem (Hohfeld's multital) rights, privileges, powers,
immunities, no-rights, duties, disabilities, and liabilities, for sixteen possibilities in all.
Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions, supra note 5, at 71.
21. Arthur L. Corbin, Foreword to Hohfeld, Essays, supra note 5, at vii, viii-ix.
22. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions, supra note 5, at 70.
23. Primary rights are contrasted with secondary (or remedial or sanctioning) rights,
i.e., rights to litigate that arise from the violation of another right (either primary or
secondary). See, e.g., I John Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence: The Philosophy of
Positive Law 44-45 (4th ed. 1873) (distinguishing primary rights from "secondary" or
"sanctioning" rights); Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic
Problems in the Making and Application of Law 134-38 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip
P. Frickey eds., 1994) (comparing remedial rights with primary rights); Arthur L. Corbin,
Rights and Duties, 33 Yale L.J. 501, 515-16 (1924) (distinguishing primary and secondary
rights); Arthur L. Corbin, Legal Analysis and Terminology, 29 Yale L.J. 163, 171 (1919)
(distinguishing secondary rights as "resulting from some operative fact that was a violation
of some precedent right" from primary rights as "resulting from some operative fact that
was not itself a violation of some precedent right").
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intermediate types of right-structures we will find it convenient to adopt
variations on Hohfeld's terminology.
Hohfeld defined a primary right in personam, or paucital right, as "a
unique right residing in a person (or group of persons) and availing
against a single person (or single group of persons); or else it is one of
the few fundamentally similar, yet separate, rights availing respectively
against a few definite persons."24 He defined a primary right in rem, or
multital right, as "one of a large class of fundamentally similar yet sepa-
rate rights, actual and potential, residing in a single person (or single
group of persons) but availing respectively against persons constituting a
very large and indefinite class of people."25 As an example of a paucital
right he cited the case of an ordinary bilateral contract: "If B owes A a
thousand dollars, A has an affirmative right in personam, or paucital
right, that B shall do what is necessary to transfer to A the legal ownership
of that amount of money. ' 26 As an example of a multital right, he cited
the case of ordinary ownership of land: "If A owns and occupies White-
acre, not only B but also a great many other persons-not necessarily all
persons-are under a duty, e.g., not to enter on A's land. A's right
against B is a multital right, or right in rem, for it is simply one of A's class
of similar, though separate, rights, actual and potential, against very many
persons."27
Hohfeld went on to offer a number of clarifying points about in rem
rights, some of which have since entered into conventional wisdom. For
example, he explained that rights in rem are not really rights "against a
thing."28 Rather, such rights, like all 'jural relations," apply to persons.29
Moreover, in rem rights are not necessarily related to a thing, in the sense
of a tangible object. Such rights can also exist in intangibles, such as
intellectual property. Indeed, Hohfeld noted that rights to bodily integ-
rity, individual liberty, and even rights of consortium and personal pri-
vacy can also be conceived of as being rights in rem.30 Thus, in rem
rights are not unique to property but exist whenever someone has a right
that holds against a large and indefinite class of others, as opposed to
specifically identified others.
Hohfeld also explained that in rem rights in a particular subject mat-
ter can coexist with a variety of other privileges, powers, and immunities.
Any of Hohfeld's eight jural conceptions-rights, duties, privileges, no-
rights, powers, liabilities, immunities, and disabilities-can be in rem or
24. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions, supra note 5, at 72 (footnotes
omitted). Hohfeld based his neologism on the Latin paucus, which means "few" or "little."
25. Id. (emphases omitted).
26. Id. at 73 (emphases omitted).
27. Id. (emphases and footnotes omitted).
28. The Latin phrase "in rem" literally means "against a thing," whereas "in
personam" means "against a person." Black's Law Dictionary 797, 795 (7th ed. 1999).
29. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions, supra note 5, at 75.
30. Id. at 85.
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in personam, 31 but he focused on in rem and in personam rights and
their corresponding duties. Although Hohfeld did not adopt the meta-
phor of a "bundle of rights, '32 his discussion of how fee simple ownership
of land can be broken down- into a complex ofjural relations33 directly
anticipates the adoption of the bundle-of-rights metaphor favored by the
Legal Realists. 34 His treatment of this aspect of property is also a direct
antecedent of the similar conception of property set forth in the opening
passages of the First Restatement of Property.3 5
B. Four Clarifications
Certain aspects of Hohfeld's discussion of the in personam/in rem
distinction have been subject to criticism, and others have been further
elaborated. Drawing upon these accounts, we offer four clarifications of
Hohfeld's explication of the nature of in rem rights: (1) in rem rights
are characterized by both an indefinite class of dutyholders and by large
numbers of dutyholders; (2) in rem rights are not simply aggregations of
in personam rights but are qualitatively different in that they attach to
persons through their relationship to particular things rather than as per-
sons; (3) in rem rights are numerous and indefinite in two directions-
not only does each in rem right give rise to a large and indefinite number
of dutyholders, but also each dutyholder holds such duties to a large and
indefinite number of rightholders; and (4) in rem rights are always claims
to abstentions by others as opposed to claims to performances on the part
of others.
1. Numerous and Indefinite Dutyholders. - The first clarification relates
to Hohfeld's conception of numerous and indefinite dutyholders. Writ-
ing in the early 1920s, Professor Albert Kocourek of Northwestern Uni-
versity School of Law objected to Hohfeld's suggestion that in rem rights
necessarily apply to large numbers of persons. 36 Kocourek pointed out
that it is possible to imagine cases in which only one person is subject to
an in rem right: for example, where A, "a land owner, has granted an
easement to every person in the state to walk across his land except to
31. Id. at 67, 71; see also supra note 20.
32. Greg Alexander has traced the first known use of the metaphor to a late
nineteenth-century treatise on eminent domain. Gregory S. Alexander, Commodity &
Propriety: Competing Visions of Property in American Legal Thought, 1776-1970, at 455
n.40 (1997) (citing John Lewis, A Treatise on the Law of Eminent Domain in the United
States 43 (1888)).
33. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions, supra note 5, at 96-97.
34. See Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in Property: Nomos XXII 69
(. Roland Pennock &John W. Chapman eds., 1980).
35. Restatement of Property §§ 1-4 (1936) (distinguishing "right," "privilege," and
"power" as different interests in property); id. § 10 ("The word 'owner,' as it is used in this
Restatement, means the person who has one or more interests.").
36. See Kocourek, Rights in Rem, supra note 14, at 332.
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B."3 7 Given that such a case could be imagined, Kocourek argued that
the key to in rem rights must be that the identity of the dutyholder is
indefinite, not that the dutyholders are necessarily numerous. 38
Kocourek accordingly proposed that a primary right in rem be defined as
"one of which the essential investitive facts do not serve directly to iden-
tify the person who owes the incident duty."39
Kocourek's criticism does not have much force with respect to the
ordinary case of in rem rights, which is full ownership of property. If A
owns Blackacre, then it is not merely that there is an indefinite number of
persons subject to a duty not to trespass on Blackacre. In addition, the
number of persons potentially subject to such a duty will, in the ordinary
case, be very large: every person who might at some future time come
into physical contact with Blackacre. Kocourek's counterexample of real
property subject to an easement in all persons save one is rather fantasti-
cal, and certainly does not defeat Hohfeld's intuition that in virtually
every real-world case, in rem rights will attach to a large number of
dutyholders. 40 Thus, Hohfeld's inclusion of numerosity as well as indefi-
niteness in defining the classic example of an in rem right appears to be
warranted.
Nevertheless, we think Kocourek was on to something in suggesting
that numerosity may be a contingent variable that is not present in all
37. Id. Note that this example does not mean that A affirmatively excludes B, but
rather that A has affirmatively included all others, leaving only B subject to A's in rem
rights of property.
38. Id. at 335. Both Hohfeld's and Kocourek's theories have antecedents in Austin's
view about property that "indefiniteness is of the very essence of the right; and implies that
the right.., cannot be determined by exact and positive circumscription." 2 John Austin,
Lectures on Jurisprudence 827 (Robert Campbell ed., 4th ed. 1873). This indefiniteness
can characterize the set of uses available to the owner. See Restatement of Property § 5
cmt. e, § 10 cmt. c (1936) (stating that while at any given time there is a maximum
combination of rights, powers, and privileges that an owner enjoys in his property, an
owner may part with some of those rights and will retain ownership); Bernard E. Jacob,
The Law of Definite Elements: Land in Exceptional Packages, 55 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1369, 1388
(1982) (discussing how Restatement definition of complete ownership requires "not only
reasonably exclusive present control, but also an indefinite reservoir of potential uses").
39. Kocourek, Rights in Rem, supra note 14, at 335. Kocourek agreed with Hohfeld
about the need for new terminology to describe rights in personam and rights in rem, but
because he did not regard the element of numerosity as being inherent in the underlying
concepts, he objected to "paucital" and "multital." Kocourek proposed the terms
'polarized" and "unpolarized" instead. See Albert Kocourek, Polarized and Unpolarized
Legal Relations, 9 Ky. LJ. 131, 131 (1921).
40. One reason that Kocourek's hypothetical is unrealistic is that the least-cost
method of allowing everyone but B onto Blackacre would normally involve identifying and
excluding B, as one does in setting up in personam rights. The force of Kocourek's
hypothetical depends on the goal of a theory of in rem rights. If the goal is to delineate
necessary and sufficient conditions that will capture all cases of an on/off distinction, then
the hypothetical is troubling. If on the other hand, one is interested in explaining on the
basis of costs and benefits why certain features place certain rights more towards one or the
other end of a spectrum from in rem to in personam rights, then Kocourek's example
poses no great problem.
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situations. Consider some cases not mentioned by Kocourek. Suppose
one of the parties to an in personam relationship assigns her rights to a
third party; for example, a tenant assigns her interest under a lease with a
landlord to a third party. From the perspective of the landlord contem-
plating the possibility of such an assignment, the identity of the third
party is indefinite, but the number of actual assignees is likely to be small
(usually, of course, one). Or consider a bailor who transfers property to a
bailee, who then misdelivers the property to a third party. Again, from
the perspective of the bailor, the identity of the third party is indefinite,
but in nearly all cases will be a single person or entity.
These fairly common situations provide more plausible illustrations
of Kocourek's suggestion that rights can be indefinite yet singular. No-
tice, however, that we would not ordinarily describe these situations as
involving in rem rights. We do not have any special name for them; they
are just cases of assignment or misdelivery or whatever. The fact that we
do not consider these situations as in rem provides additional confirma-
tion that both indefiniteness and numerosity of dutyholders must be pre-
sent in the case of a pure in rem right.
We can carry the analysis of contingency of conditions one step fur-
ther. Not only is it possible to identify cases in which dutyholders are
indefinite but singular, but it is also possible to identify cases in which
either the dutyholders or the rightholders are definite but numerous. A
single seller who enters into a large number of identical standard-form
contracts with numerous buyers provides one possible illustration; a class
action lawsuit perhaps provides another.
4 1
In fact, if we think of definiteness and numerosity of dutyholders as
two contingent variables that are jointly necessary to establish pure in
rem rights, we can see that there are in fact four modalities of rights with
respect to these variables. There are the two polar cases: rights that are
definite and singular (pure in personam or paucital rights), and rights
that are indefinite and numerous (pure in rem or multital). But there
are also two intermediate cases. There are rights that are definite but
numerous-what might be called "compound-paucital" rights, illustrated
by the example of a standard-form contract. And there are rights that are
indefinite but singular-what might be called "quasi-multital" rights, illus-
trated by the example of a lease assignment. We present these four mo-
dalities in the two-by-two matrix shown in Figure 1.
41. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. Most class actions involve multiple but identifiable plaintiffs,
but it is also possible to have a class action with multiple but identifiable defendants. See,
e.g., Williams v. State Bd. of Elections, 696 F. Supp. 1574, 1576-77 (N.D. Il1. 1988)
(explaining that defendant classes may be certified under either Rule 23(b) (1) or Rule
23(b) (3)); 5 James Win. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice § 23.45[3] (3d ed. 2000)
("A defendant class may be certified under Rule 23(b)(3)."); Scott Douglas Miller, Note,
Certification of Defendant Classes Under Rule 23(B)(2), 84 Colum. L. Rev. 1371, 1371
(1984) (examining the text, history and policies underlying the rule and arguing that
"[t]hese conclusively establish that Rule 23(b)(2) authorizes defendant class
certification.").
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FIGURE 1. MODALITIES OF RIGHTS
Numerosity
Nonnumerous Numerous
Definiteness Definite Paucital: e.g., Compound-paucital:
bilateral contract e.g., standard-form
contract
Indefinite Quasi-multital: e.g., Multital: e.g., fee
assignment, simple in Blackacre
misdelivery
Breaking apart the differentiating features of in rem rights in this
fashion allows us to see that the world does not consist simply of in per-
sonam and in rem rights, but also includes intermediate cases. Since
both "indefiniteness" and "numerosity" are matters of degree, the num-
ber of intermediate cases is probably very large and presumably falls
along a continuum. Thus, our intermediate cases should not be re-
garded as pure types in the same way that Hohfeld's paucital rights and
multital rights can be considered pure types.
2. Rights with Respect to Things. - Hohfeld conceived of in rem rights
as a kind of cluster bomb of actual and potential in personam rights. In
other words, Hohfeld thought that in rem rights can be broken down
into a large and indefinite number of individual in personam right/duty
relations. 42 According to Hohfeld, all paucital and multital rights can be
formed by grouping together sets of fundamentally similar yet distinct
rights; a paucital right is simply one that corresponds to a special type of
"uncompanioned" duty in a single or small number of individuals. 4 3
Hohfeld has been criticized for suggesting that in rem rights are
qualitatively indistinguishable from in personam rights. Modern analytic
42. As he put it: "A single multital right, or claim (right in rem), correlates with a
duty resting on one person alone, not with many duties (or one duty) resting upon all the
members of a very large and indefinite class of persons." Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal
Conceptions, supra note 5, at 91 (emphasis omitted). The idea that Hohfeld appeared to
be resisting in taking this position was that multital duties are in some sense 'Joint." As he
noted, A's multital right as the owner of Blackacre does not give rise to ajoint duty among
B, C, or D not to enter on Blackacre. This is because A could grant B a license to enter,
and this would not in any way extinguish the duties of C or D, which would continue
"precisely as before." Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions, supra note 5, at 93-94.
In an effort to head off the error of conceiving of multital duties as joint, however, Hohfeld
embraced a characterization of multital duties that appears to distort the inherent features
of multital interests.
43. For Hohfeld, a paucital right corresponds to a duty in one single person (or group
of persons), or else the right is one of "a few fundamentally similar, yet separate, rights
availing respectively against a few definite persons." Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal
Conceptions, supra note 5, at 72. For the subset of paucital rights availing against a single
dutyholder, Hohfeld suggested the term "unital." See id. at 72 & n.18. Thus, the
difference between unital, non-unital but paucital, and multital rights was merely the
number of fundamentally similar yet distinct rights that were grouped together.
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philosophers, most prominently J.E. Penner, have argued that in per-
sonam and in rem rights are in fact qualitatively different in at least one
important respect: In personam rights attach directly to specific persons,
whereas in rem rights attach to persons only because of their relationship
to a particular "thing."4 4 In rem rights may be rights against persons
rather than things, as Hohfeld argued, but the persons who are so bound
are identified by their relationship to a thing. For example, if A sells
Blackacre to B, this does not result in any change in the duties of third
parties W, X, Y, or Z toward Blackacre. Those duties shift silently from A
to B without any requirement that W, X, Y, or Z be aware of the transfer,
or even of the identities of A or B.45 Similarly, if the thing that identifies
the existence of in rem rights disappears or is destroyed, the rights and
duties in rem disappear with it, leaving (at most) only in personam rights
and duties (e.g., an in personam action for trespass or trover against the
person who took or destroyed it). As Penner puts it, "'[t]hings' . . .
whether physical things or states of affairs such as bodily security, mediate
between rights in rem and duties in rem, blocking any content which has
to do with the specific individuality of particular persons from entering
the right-duty relation. 4 6
Penner is correct that Hohfeld's conception of in rem rights as sim-
ply an aggregation of in personam rights misses a fundamental aspect of
in rem rights. The duty to respect the property of others (and other in-
terests such as bodily security and privacy of others) has an impersonality
and generality that is qualitatively different from duties that derive from
specific promises or relationships. Moreover, this general duty to respect
the property and security of others would seem to perform extremely im-
portant social functions. As Penner observes:
Norms in rem establish the general, impersonal practices upon
which modern societies largely depend. They allow strangers to
interact with each other in a rule-governed way, though their
dealings are not personal in any significant respect. Grasping
this point is absolutely vital to grasping legally recognized prac-
tices like property.
4 7
44. J.E. Penner, The Idea of Property in Law 25-31 (1997) [hereinafter Penner, Idea
of Property]; see also Kenneth Campbell, On the General Nature of Property Rights, 3
King's C. L.J. 79, 84-89 (1992) (discussing scholarship on the difference between in rem
rights and in personam rights, and arguing for a qualitative distinction between the two);
Honort, supra note 15, at 455-57 (critiquing Hohfeld's conception of rights and claims);
J.E. Penner, The "Bundle of Rights" Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. Rev. 711, 728 (1996)
(describing and questioning Hohfeld's conception of the disctinction between in rem
rights and in personam rights).
45. See Campbell, supra note 44, at 88 (noting that with respect to in rem rights
"further persons may become persons against whom the right holds, irrespective of
whether any other person has ceased to be a person against whom the right holds").
46. Penner, Idea of Property, supra note 44, at 29.
47. Id. at 30.
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3. The Two-Way Nature of In Rem Rights. - A third clarification con-
cerns a point that is mostly implicit in Hohfeld's account, and is explicit,
but not given sufficient emphasis, in Penner's. 48 In rem rights involve a
large and indefinite number of persons not only from the perspective of
the rightholder, considering the world of persons who are subject to du-
ties to respect the rightholder's control over some thing. They also in-
volve a large and indefinite number of persons from the perspective of
the dutyholders, looking out over the world consisting of persons who
hold rights in rem. Penner suggests as much when he observes that "in
general, it is completely unknown to us whether any given amount of
property is owned by one person or by several or many .... We are under
one duty to the plurality of property holders however their property is
distributed amongst themselves." 49
In rem rights, in other words, involve indefiniteness and numerosity
in two directions. There is (usually) only one owner of a thing. This
ownership is protected against interference from a large and indefinite
class of dutyholders. But each dutyholder also confronts a world contain-
ing a large and indefinite class of owned things. In rem rights thus pre-
sent a potentially massive coordination problem. Each person in society
has in rem rights that must be protected against a large and indefinite
number of potential violators. At the same time, each person must re-
spect the in rem rights of a large and indefinite class of others. This
feature of in rem rights, in particular, has implications for the informa-
tion-cost constraints associated with establishing any system of rights that
has in rem features.
4. In Rem Rights Have as Correlatives Duties of Abstention. - Finally,
extending an assertion of Hohfeld's, A.M. Honor( has observed that in
rem rights are always negative in character: They require that persons
abstain from certain types of interference with a thing or status.
50
iT] here appears to be no instance, either in the Anglo-American or con-
48. Hohfeld anticipates the numerosity of rightholders from the perspective of a
dutyholder when he distinguishes multital from general:
It is submitted ... that according to the best usage the term "general," as applied
to a jural relation, indicates that the latter is one of a large class of similar relations
residing respectively in many persons, i.e. people in general. For example, any duty
correlating with a multital right would be a general, or common, duty. The right of a
person not to be struck by another is both multital and general.
Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions, supra note 5, at 72 n.20. Sadly, Hohfeld leaves
off here, promising that "[t] his matter will receive more complete consideration at a later
time." Id.
49. Penner, Idea of Property, supra note 44, at 27.
50. See Honort, supra note 15, at 458-59; see also Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Faulty
Analysis in Easement and License Cases, 27 Yale L.J. 66, 71-72 (1917) (observing that a
landowner is not required to exercise reasonable care to protect property stored on his
land from harm caused by negligent use of adjacent land); Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal
Conceptions, supra note 5, at 72 (defining paucital and multital rights and claims);Jacob,
supra note 38, at 1378 n.40 ("Hohfeld's position on affirmative obligations relates directly
to his belief that property was paradigmatically constructive rather than consensual. The
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tinental lists, of a right protected by a claim that persons generally should
perform something. ' 51 Thus, for example, the in rem rights associated
with tangible property "all are claims to exclude others and prevent
others from doing acts."52 Similarly, in rem rights of bodily security or
privacy are claims that others desist from certain types of intrusions upon
the protected interest. Where affirmative obligations to engage in certain
performances arise, whether it be to perform in an opera or provide sup-
port to dependent children, they are usually in personam: They impose a
singular duty on an identified person.5 3
Of course, there are also claims to abstentions that are in personam.
A covenant not to compete provides one example. In personam obliga-
tions can be either duties of performance or abstention. But in rem obli-
gations, at least with respect to the ownership of property, seem always to
assume the form of negative duties of abstention.
In sum, we would modify Hohfeld's analysis of the distinction be-
tween in rem and in personam rights by emphasizing four differentiating
features of in rem rights: (1) in rem rights apply to a large and indefinite
class of dutyholders; (2) in rem rights attach to persons only insofar as
they own particular "things" and not otherwise; (3) all persons hold in
rem duties to a large and indefinite class of holders of such rights; and
(4) in rem duties are always duties of abstention rather than
performance.
II. IN PERSONAM RIGHTS, IN REM RIGHTS, AND INFORMATION COSTS
Although one can say that in rem rights are good against the world,
and this formulation can be refined along the lines set forth in Part I, the
question remains why some rights are of the in rem modality and others
are in personam. Why do we find this fundamental and widespread dif-
ference in the structure of rights and why do contract rights (typically)
adopt one modality and property rights (typically) adopt the other? In
this Part we sketch out some functional reasons for having a legal system
that includes both in rem and in personam rights with respect to control
over the use of resources. This sketch builds generally on work by one of
us on the characteristic costs and benefits of defining rights on the basis
argument he is making is that few affirmative, as opposed to negative, obligations ought to
be broadcast. Hohfeld has in mind something like the obligation to join a posse.").
51. HonorC-, supra note 15, at 459. For judicial recognition of this point, see LeRoy
Fibre Co. v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry., 232 U.S. 340, 348-52 (1914) (holding that
landowner has no affirmative obligation to modify use of his land so as to minimize harm
caused by negligence of another).
52. Honorn, supra note 15, at 458.
53. There are some affirmative obligations, such as an obligation to maintain a
common wall, that "run with the land" and thus can be said to be quasi-multital-they are
singular but indefinite. See generally Charles E. Clark, Real Covenants and Other Interests
Which "Run With The Land" 144-69 (2d ed. 1947) (discussing arguments concerning
whether party-wall covenants should be allowed by courts to run with the land). But there
are few if any affirmative obligations that are purely in rem.
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of rule-governed use of resources versus exclusive access to a resource.5 4
Sometimes speci. Ic users of a resource are identified and their use gov-
erned by use restrictions, and at other times a resource is defined and an
owner is delegated control by means of the right to exclude.55 We expect
the structure of rights over the resource to tend towards cost effective use
of each strategy. In particular, in personam contract rights, which re-
present a type of governance strategy, will be used when it is cost effective
to impose a relatively large informational burden on a small number of
identified people; in rem rights to property, which constitute a type of
exclusion strategy, will be used when it is cost effective to impose a small
informational burden on a large and indefinite number of people. We
further argue that the information costs associated with each of these mo-
dalities of rights are likely to affect the legal doctrine that governs each
type of right: In personam rights will be governed by flexible legal rules
that minimize the costs of tailoring rights and obligations to each particu-
lar situation, whereas in rem rights will be governed by bright-line rules
that allow large and indefinite numbers of people to identify owned re-
sources at low cost.56
A. Why We Have Two Modalities of Rights
In personam contract rights and in rem property rights can be seen
as two different strategies for regulating the use of resources. The in per-
sonam strategy proceeds by directly specifying use rights as between speci-
fied individuals. It indicates which of the designated individuals is enti-
tled to engage in which uses of particular resources. By contrast, the in
rem strategy establishes use rights in two stages. First, it identifies particu-
lar resources ("things"), and specifies which person (the "owner") is to
act as the gatekeeper or regulator of the thing.5 7 Then this owner deter-
mines, in a relatively unconstrained fashion, which individuals can en-
gage in which uses of the resource. 58
54. See Henry E. Smith, Two Dimensions of Property Rights 3-7 (November 29,
2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Smith,
Two Dimensions].
55. In this Article, we will examine the exclusion/governance dichotomy only as a
means of explaining the existence of in rem and in personam rights. Further discussion of
these different strategies for defining rights is beyond the scope of this Article.
56. This accords with our prior work on the numerus clausus principle in which we
explain that principle as a response to the information-cost implications of relatively
anonymous in rem property rights. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 9, at 8.
57. See, e.g., Penner, Idea of Property, supra note 44, at 74 (using gatekeeper
metaphor for property); Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 Neb. L.
Rev. 730, 749 (1998) (adopting the gatekeeper metaphor to explain the distinctive nature
of property rights).
58. That is, the owner or "gatekeeper" is free to select uses and users subject only to
general constraints that the law imposes on general behavior (for example, one is not
allowed to use a car to run someone over). Cf. Jeremy Waldron, The Right to Private
Property 32-33 (1988) (arguing that general rules against using property in ways that harm
others are not properly considered elements of the definition of property). Moreover, one
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Viewed in this way, in personam contract rights and in rem property
rights are species of two more general strategies for regulating resource
use: In personam rights are an instance of what can be called a govern-
ance strategy for determining use rights; in rem rights reflect an exclu-
sion strategy for determining use rights. Under a governance strategy,
rights to resources are defined in terms of permitted and restricted uses.
Some examples of governance include the in personam rights imposed
by contracts, the in personam rights imposed by courts, 59 government
licenses that control the use of particular resources, 60 and some of the
informal norms and formal regulations relating to particular uses of re-
sources. 6 1 Governance rules typically specify particular uses in some de-
tail, including often the identity of the rightholder and the dutyholder.
Indeed, often the dutyholder will need to know the identity of the
rightholder in order to avoid violating the duty.
Exclusion strategies, by contrast, proceed by restricting access to a
particular resource rather than by specifying permitted or prohibited
uses. Exclusion identifies a person or entity as the manager of a resource
(the owner), and then delegates to this manager the discretion to select
from among an open-ended set of potential uses. Groups typically deline-
ate and enforce exclusion rights over resources by using rough proxies,
such as territorial boundaries, that bunch together a class of uses such
that only the owner needs to measure them separately if at all. 62 One
example of exclusion occurs where groups restrict access to resources,
such as where a particular community restricts a fishing ground to mem-
can view governance and exclusion as forming poles on a spectrum according to how few
or how many uses are left to the discretion of the rightholder. See Smith, Two
Dimensions, supra note 54, at 3.
59. The rights imposed by courts would include not only those arising under
judgments but also those stemming from consent decrees and settlements.
60. See Orin S. Kerr, Rethinking Patent Law in the Administrative State, 42 Win. &
Mary L. Rev. 127, 141-43 (2000) (contrasting the function of government licenses with
government-created property rights like patents).
61. On the role of social norms in controlling behavior with respect to resources, see,
e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes 167-83
(1991) (hypothesizing that "members of tight social groups will informally encourage each
other to engage in cooperative behavior"); Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The
Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action 29-57 (1990) (examining institutional
solutions to problems of allocating "common-pool resources"); James M. Acheson,
Management of Common-Property Resources, in Economic Anthropology 351 (Stuart
Plattner ed., 1989); Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and
Inherently Public Property, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 711, 739-49 (1986) [hereinafter Rose, The
Comedy of the Commons] (tracing the role of custom in managing the commons).
62. Smith, Two Dimensions, supra note 54. Relatedly, Ellickson has noted that
territorial boundaries are cheap to defend because one can train a dog to guard them,
whereas norms of good behavior require judgment that is beyond a dog's capacity. Robert
C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 Yale L.J. 1315, 1329 (1993) [hereinafter Ellickson,
Property in Land].
2001]
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
bers of the community.6 3 Another example is where groups informally
divide a resource into separate territories in accordance with social
norms, such as the right of a particular member of the community to
exclusive use of a particular plot of land.64 And a third example would be
an in rem property right backed by the force of law, such as the conven-
tional legal property right of quiet enjoyment.
For any given issue of resource use, the choice between governance
and exclusion will depend on the advantages and disadvantages of using
different versions of these strategies in the particular context. Each strat-
egy has certain characteristic advantages and disadvantages, which to
some extent are mirror images of each other. The real world consists of a
diversity of institutions for controlling the use of resources. These institu-
tions lie on a spectrum between those that rely solely on governance to
those that rely solely on exclusion. 65 Yet for analytical purposes, it is use-
ful to consider the unique features of the pure types. We consider first
some of the advantages and disadvantages of in rem exclusion rights, and
then turn to in personam governance rights.
1. The Advantages and Disadvantages of In Rem Rights of Exclusion. - In
rem rights of exclusion-classic property rights-perform a number of
useful social functions. For example, they provide a basis for security of
expectation regarding the use of resources over time;6 6 they permit flexi-
ble adjustments in the use of resources over time; they provide a baseline
against which parties can establish contracts that specify particular uses of
resources; and they establish the identity of the "residual claimant" to the
attributes of a resource. 67 We do not question the importance of these
63. See James M. Acheson, Variations in Traditional Inshore Fishing Rights in Maine
Lobstering Communities, in North Atlantic Maritime Cultures: Anthropological Essays on
Changing Adaptations 253, 262 (Raoul Anderson ed., 1979).
64. See, e.g., Robert Sugden, The Economics of Rights, Co-operation and Welfare
153-55 (1986) (using game theory to develop Humean account of conventional rights of
possession).
65. Smith, Two Dimensions, supra note 54, passim.
66. For some modern commentary on this point, see Richard A. Posner, Economic
Analysis of Law 36 (5th ed. 1998); Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View of the Cathedral: The
Dominance of Property Rules, 106 Yale L.J. 2091, 2093-94 (1997); Carol M. Rose, Canons
of Property Talk, or, Blackstone's Anxiety, 108 Yale L.J. 601, 626 (1998) (describing
utilitarian argument based in part on security that promotes planning, investment, and
trading). For some earlier writings supporting this view, which can be traced back at least
as far as the utilitarians and their precursors, see Jeremy Bentham, Theory of Legislation
110-13 (C.K. Ogden ed., 1931) (arguing that "the principle of security ... requires that
events, so far as they depend upon laws, should conform to the expectations which law
itself has created"); 2 William Blackstone, Commentaries *7 (1766); David Hume, A
Treatise of Human Nature 485-89, 502-07 (P.H. Nidditch ed., 1978) (1739-40)
("[E]veryone knows what he may safely possess ....").
67. Residual claims are the value associated with a resource (positive or negative) that
remains after all contractual claims associated with the resource have been satisfied. See
Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Agency Problems and Residual Claims, 26 J.L. &
Econ. 327, 328 (1983) (defining residual claims); see also Barzel, Economic Analysis, supra
note 7, at 3 (developing property rights theory based on notion of residual claimancy).
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(and other) traditional justifications of property rights. But none of the
foregoing justifications is unique to in rem rights. Each of these func-
tions is also performed, at least some of the time, by in personam rights.
Consider, for example, employment contracts-an obvious type of in
personam or paucital right.6 8 Depending on how they are drafted, em-
ployment contracts can create a basis for security of expectation in future
employment, provide for flexible adjustments in the employment rela-
tionship over time, establish a baseline for future contractual modifica-
tions of the parties' respective rights, and help identify residual claimants
in the employment setting. Thus, in rem rights are not strictly necessary
in order to fulfill the traditional functions of property emphasized in the
literature on property rights. 69
The unique advantage of in rem rights-the strategy of exclusion-is
that they conserve on information costs relative to in personam rights in
situations where the number of potential claimants to resources is large,
and the resource in question can be defined at relatively low cost. In the
world of Robinson Crusoe, where the only relevant actors are Crusoe and
Friday, there will be no occasion to create in rem rights of exclusion. All
resources can be divided between Crusoe and Friday by in personam
agreement. But as societies become more complex, with increasing num-
bers of persons and resources, rules of exclusion quickly become the
more cost effective strategy for determining use rights. The simple rea-
son is that the information costs of fixing all use rights to resources by in
personam contract (or by other governance strategies such as govern-
ment regulation) would be prohibitive.
Consider the hypothetical world in which A has in personam use
rights in a resource and B must expend $X in order to gather and process
information about A's rights.70 If the society grows to the point where
68. There are, of course, collective bargaining agreements, but these would be
classified under our schema as compound-paucital rights rather than any type of in rem
right. Although the number of parties on one side of the relationship is very large, and
each individual has a relatively small stake in understanding the terms governing the
relationship, each of the parties to the agreement is individually identifiable.
69. In particular, although in rem exclusion rights often supply a baseline against
which contracting takes place, in rem rights are not a necessary condition of establishing in
personam contracts. One could establish the baseline for contracting by specifying
bundles of use rights over resources, in effect collectively imposing a governance rule,
which would then be subject to contractual modification. In fact, this seems to be the way
modern economists, beginning with Coase, seem to imagine the system of property rights
operating. See Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & Econ. 1, 27, 37-38
(1960) (implicitly defining the initial "delimitation of legal rights" in terms of use fights).
70. The $X can be regarded as the average cost of additional rights in this world.
Whether marginal costs would be increasing, flat, or decreasing would depend on several
factors. These include any commonalties among rights that emerged spontaneously
(assuming an absence of a numerus clausus, as described in supra note 11), any certification
or insurance mechanisms such as those described in infra note 71, and the extra burdens
on processing capacity with greater numbers of things to process. The first two factors
would lead to declining marginal costs and the third would lead to increasing marginal
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there are 1000 Bs, and each B is similarly bound to respect A's rights, this
means it will now be necessary to expend $1000X on gathering and
processing information about A's rights by all Bs combined. 71 When we
add in the fact that each B also has her own rights to resources, which
must be processed by A and all the other Bs, then the magnification of
information gathering and processing costs is multiplied many times
over-it is in effect $1,001,00OX. 7 2 Clearly, the in personam strategy for
determining use rights will rapidly break down in the face of even rela-
tively modest numbers of persons with interlocking interests in the use of
scarce resources.
The solution in any moderately complex society to the information-
cost problem presented by the need to allocate use rights to resources is
to switch to the rem exclusion strategy. In rem rights offer standardized
packages of negative duties of abstention that apply automatically to all
persons in the society when they encounter resources that are marked in
the conventional manner as being "owned." Information is conserved by
making these duties apply automatically to delineated resources without
regard to the identity of the owner; by making the duties uniform; by
restricting the duties to a short list of negative obligations, easily defined
and understood by all; and by marking boundaries using easily observed
proxies. Large numbers of people still must process information about
resources. But the unit costs of processing the information are now
much lower-$aX instead of $X, with 0 < a < 1-so that the total cost of
allocating use rights in the society ($1,001,00OXa) is much lower than it
would be if all use rights had to be established individually
($1,001,OOOX).
David Hume and other philosophers have obliquely recognized this
point by observing that a system of property rights represents a kind of
general convention that permits the coordination of social and economic
costs. The point here is that in rem rights involve widespread information costs, which
increase with greater idiosyncrasy of the rights in question.
71. One solution might be for the Bs to pool their efforts, and develop some collective
means of identifying rights that would reduce the costs to something less than X for each
dutyholder. But when a large number n of dutyholders is involved, each of whom is
potentially affected by a right, we are likely to encounter a collective action problem in
devising these sorts of collective mechanisms. Even if the collective action problems can be
overcome and some cost-saving device is established, as long as the remaining proportion
of cost to each of the n dutyholders (Bs) is positive and exceeds the reciprocal of the
number of dutyholders (1/n), then imposing the duty on large numbers of persons will
entail larger aggregate information costs than if there is only one dutyholder.
72. Here there are 1001 members of the society (A and the 1000 Bs), each of whom
imposes a total of $1000X in processing costs for a total of 1001 x $1000X or $1,001,000X
in processing costs. For an analogous point about the transaction cost savings from having
real covenants imposerd by a single real estate developer rather than by bilateral contracts
among all affected parties, see Richard A. Epstein, Covenants and Constitutions, 73
Cornell L. Rev. 906, 914-16 (1988).
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activity. 73 Exclusion rules represent a simple and universal "organizing
idea"7 4 that allows a multitude of individuals with a small amount of infor-
mation to interact in mutually beneficial ways that would be impossible in
a world that had only governance rules. Jeremy Waldron has made the
point in a particularly trenchant fashion, observing that in a world that
lacked such an organizing idea
citizens would have great difficulty following the rules. Every-
one would need to become a legal expert to determine at any
point what he could or could not do in relation to the resources
that he comes across. He would have to acquire a detailed
knowledge of the rules for each resource and of his rights, pow-
ers, liberties, and duties in relation to it. There would be no
other way of ensuring, in ordinary life, that one abided by the
rules except to find out what they were and learn them by
heart.75
In other words, exclusion rules, and in particular in rem legal rights, are
a critical part of the "social glue" that allows any group of individuals of
any size and complexity to function on a day-to-day basis.76
The disadvantages of the exclusion strategy are largely a function of
the limitations on such rights imposed by the need to minimize the unit
costs of processing information. In order to keep these costs low, it is
simply not possible to make these duties very complex or detailed. In
rem rights can only work if they are highly standardized and rely on rela-
tively crude proxies to identify the resources that are subject to such
rights. This standardization, in turn, greatly limits the degree to which
exclusion rules can be used to dictate more fine-tuned and individualized
uses of resources. Any time we want to go beyond crude proxies that
allocate discretion to owners over large bundles of rights, it will be neces-
sary to shift to a different strategy.
Another way to view the matter is to observe that every in rem right
imposes external information costs on a large and indefinite class, with-
out this externality being impounded into the price of the package of
rights governing the resource. Because of the potential third-party infor-
mation costs associated with the creation of novel in rem rights,7 7 all
73. See Hume, supra note 66, at 490; see also Penner, Idea of Property, supra note 44,
at 30 (positing that "[n] orms in rem establish the general, impersonal practices upon which
modern societies largely depend"); Sugden, supra note 64, at 87-97 (emphasizing the
importance of coordination of social activity through property rights).
74. See Waldron, supra note 58, at 42-43.
75. Id. Of course, if rules were as complicated as they are in Waldron's example, one
alternative to learning and following all rules might be ignoring them, which would defeat
the very objective of having a system of rights.
76. Bruce Ackerman has made a similar point. Bruce A. Ackerman, Private Property
and the Constitution 116 (1977) (stating that "most of the time Layman negotiates his way
through the complex web of property relationships that structures his social universe
without even perceiving a need for expert guidance").
77. To illustrate, suppose A transfers Blackacre to B but in so doing attempts to create
a new type of in rem right: A reserves an easement in Blackacre for the public to travel
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modern legal systems have been very reluctant to permit new types of in
rem rights over resources to be established. 78 To prevent the creation of
these kinds of external information costs, in rem rights are everywhere
limited to a small number of standardized types.
Standardization is probably also necessary if in rem rights are to be
widely obeyed. As Hume and his successors have observed, much of the
protection that property owners enjoy comes from a general respect for
property rights and from the fact that third parties informally monitor
and help to enforce such rights. 79 For this informal type of enforcement
to occur, it is also necessary that people have a basic notion of what rights
exist. This too points to the need for in rem rights to be defined by crude
proxies that are readily capable of being understood by all and to the
corresponding need to sacrifice some of the benefits of customization of
these rights.
Closely related but distinct from the question of the need for stand-
ardization is the issue of who supplies these standards. Here too, it seems
that the more diffuse and unspecified the relevant third parties are, the
more likely it is that some form of governmentally imposed standards will
be needed. 80 Even if we view in rem rights as being social conventions,
over the parcel unless the traveler is wearing an orange coat; orange-coat-wearing people
found on Blackacre will be treated as trespassers. This might not seem to expand the
scope of the rights of A and B, but it does mean that the public must do a lot of inquiring
before following a large crowd onto an apparently public easement. Note that A and B
could perhaps achieve the same result by agreeing that B would post notices granting
permission to all to enter Blackacre except those wearing orange coats. But this would be
an in personam licensing agreement-a promise by B to adopt a certain type of license
permitting access to Blackacre. The license would last only as long as B continued to
perform his in personam obligation toward A, and would not "run" with the property. The
hypothesized property right, in contrast, would last potentially forever and would restrict
the rights of the public no matter what actions B decided to take by way of posting notice.
78. Merrill & Smith, supra note 9, at 3-4; see also, e.g., Jfirgen Kohler, The Law of
Rights in Rem, in Introduction to German Law 227, 230 (Werner F. Ebke & Matthew W.
Finkin eds., 1996).
79. Eric Posner makes this point in the context of marriage. Restricting the form of
marriages facilitates third-party enforcement by making the formal marriage institution
focal. Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms 79 (2000). As Posner points out, "[t]he
problem is that the existence of multiple or idiosyncratic relationships might be so
confusing to the members of the community that community enforcement becomes
impossible." Id. The norm of possession has been analyzed as a focal point in a game of
chicken. Id. at 45, 178-79; Sugden, supra note 64, at 53-103. To this we might add that
enforcement of property norms by the third parties in the community becomes much
easier when easy conventions like possession and the limited possessory estates facilitate
such enforcement.
80. Cf. R.H. Coase, Essays on Economics and Economists 12 (1994) (noting that even
stock and produce exchanges regulate activities of traders in great detail in order to
facilitate exchange in what amounts to a private law and that "[o]f course, when trading
takes place outside exchanges (and this is almost all trading) and where the dealers are
scattered in space and have very divergent interests, as in retailing and wholesaling, such a
private law would be difficult to establish and their activities will be regulated by the laws of
the state"); R.H. Coase, The Firm, the Market, and the Law 10 (1988) [hereinafter Coase,
THE PROPERTY/CONTRACT INTERFACE
the government may have an advantage in setting up focal points in order
for parties desiring conventions to attain them more quickly and
cheaply. 81 When standardization must be supplied by the government,
there are associated disadvantages, such as reduced opportunities for in-
dividual experimentation and the potential collective-choice pathologies
associated with efforts to influence government action. Nevertheless,
where the government has an advantage in securing the benefits of stand-
ardization, we expect a tendency toward some sort of standard forms in
the law.
2. The Advantages and Disadvantages of In Personam Governance. - The
alternative to a regime of exclusion rules is a regime of governance rules.
Governance rules differ from exclusion rules in that they assign particular
use rights and duties to particular persons. The principal advantage of
governance rules is that they allow society to control resources in non-
standard ways that entail greater precision or complexity in delineating
use rights than is possible using exclusion. Allowing in rem property
rights to be supplemented by in personam contract rights, in particular,
introduces an enormously larger set of options for the use and control of
resources than would be possible using exclusion alone.82 Permitting re-
source uses to be regulated by contract also permits a degree of innova-
tion in developing governance structures better suited to individual
needs and aspirations than would ever be possible using exclusion rights
alone. Persons who have standardized in rem exclusion rights can sup-
plement these rights with a variety of voluntary governance structures,
including structures that impose affirmative obligations of performance
rather than merely negative duties of abstention. This added flexibility
substantially reduces the frustration costs that would result if parties were
limited to the few standardized forms permitted by a system of in rem
rights.
These private, use-governance regimes for the control of resources
have another advantage: Although they impose intensive informational
demands on the contracting parties, they do not as a rule generate signifi-
cant informational demands on third parties. Such tailored use-govern-
ance regimes thus can act as a supplement to the legally mandated system
The Firm] (also noting rules established by commodity exchanges and the need for state
regulation in diffuse markets).
81. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 9, at 47 & n.169. For a general discussion of the
role of law in facilitating the emergence of focal points, see Richard H. McAdams, A Focal
Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 Va. L. Rev. 1649, 1650-54 (2000).
82. Despite other differences, contracts and public regulation may be used to refine a
property regime in order to govern specific uses in a more detailed way. On three
alternative arrangements for contracting over externalities, see Cheung, Structure, supra
note 7, at 64. Cheung's three-way classification (property, contract, regulation) has been
extended and used to explain the evolution of pollution-control regimes. See Carol M.
Rose, Rethinking Environmental Controls: Management Strategies for Common
Resources, 1991 Duke L.J. 1, 9-36; see also Thomas W. Merrill, Explaining Market
Mechanisms, 2000 U. Ill. L. Rev. 275, 278-80 (2000) (discussing Rose's adaptation).
I
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of forms associated with exclusion rules, but without creating the large
external information costs that would be associated with creating more
tailored in rem rights.
Governance rules also have unique advantages when we deal with
resources that are difficult to package into easily measured and moni-
tored parcels such as are required for exclusion strategies to work. Land
and tangible objects can be marked with boundaries, which are visible to
others and can be monitored for violations.8 3 But other types of re-
sources, such as ocean fisheries, submerged oil, clean air, and ideas, are
much more difficult to divide into parcels.8 4 All else being equal, we are
more likely to see restrictions on types of use-governance mecha-
nisms-in seeking to control externalities associated with these difficult-
to-define resources.
The disadvantages of governance rules more or less track the advan-
tages of exclusion, summarized earlier. As the number of individuals
whose actions could potentially impact the resource increases, it will be
more costly to specify individual behavior according to a governance
strategy: The information costs of specifying which individuals have the
right to do what will simply become too great. Accordingly, as the num-
ber of affected persons increases, we expect the content of rights over the
resource to move in the direction of exclusion, with a designated gate-
keeper.85 The result will commonly take the form of an in rem right.
The conclusion we draw from this discussion is that systems of in rem
and in personam rights entail distinctive advantages and disadvantages
associated with the exclusion or governance strategies of which they are
83. See, e.g., Ellickson, Property in Land, supra note 62, at 1329; cf. Waldron, supra
note 58, at 37-39 (discussing material resources as central case and noting association of
resource with decisionmaker as basis for property).
84. Often what we find is a commons in which a group excludes the "rest of the
world" and devises and enforces governance rules that apply to members of the group.
See, e.g., BonnieJ. McCay & James M. Acheson, Human Ecology of the Commons, in The
Question of the Commons: The Culture and Ecology of Communal Resources 1, 12-14
(BonnieJ. McCay &James M. Acheson eds., 1987) (noting that territoriality-the keeping
out of nonmembers-is a prerequisite for rules to control use by members, and providing
examples of this phenomenon in fisheries); see also, e.g., Ostrom, supra note 61, at 58-102
(analyzing various successful, long-term "common pool resources" communities and
identifying similarities among them); Dean Lueck, The Rule of First Possession and the
Design of the Law, 38 J.L. & Econ. 393, 407-09 (1995) (showing how customary rules
evolve in communal land relationships which restrict members' use and encourage
homogeneity of group members); Rose, The Comedy of the Commons, supra note 61, at
742-44 (citing examples from nineteenth-century Britain and the United States in noting
that customary rights vest property rights in groups that are indefinite and informal, yet
are nevertheless capable of self-management); Henry E. Smith, Semicommon Property
Rights and Scattering in the Open Fields, 29J. Legal Stud. 131, 161-69 (2000) (examining
the medieval open-field system, in which peasants owned strips of land but used the land
collectively for grazing, and identifying manipulating of boundaries and monitoring of
norm compliance as substitute methods of abating strategic behavior in the
"semicommons").
85. Smith, Two Dimensions, supra note 54, at 41-42.
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subsets. In particular, each system of rights entails different patterns of
information costs, and hence will be used in different circumstances.
Where they are used will be a function of their respective advantages and
disadvantages. If rights were costless to delineate and enforce, any struc-
ture of rights would do, and there would be no need for a distinction
between in personam and in rem rights.8 6 But because the delineation
and enforcement of rights is costly, the legal system has found it useful to
deploy two different but complementary modalities of rights.
B. The Legal Rules Expected with Different Modalities of Rights
Given the different information costs associated with in personam
and in rem rights, we are now in a position to suggest in general terms
how we would expect the legal doctrine associated with these modalities
of rights to differ. In this section, we will first consider as a matter of
general theory the legal doctrines likely to be associated with in rem and
in personam regimes; we then turn to a discussion of the doctrines that
are likely to arise in intermediate situations.
1. In Personam and In Rem Regimes. - As noted in Part I.B, the key
variables in distinguishing in rem from in personam rights are (1)
whether the number of dutyholders is small or large and whether their
identity is definite or indefinite; (2) whether the right attaches directly to
persons or to persons only through their ownership of a thing; (3)
whether those who hold duties simultaneously hold duties to other nu-
merous and indefinite holders of rights; and (4) whether the right is a
negative duty of abstention.8 7 The first of these variables, concerning
numbers and definiteness, is a matter of degree. Other variables, such as
whether the duty attaches to persons directly or only through things, will
generate different degrees of complexity insofar as different resources
present different definitional problems. Thus, in the real world we would
expect to find a spectrum of legal rights, ranging from pure in personam
contract law to pure in rem property, with various way stations in be-
tween. To facilitate exposition and informal empirical analysis, however,
we will proceed as if these variables define distinctive categories.
In personam rights clearly entail greater information-gathering and
processing costs than do in rem rights, at least on a unit cost basis.8 8 To
create an in personam right, it is necessary to specify right-duty relation-
86. See id. at 52. That governance and exclusion would be interchangeable in a
world of zero institution costs is analogous to the point that in such a world all market
transactions could be undertaken in one giant firm, and vice versa. See Ronald H. Coase,
The Nature of the Firm, 4 Economica (N.S.) 386 (1937), reprinted in Coase, The Firm,
supra note 80, at 37-46. Cheung makes a related point that in a zero-transaction-cost
world there would be no need for a market or property rights. See Steven N.S. Cheung,
The Transaction Costs Paradigm, 36 Econ. Inquiry 514, 518-20 (1998).
87. See supra Part I.B.
88. That is, the total information costs required to implement an in personam right
divided by the number of parties bound by the right-duty relationship is relatively high
compared to in rem rights. See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
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ships with respect to particular uses of resources and to assign these rights
and duties to particular persons. The "deal" that the parties must articu-
late in specifying these rights and duties is thus relatively elaborate. Iden-
tifying the affected persons, defining the permitted uses, understanding
those definitions, and monitoring for compliance all entail the expendi-
ture of resources.
On the other hand, in personam rights typically entail few external
costs for third parties. In most cases the information costs associated with
in personam rights will be limited to those incurred by the parties them-
selves. Since third parties are ordinarily not bound by the rights and obli-
gations created, they ordinarily will not need to acquire information to
understand those rights and obligations. 89
Given the high value associated with flexibility in prescribing particu-
lar use rights, and the absence of third-party effects, we would expect the
law to encourage customization of in personam rights in order to maxi-
mize the value of these reciprocal obligations to the parties. This leads us
to expect that the primary means of conserving on the need to acquire
information in making and enforcing contracts would be through the
adoption of off-the-rack "default rules." These are outcomes that the law
specifies as governing the relationship absent a contrary agreement by
the parties.90 Thus, the parties need not foresee every eventuality, nor
need they negotiate rules where they see no need to modify the default.
Nor need they acquire information if they know that the default will not
surprise them with an unseen trap; knowledge that there is a system of
defaults can obviate a great deal of precaution. In truly in personam situ-
ations where information is costly and there are no special problems such
as bilateral monopoly, the background rules need only be defaults of one
sort or another rather than immutable rules. The parties to the in per-
sonam relation can either adopt the law's defaults, or if they wish, substi-
tute a provision more suited to their particular circumstances.
We would expect a major class of these defaults to be "majoritarian,"
meaning that they seek to identify the rule that most parties would prefer
to adopt to govern their relationship, if they could costiessly negotiate on
the subject.91 Some defaults may be penalty defaults, which seek to force
an informationally advantaged party to contract around the default and
89. The fact that parties are not bound by these rights does not mean that they will
never gather any information on these rights. Competitors, customers, or others who
interact with the parties may gather information on rights which affect them but do not
bind them.
90. See supra note 10 and sources cited therein.
91. The issue is more complicated than simply counting up the preferences of
contracting parties, since this ignores the disparate costs of contracting around or of
failing to contract around default rules. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Majoritarian vs.
Minoritarian Defaults, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 1591, 1600 (1999); David Charny, Hypothetical
Bargains: The Normative Structure of Contract Interpretation, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 1815,
1849 (1991). We do not address this complication here.
[Vol. 101:773
THE PROPERTY/CONTRA CT INTERFACE
thereby reveal information to the informationally disadvantaged party.9 2
Even if contracting on the issue does not occur, the uninformed party will
enjoy the benefit of the default and so will have less incentive to make
costly inquires to avoid potential pitfalls. In a few circumstances involving
in personam relations, the law will adopt immutable rules, particularly in
the areas of fraud, duress, unconscionability, and the nature of the con-
tracting process itself, often in order to assure that the rights and obliga-
tions are truly consensual.93 General knowledge of the existence of such
a system of default and immutable rules (rather than its details) will con-
serve on information gathering: A rationally ignorant party will need to
make fewer inquiries to avoid traps.
We would also expect to observe significant variation in default rules
both over time and from one legal context to another. This again follows
from the importance attached to flexibility where in personam obliga-
tions are chosen and from the general absence of third-party effects. As
the nature of economic activity evolves and the assessment of the costs
and benefits of particular activities changes, we would expect to see
changes in majoritarian and penalty default rules. Similarly, there is no
reason why we would expect to find the same default rules in different
areas of economic activity. What makes sense for employment contracts
may not make sense for construction contracts, and vice versa. Thus, we
would predict that majoritarian and penalty defaults will differ from one
area of in personam obligation to another.9 4 The principal question for
the legal system will be identifying the point at which the fine-tuning of
defaults ceases to be cost effective.
This complex and mutating menu of default rules is made possible
by the fact that these rules will be of primary concern only to the con-
tracting parties. Since such rules typically will not impose large informa-
tional costs on third parties, the law is free to indulge in a larger variety of
rules and in changes in rules over time. This is especially true in private
dispute resolution between members of an industry. Thus, for example,
the diamond industry can adopt rules for the private adjudication of dis-
putes that are unique to the industry, without imposing significant costs
on those who contract in other industries. 95 The costs of processing in-
92. Ayres & Gertner, Filling Gaps, supra note 10, at 112-15.
93. See supra note 10 and sources cited therein.
94. Both majoritarian and penalty defaults can be said to seek to maximize value of
the in personam relation-taking into account the parties' ability to economize on inquiry
costs-in situations where the design (and possibly the application) of the default requires
detailed knowledge of the characteristics of the other party, what information they possess,
or other information. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency
and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules, 101 Yale L.J. 729, 765-66 (1992) [hereinafter
Ayres & Gertner, Contractual Inefficiency]; Schwartz, Default Rule, supra note 10, at
390-98 (arguing that many "problem-solving" default rules make excessive informational
demands on officials).
95. Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations
in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. Legal Stud. 115, 115 (1992) (indicating that "[tihe
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formation about industry-specific default rules will be largely confined to
the parties themselves, greatly reducing the potential for confusion that
would likely arise if a large and indefinite class of dutyholders had to
process information about a variegated menu of default rules.
In rem rights entail lower information costs, at least on a unit-cost
basis. To create an in rem right it is necessary only to specify particular
resources and to identify one person as the manager (owner) of the re-
sources. The "deal" here is much simpler. It confers general exclusion-
ary rights on the owner and then leaves it to the owner's discretion to
establish use rights. To be sure, the resource itself must be defined, this
definition must be understood by a large and indefinite class of
dutyholders, and there will be monitoring for compliance. But the legal
specification of the right stops with the identification of the resource and
a few simple rights of exclusion. The legal rules do not concern them-
selves with use rights or identification of persons entitled to engage in
particular uses. In these respects, in rem rights conserve on information
gathering and processing costs.
Nevertheless, because in rem rights impinge upon a very large and
open-ended class of third persons, the legal rules must be designed so as
to minimize the information-cost burden imposed on a great many per-
sons beyond those who are responsible for setting up the right. This sug-
gests that standardized rights will be strongly encouraged, since a
proliferation of forms will magnify the information costs to the third par-
ties who must respect the rights so created. A system of in rem rights will
thus generally require that the parties adopt one of a small number of
standard forms that define the legal dimensions of their relationship. 96
And the substantive rights and duties associated with in rem rights will
typically be immutable, meaning that they are not subject to revision by
agreement.
The fact that the identity of the dutyholders is indefinite also magni-
fies the information costs. Where in personam rights are concerned, the
identities of the parties who have rights and duties are specified when the
right is created. This means that the person establishing the right can
investigate the dutyholder, draw upon past experience, reputation evi-
dence, or other factors, before determining whether to impose a duty of
performance. In contrast, holders of in rem rights do not know the iden-
tity of the dutyholders ex ante. As a result, the attributes of those persons
who will come into contact with and may potentially violate the right are
also unknown. This helps explain why in rem rights are always simple
duties of abstention. The quality of performance of positive duties de-
diamond industry has systematically rejected state-created law," and instead has "developed
an elaborate, internal set of rules, complete with distinctive institutions and sanctions, to
handle disputes among industry members").
96. This is the numerus clausus principle described in supra note 11. See also Merrill
& Smith, supra note 9, at 3-4.
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pends critically on the attributes of the individual performing such obli-
gations, making it inappropriate to cast such a duty on the world at large.
Because in rem rights are binding on an indefinite class of persons,
the rules must communicate information about the scope of protected
rights to this large universe of interests at acceptable costs. This means
that substantive legal norms associated with in rem rights are more likely
to be expressed as rules that turn on one or a small number of publicly
observable states of fact, and thus are formalistic or bright-line in charac-
ter. The common law rule that the person in possession of a resource is
presumed to have a property right is one example. 97 The rule of strict
liability for intentional or continuing trespass to land as defined by the ad
coelum maxim is another. 98
2. Intermediate Situations. - We can also offer some general predic-
tions about intermediate situations that partake of some features of in
personam and some features of in rem rights. As noted in Part I, we can
isolate two types of intermediate situations: compound-paucital (in which
rights avail against numerous identified persons) and quasi-multital (in
which rights avail against singular, unidentified persons). In reality, in-
termediate situations will vary along both dimensions (definiteness and
numerosity), and thus will reflect various way stations along a continuum
between the pure in personam and pure in rem modalities of rights. De-
97. See, e.g., Russell v. Hill, 34 S.E. 640, 640 (N.C. 1899) ("[A]s possession is the
strongest evidence of the ownership, property may be presumed from possession.").
Commentators have noted that the concept of possession, which is critical both in
establishing rights to unowned resources and as a proxy for ownership in everyday life, is
defined in terms of acts that are likely to provide clear notice to the world of a unique
claim to a resource. Richard A. Epstein, Possession as the Root of Title, 13 Ga. L. Rev.
1221, 1222-23 (1979) (arguing that because of courts' modest remedial powers their
"definition of rights is therefore apt to be made along certain 'natural lines'; there will be
broad general propositions that can apply to all against all, and there will be no reference
to the numbers or formulas . . . that can be generated by direct administrative controls,
such as zoning"); Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev.
73, 88 (1985) (concluding that the standards for determining possession are based on "a
specific vocabulary within a structure of symbols approved and understood by a
commercial people").
98. The full statement of the maxim is cujus est solum, jus est usque ad coelum et ad
inferos (he who owns the soil owns also to the sky and to the depths). The maxim is
routinely followed in resolving issues about ownership of air rights, building
encroachments, overhanging trees limbs, mineral rights, and so forth. See, e.g., Harding v.
Bethesda Reg'l Cancer Treatment Ctr., 551 So. 2d 299, 302 (Ala. 1989) (finding that under
ad coelum rule surface owner has the right to remove overhanging tree limbs and intruding
tree roots); Peters v. Archambault, 278 N.E.2d 729, 730 (Mass. 1972) (holding that surface
owner has right to mandatory injunction against building encroachment); Edwards v. Sims,
24 S.W.2d 619, 620 (Ky. 1929) (stating that under ad coelum rule owner of surface can
control access to cave immediately below the land). Certain exceptions to the maxim have
been recognized, for example an exception for airplane overflights. See Brown v. United
States, 73 F.3d 1100, 1103-04 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Thomas W. Merrill, Trespass, Nuisance, and
the Costs of Determining Property Rights, 14 J. Legal Stud. 13, 35-36 (1985). But for
work-a-day issues about what is included in the ownership of land, the maxim is assumed by
all to be the governing rule.
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tails of resource governance must be processed by (or about) either a
large or indefinite class of dutyholders in these intermediate situations.
As such, they present more widespread information costs than do in per-
sonam rights and may call for intervention by the law that goes beyond
that seen in the in personam case. Still, the informational burden is less
than in the case of in rem rights. Thus, legal intervention is likely not to
require the same strong standardization and heavy use of immutable
rules characteristic of the in rem modality.
In both what we have called the compound-paucital situation and
the quasi-multital situation, the parties are likely to have incomplete in-
formation, and one party may be at an especial informational disadvan-
tage, yet the problem is not likely to be severe enough to warrant full
mandatory standardization of the numerus clausus variety. In both our
stylized intermediate situations, those parties who do overcome the infor-
mational deficiency can do so in ways that do not impose costs on third
parties generally. Thus, we expect an intermediate level of intervention
in intermediate situations. This intervention will reflect the nature of the
informational problem.
In the compound-paucital case, where the identity of the parties is
definite but there are numerous parties on one side of the relationship,
two types of information problem are likely to arise. First, many of the
exact characteristics of the numerous parties on one side of the relation-
ship cannot be cost effectively known. This presents a problem for the
single party who, just as in an in personam situation, wants information
about the group as a whole in order to negotiate a contract that accounts
for those characteristics. The situation is in this respect little different
from the incentive to investigate one's contractual partner in ordinary in
personam relations. Second, the numerous parties individually may be
rationally ignorant about aspects of the contract, to a greater extent than
the singular party.99 The singular entity on the one side of the transac-
tion has a large amount at stake, equal to the individual benefit from
each transaction times the total number of parties on the other side. But
each member of the class of definite but numerous parties on the other
side has only his or her individual transaction at stake, which is certainly
small in absolute value relative to the amount that the singular entity has
at stake. This asymmetry may create opportunities for the singular entity
99. Numerosity can affect either the right-side or the duty-side of the equation. The
numerous participants in a lottery or raffle can be said to have distinct individual rights
against the sponsor of the contest; this is a case of numerous but individual rightholders
and a single dutyholder. An automobile manufacturer who provides financing to
numerous sellers illustrates the situation where there is a single rightholder and numerous
but individually identifiable dutyholders. In some circumstances, e.g., the provision of
financing for the sale of a product subject to a warranty, a single entity will have both rights
and duties against a large number of definite but similarly situated individuals.
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to exploit its superior information about the terms and conditions of the
obligation to the detriment of the class. 10 0
In the quasi-multital situation, where the number of parties is small
but the identity of one of the affected parties is indefinite, a lack of infor-
mation about the indefinite party is likely to be a problem. Such situa-
tions usually arise when one of the original contacting parties, A or B,
transfers all or part of his or her interest to a third party, C. 101 Because it
is foreseeable that this may happen, A and B can, in theory, anticipate the
problem and negotiate appropriate provisions to protect against it. But
because the identity of C is indefinite, it is difficult to foresee exactly what
issues will arise and what contingencies must be protected against. If ap-
propriate contractual provisions are not adopted to handle the contin-
gencies that arise, A or B will have to fall back on either their general in
rem rights vis-,A-vis C, or on whatever special default rules the law adopts
for dealing with these situations.
What sort of legal doctrine would we expect to find in these interme-
diate situations? Stated in its most general form, the problem is that as
rights take on more in rem features-increased numerosity and indefi-
niteness-informational demands become greater. Short of requiring
standardization to remove the extra information-processing load, the law
can adopt one of two strategies: It can either facilitate the generation of
information-the notice strategy-or it can impose a rule that favors the
uninformed party in order to reduce that party's need for information
gathering-the protection strategy.
The notice strategy entails the disclosure of new information about
one or more discrete attributes of the parties' relationship. Notice will
generally work best where information can be cost effectively produced,
but this may not happen because those who have the information do not
have sufficient incentive to produce it or disclose it, 10 2 or have a strategic
incentive to keep the information secret. 10 3 In such situations, the law
100. Whether this could in fact occur will depend on the characteristics of the
relevant market, including the fraction of those in the position of the numerous parties
who comparison shop. See infra note 111 and sources cited therein.
101. For example, where a bailee mistakenly delivers bailed goods to a third party, the
third party will incur a duty to return the goods to the bailor, but the identity of the third
party would have been unknown to the bailor ex ante.
102. This can happen, for example, because the information has a public or collective
good character. Normally, if the potential producer of the information cannot profit from
the information or its dissemination, less of it will be produced and disseminated. Jack
Hirshleifer & John G. Riley, The Analytics of Uncertainty and Information 259 (1992)
(describing traditional public-goods analysis of information and citing literature); Marcel
Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (or
"The Economics of Boilerplate"), 83 Va. L. Rev. 713, 729-36 (1997) (explaining possibility
that positive externalities conferred on later adopters would leave diminished incentive to
innovate in contractual terms).
103. This type of strategic behavior has been thoroughly explored in the literature on
penalty default rules; with respect to the issue in question, the penalty default is aimed at
the informationally advantaged party who is tempted to inflict a loss on the other party
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can force the production of information either through regulations that
mandate disclosure or through penalty default rules.10 4
The protection strategy entails the legal standardization of one or
more discrete attributes of the parties' relationship. Protection works
best when it is not cost effective to produce the missing information, gen-
erally because the individual stakes are too small to warrant the expense
of generating or processing the information. Default rules in contract
perform such a protection function: Where the law supplies a default
that uninformed parties would prefer, one effect is to reduce the need to
collect information.' 0 5 In situations where both parties are rationally un-
informed, we typically find majoritarian defaults, that is, defaults that give
the parties what they would have agreed to had they contracted over the
issue.10 6 Knowing that the law supplies such defaults, the parties can re-
main rationally ignorant. Alternatively, the uninformed party may be on
one side of the transaction only, and here we tend to find information-
forcing, penalty-default rules.10 7 Such rules tend to be justified on the
ground that they force information, 08 but they also provide protection.
In those situations where the informationally advantaged party does not
contract around the default, the uninformed party can rely on the protec-
(and shrink the contractual pie overall) in order to appropriate larger gains for himself.
Ayres & Gertner, Filling Gaps, supra note 10, at 94 (discussing strategic behavior and share-
of-pie and size-of-pie effects). Many of the situations discussed in the penalty-default
literature are compound-paucital or quasi-multital.
104. Classic examples of penalty default rules are the reasonable-foreseeability rule of
Hadley v. Baxendale for contract damages, and the zero-quantity default under the Uniform
Commercial Code. The Hadley rule can be expected, under certain assumptions, to induce
a customer to reveal supranormal damages from the loss of shipped goods. Ayres &
Gertner, Filling Gaps, supra note 10, at 112; Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Steven Shavell,
Information and the Scope of Liability for Breach of Contract: The Rule of Hadley v.
Baxendale, 7J.L. Econ. & Org. 284, 286 (1991). The "zero-quality default" refers to the
U.C.C. provision that enforcement of a sales agreement will only occur up to an amount
stated, and if parties to a sale do not specify a quantity, then the agreement may be deemed
unenforceable. U.C.C. § 2-201(1) (1999). This rule can be expected to induce
explicitness about quantity for the benefit of courts interpreting contracts for the sale of
goods. Ayres & Gertner, Filling Gaps, supra note 10, at 96-97. In contrast, the U.C.C.
provides for a reasonable price default if the parties contract for sale without being explicit
as to price. U.C.C. § 2-305(1).
105. The point is now familiar but for a very early recognition of how default rules are
in effect mandatory when parties do not make the effort to contract around them, see
Nathan Isaacs, The Standardizing of Contracts, 27 Yale LJ. 34, 38 (1917).
106. Ayres & Gertner, Filling Gaps, supra note 10, at 94.
107. See id. at 91.
108. If a penalty default is set against an informationally advantaged party, there may
be notice if the informationally advantaged party contracts around the rule. Contrast
penalty defaults that are designed to force both parties to reveal information for the
benefit of an adjudicator; the default-for example the U.C.C.'s zero-quantity default-is
set at a default neither party will want, in order to induce them to reveal the information.
Here the situation involves courts as the relevant third parties. See supra note 104 and
sources cited therein.
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non of the default. 10 9 Protection can also come about through positive
regulation, as in consumer protection laws. Thus, the case for a
mandatory warranty is strongest where most consumers would like a war-
ranty, but too few find it worthwhile to inform themselves about available
warranties or incur the expense of comparison shopping on this basis;
here the regulatory mandate can supply a protective term.
We would further predict compound-paucital relations and quasi-
multital relations to coincide with one strategy or the other based on the
differing characteristics of the uninformed party in each situation.
Under either strategy, the legal doctrine in intermediate cases will gener-
ally fall short of the mandatory standardization of in rem rights but there
will be a tendency towards increased standardization as the numbers or
indefiniteness of third parties increases.
We would expect compound-paucital situations to tend in the direc-
tion of the protection strategy. This is because the stakes for the numer-
ous parties on one side of the relationship are apt, in most cases, to be
too small to justify much processing of information over any but the most
salient issues. 110 Of course, there are a number of solutions to the prob-
lem of rational ignorance, many of which do not entail legal intervention,
such as the development of tradenames and trademarks that are associ-
ated with reputations for honesty and reliability, the rise of informational
intermediaries, or simply relying upon sophisticated marginal consum-
ers.1"1 But as a positive matter, we would expect to find that compound-
109. Penalty defaults tend to be "strong" default rules. See, e.g., Ayres & Gertner,
Filling Gaps, supra note 10, at 120-24 (noting spectrum of default rules in contract law
with a range of strength according to how explicit one must be to contract around the
default); Zamir, supra note 10, at 1738 (describing areas in which defaults are strong). In
general, the contract literature speaks of defaults as becoming stronger as they become
more difficult to contract around because the law requires more explicit action to do so.
"Strength" is a matter of degree with a mandatory rule being the strongest. If parties are
not likely to contract around a default, the rule mainly ensures protection for the
informationally disadvantaged party. Conversely, if parties are likely to contract around a
default (for example, because it is not costly or is very advantageous to do so), then notice
is being emphasized.
110. If consumers cannot process great quantities of information, new information
may be ignored or may crowd out other information. See, e.g., Richard Craswell,
Interpreting Deceptive Advertising, 65 B.U. L. Rev. 657, 690-91 (1985) (noting
controversy over information overload theory under which more information can cause
recipients to ignore all information, but noting possible crowding out effect of mandatory
information).
111. It is not necessary for all of the numerous parties in the compound-paucital
situation to inform themselves; some minimum subset will do. For a detailed treatment of
the circumstances under which features of contracts like product warranties will or will not
be supplied by the market, see Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Imperfect Information in
Markets for Contract Terms: The Examples of Warranties and Security Interests, 69 Va. L.
Rev. 1387, 1401-29 (1983) (proposing that regulatory efforts aim at promoting disclosure
of information to consumers and comparison shopping rather than banning of certain
contract terms to protect uninformed consumers); see also Richard Craswell, Passing on
the Costs of Legal Rules: Efficiency and Distribution in Buyer-Seller Relationships, 43
Stan. L. Rev. 361, 362, 368-85 & n.35 (1991) (discussing circumstances under which costs
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paucital situations will incline with some frequency toward the protection
strategy.' 12
Conversely, we would expect to find that quasi-multital situations
tend to be associated with notice strategies. Because it is possible to antic-
ipate third-party transfers by contract, mandatory protection rules are
generally inappropriate here. At the same time, because the identity of
the third party is indefinite, and the problems that the transferee will
present are difficult to anticipate, the rules should be designed to protect
the interests of the nontransferring party. Together, these considerations
suggest that it will ordinarily make sense for the law to encourage disclo-
sure of information by the transferring party as a way of overcoming in-
formational problems, rather than to impose protective rules. This does
not mean, of course, that notice will always be the preferred strategy in
quasi-multital situations. There may be circumstances in which the stakes
are too low tojustify much ex ante contracting over a particular issue, in
which case a protection strategy might make more sense here, as it does
in the typical compound-paucital situation. We would also expect that, in
many cases, the notice strategy will incorporate a protective element, such
that a failure to disclose would result in the imposition of a rule favorable
to the nontransferring party, as is the case with the typical penalty default
rule. ' 3 Such a protective rule allows parties to transact without being
of a mandatory rule are passed on and arguing against the intuition that "buyers are more
likely to benefit from a rule if sellers are unable to pass along much of their costs");
Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, 41 Md. L.
Rev. 563, 614-21 (1982) (discussing inequality of bargaining power); Alan Schwartz &
Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and
Economic Analysis, 127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 630, 646-58 (1979) (employing economics of
information models to ascertain which criteria justify market intervention); Henry E.
Smith, Ambiguous Quality Changes from Taxes and Legal Rules, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 647,
702-15 (2000) (arguing that price movements after the imposition of mandatory
contractual terms are ambiguous where quality is variable).
112. Perhaps the classic illustration of a protection strategy imposed by regulation in
the compound-paucital situation is provided by the filed-rate doctrine of public utility and
common carrier law. See generally Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great
Transformation of Regulated Industries Law, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 1323, 1330-33 (1998)
(analyzing the origins of the filed-rate doctrine in the context of regulated industries law).
Under this doctrine, utilities and common carriers must establish their rates and services in
standard form contracts called tariffs, which must be made available on equal and
nondiscriminatory terms to all customers. Deviations from the filed tariff are not
permitted, but the relevant regulatory agency is authorized to review and adjust the terms
to ensure that they are 'just and reasonable" to affected customers. See AT&T v. Central
Office Tel., Inc., 524 U.S. 214, 221-24 (1998); Maislin Indus., U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel,
Inc., 497 U.S. 116, 130-32 (1990). In effect, the singular provider of services establishes an
in personam right which is made available to a numerous class of customers, and the
customers (who remain rationally ignorant of the details of the tariff) are then protected
from exploitation by the provider through agency oversight.
113. If parties are heterogeneous, the majority rule approach may not result in overall
wealth maximization; some contracts will have higher stakes than others and some will be
more susceptible to legal intervention than others.
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detained by the need to engage in extensive inquiry in order to avoid
nasty surprises about the indefinite identity of the third party.
By breaking down in rem rights into two intermediate cases we can
sharpen our expectations about the form that legal intervention will take.
It should be remembered, however, that we are dealing with a spectrum
from in personam to in rem rights, and we will emphasize how familiar
problems of incomplete information are increasingly important as one
moves toward the in rem pole of the spectrum.
III. INSTITUTIONS ALONG THE PROPERTY/CONTRACT INTERFACE
In this Part, we review several legal institutions that exist along the
property/contract interface: bailments, landlord-tenant law, security in-
terests, and trusts. We have identified these institutions by looking to ar-
eas of the law that historically have been subject to disputes about
whether they are "truly" based on contract or on property. Our assump-
tion is that such debates mean that these institutions partake of features
that are both in personam and in rem.1 14 In each of our four areas, we
will begin with a brief look at the history and general structure of the
institution, and will then review examples of the legal treatment of situa-
tions implicating in personam, intermediate, and in rem relations.
Drawing on the discussion in Part II, we can articulate the following
hypotheses regarding the structure of legal rules within these test institu-
tions. In terms of independent variables, we seek to identify four proto-
typical situations within each of these institutions: (1) pure in personam
relations, where a single identified person has rights against and is owed
duties by another identified person; (2) compound-paucital relations,
where a single identified person has rights against or is owed duties by a
large number of identified persons; (3) quasi-multital relations, where a
single identified person has rights against or is owed a duty by a single
person of indefinite identity; and (4) pure in rem relations, where a sin-
gle person has rights against and is owed duties by a large and indefinite
class of persons.
Our dependent variable is the nature of the legal doctrine adopted
in any particular situation. Our general hypothesis is that in personam
relations will be governed by rules similar to those associated with the law
of contract, in rem relations will be governed by rules similar to those
associated with the law of property; and intermediate relations will adopt
protection strategies and notice strategies designed to overcome interme-
diate-level informational problems, with greater standardization as the
problems take on more of an in rem character. More specifically, we
would predict the following:
114. Our list is not exhaustive. For example, we have omitted easements, real
covenants, and equitable servitudes, concluding that they are better left for separate
treatment at a later date.
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(1) In the in personam situation the legal regime will tend to (a)
enforce any express agreement between the parties in accor-
dance with its terms; (b) where no express agreement exists,
adopt default rules that, directly or indirectly, plausibly maxi-
mize the joint wealth of the parties.
(2) In the compound-paucital situation, the legal regime will tend to
adopt contract rules modified by rules designed to redress
problems of incomplete information associated with rational ig-
norance, with the predominant strategy being rules designed to
protect numerous parties with incomplete information from ex-
ploitation by singular parties armed with better information.
(3) In the quasi-multital situation, the legal regime will tend to
adopt contract rules modified by rules designed to address the
incomplete information associated with the presence of an in-
definite party, with the predominant strategy being rules de-
signed to compel notice of critical information to nontransfer-
ring parties with incomplete information.
(4) In the in rem situation, legal regimes will tend to (a) endorse
formalistic rules that define resources in easily ascertained ways
and that impose negative duties of abstention with respect to
these resources that are uniform and easy to understand; (b)
treat these rules as immutable, meaning that they are not subject
to modification by contract.
These predictions are summarized in Figure 2.
FIGuRE 2. PREDICTED LEGAL RULES
Numerosity
Nonnumerous Numerous
Definiteness Definite Paucital: Default Compound-paucital:
Rules Protection Strategy
Indefinite Quasi-multital: Notice Multital: Immutable
I Strategy bright-line rules
We do not expect to find that the legal doctrine of each of our four
institutions would correspond exactly to the predicted pattern. But we
hypothesize that the degree of correspondence will serve as a test of the
power of our underlying theory about information costs and the differ-
ences between property and contract rules. If we find little evidence of
the predicted pattern, but simply a blend or hash of contract and prop-
erty principles, then this will tend to suggest that our theory is relatively
weak-discernible perhaps in the pure contract and pure property situa-
tions from which we have drawn it, but subject to dilution by other forces
and considerations we have not identified. If we find the predicted pat-
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tern repeated among all or even several of these institutions, then this will
tend to suggest that our theory is more powerful.
Our choice of legal institutions and doctrines for review is, by neces-
sity, selective. Thus, we cannot prove with any certainty that the patterns
we detect hold throughout each institution, or would be replicated if
other institutions were considered. Nevertheless, we have endeavored to
identify four institutions that are widely regarded as falling along the bor-
derline between contract and property, and legal issues within those insti-
tutions that arise with some frequency and have been regarded by com-
mentators as being of central importance to each institution.
Also, we readily admit that in many instances it is possible to cite
alternative functional explanations for the doctrines we discuss. We do
not deny that these explanations may have some validity. We are inter-
ested in determining whether the larger pattern of legal doctrine within
these borderline institutions either does or does not conform to the in-
formation-cost demands associated with the underlying structure of
rights. Thus, the fact that some individual doctrines may have additional
explanations, and hence may from our perspective be overdetermined,
does not necessarily undermine the inquiry we undertake.
A. Bailment
A bailment is the rightful possession of a thing for a particular pur-
pose by one who is not the owner.'1 5 Familiar examples include clothing
given to a dry cleaning shop for cleaning, an automobile handed over to
a valet for parking, or securities transferred to a broker for sale on an
exchange. Bailment clearly falls along the property/contract interface
under our criterion of identification. Some commentators, including
Blackstone and Story, have maintained that all bailments must be
grounded in express or implied contract.1 1 6 Other commentators, most
notably Williston, have noted that bailment duties can arise in situations,
such as a finding of lost property, where it is utterly implausible to say
that any contract exists.1 17 This leads to the conclusion that bailment
should be regarded as a type of property right.
115. See R.H. Helmholz, Bailment Theories and the Liability of Bailees: The Elusive
Uniform Standard of Reasonable Care, 41 U. Kan. L. Rev. 97, 97 (1992).
116. See 2 Blackstone, supra note 66, at *452-*454 (defining bailment as "a delivery
of goods in trust, upon a contract expressed or implied, that the trust shall be faithfully
executed on the part of the bailee");Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Law of Bailments
§ 2, at 5 Games Schouler ed., 9th ed. 1878) (defining bailment as "a delivery of a thing in
trust for some special object or purpose, and upon a contract, express or implied, to
conform to the object or purpose of the trust").
117. See 9 Samuel Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts § 1030, at 875
(Walter H.E. Jaeger ed., 3d ed. 1967) (defining bailment as "the rightful possession of
goods by one who is not the owner"); see also William King Laidlaw, Principles of
Bailment, 16 Cornell L.Q. 286, 287 (1931) ("Although it is frequently said that bailment is
founded upon contract, the actual decisions show that it is not so founded.").
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Our objective is not to resolve this definitional dispute. Rather, we
are interested in testing the hypothesis that borderline institutions will
resemble contract law insofar as the structure of rights is in personam
with its narrower informational effects, but will mutate into more prop-
erty-like forms as the structure of rights becomes in rem, with corre-
spondingly widespread information-cost implications.
All bailments are grounded in some kind of voluntary undertaking
by the bailee to take possession of the bailor's property; consequently, the
bailee's obligation to the bailor is always in personam in nature. 1 8 It is
more difficult to see how bailment implicates in rem relations, but they
are also present. The bailor transfers possession to the bailee for a partic-
ular purpose, but most other attributes of property are retained by the
bailor. In other words, most in rem rights associated with the ownership
of property-including the right to exclude others, the power to sell the
chattel to third parties, the power to transmit the chattel upon death, and
so forth-are retained by the bailor. 19 Both the bailee and the large and
indefinite class of persons who make up "the rest of the world" are obli-
gated to respect these retained in rem rights.
Given that these in rem rights are unaffected by the bailment, the
institution of bailment creates a pervasive problem of ostensible owner-
ship.' 20 Ordinarily, possession of chattels signifies ownership.12 ' If one
drives around in a certain car, or has a certain painting hanging in one's
house, third parties will justifiably assume that one owns the car or the
painting. Bailees have possession of chattels but do not have ownership
rights. Thus, the institution of bailment creates a serious danger of con-
fusion on the part of third parties. One concern is that bailees may take
advantage of this confusion to convert the bailor's property. At the very
118. In the case of a bailment for hire, the bailee's duty rests on contract. Gratuitous
bailments are those voluntary bailments in which the bailee receives no explicit or implicit
consideration, current or prospective. See Kurt Philip Autor, Note, Bailment Liability:
Toward a Standard of Reasonable Care, 61 S. Cal. L. Rev. 2117, 2119 n.2 (1988) (spelling
out common law definition and citing cases). See generally 8A Am. Jur. 2d Bailments § 1
(1997) (discussing legal possibility of gratuitous bailment). Bailments created by a finding
of lost property can be said to rest on the bailee's voluntary undertaking upon assuming
possession and control of the lost object. See id. § 39 (discussing nature of bailment in
finder cases); Joseph H. Beale, Jr., Gratuitous Undertakings, 5 Harv. L. Rev. 222, 224
(1891) (noting lack of consent by loser of property in finder situation and implying
consent by finder); Laidlaw, supra note 117, at 287 (same). In the case of finders, the
identity of the owner is indefinite, making this case closer to what we have called quasi-
multital than in personam.
119. The exception, of course, is the right of use. While all other ownership rights are
retained by the bailor, the transfer of possession to the bailee means that in practice the
bailor is unable to exercise the right to use for the duration of the bailment. For example,
the owner of a book loaned out to another will be unable to exercise the right to use the
book while it is in the bailee's hands.
120. On the general problem of ostensible ownership in law, see Richard A. Epstein,
Inducement of Breach of Contract as a Problem of Ostensible Ownership, 16J. Legal Stud.
1, 10-15 (1987) [hereinafter Epstein, Inducement].
121. See supra note 97.
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least, third parties who have dealings with either bailors or bailees may
incur higher information costs if bailees conceal the limits of their au-
thority. For example, persons who are interested in acquiring ownership
of similar objects will incur higher information costs if bailees as a class
have a tendency to act like owners-more investigation will be required
to make sure that persons who purport to be owners are not in fact errant
bailees. Although bailment gives rise to a variety of legal issues, we focus
here on the most frequently litigated issue-the question of the bailee's
responsibility for loss or destruction of the property.
1. In Personam Relations. - The first place to look in determining the
bailee's responsibility for loss or destruction is to examine the express or
implied undertaking of the bailee. Insofar as the parties have made an
express agreement establishing the bailee's duty of care, that agreement
will generally be enforced according to its terms.1 22 More significant for
our purposes are the rules that apply if the parties have failed to specify
the standard of care. Bailment law historically adopted different stan-
dards of care depending on the nature of the bailment. Gratuitous bail-
ments for the benefit of the bailor were distinguished from gratuitous
bailments for the benefit of the bailee, and both were distinguished from
bailments for hire. 123 Commentators have long urged that these distinc-
tions be eliminated, and replaced with a single uniform standard of
care-a duty of reasonable care, or a negligence standard. 124 At the level
of official doctrine, the decisional law appears to have moved far toward
embracing this position.' 2 5
A standard of reasonable care is consistent with what our theory
would predict we would find where the structure of the relationship is in
personam. General contract law precepts suggest that the law will adopt
the standard that the parties would most likely agree upon if they could
122. See Ray Andrews Brown, The Law of Personal Property § 11.5, at 274 (Walter B.
Raushenbush ed., 3d ed. 1975) (noting that bailors and bailees are generally free to vary
terms of bailee's liability by contract); cf. Charles C. Arensberg, Limitation by Bailees and
by Landlords of Liability for Negligent Acts, 51 Dick. L. Rev. 36, 37 (1946) (noting that a
bailee under Pennsylvania law may stipulate against his own negligence if stipulation is the
essence of the contract").
123. See Brown, supra note 122, § 11.1, at 255-57; Autor, supra note 118, at 2128-29.
Roman law adopted an even more complex six-part classification, which was seemingly
endorsed as a matter of common law in Coggs v. Bernard, 2 Ld. Raym. 909, 912-13, 92
Eng. Rep. 107, 108 (KB. 1703). Brown, supra note 122, § 11.1, at 252-55.
124. See, e.g., Autor, supra note 118, at 2151 (proposing adoption of "the standard of
reasonable care as a uniform measure for determining liability" of bailees).
125. See Helmholz, supra note 115, at 99. The difference between the old approach
(different standards of care for different categories of bailments) and the new approach (a
single standard of reasonable care for all bailments) may be more apparent than real. This
is because the factors singled out by the old approach-such as whether the bailment was
gratuitous or for hire, and whether it was for the benefit of the bailor or the bailee-are
circumstances that can be argued to the trier of fact under the new approach in calibrating
what constitutes reasonable care under the circumstances.
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costlessly negotiate over the issue. 126 A standard of reasonable care or
negligence presumably encourages an efficient degree of care by the
bailee, which in turn maximizes the joint value associated with the bail-
ment. Thus, this standard is plausibly the one the parties would agree
upon if they were to negotiate a standard. 127
Moreover, because the issue arises in an in personam context, it is
appropriate that the parties be allowed to modify this standard by con-
tract. The relevant interests, present and future, are fully represented by
the two parties, and their judgment about the appropriate standard of
care is probably more accurate, over the run of cases, than would be that
of any external arbiter such as a court. And in fact, we find that the negli-
gence standard is understood to be a default rule subject to express modi-
fication by the parties' agreement. 128
2. Intermediate Relations. - Bailment also gives rise to relations that
can be described as compound-paucital or quasi-multital. Bailees who
deal in large numbers of standardized transactions, such as parking lots
and coat check rooms, frequently issue receipts or tickets that seek to
define the terms of the bailment agreement. This is a classic compound-
paucital situation: The identities of the parties are definite and the rights
and duties attach to particular persons, but there are large numbers of
bailors engaged in identical transactions with a single bailee. Such rela-
tionships are generally characterized by asymmetric information, and not
surprisingly, we find that the receipts and tickets issued by bailees in these
situations often seek to disclaim the bailment relationship or to impose
very low limits on the bailee's liability.129
Given the compound-paucital nature of the relationship, we would
expect to find the law intervening to regulate these sorts of disclaimers,
either by requiring prominent disclosure (the notice strategy) or by inval-
idating such disclaimers (the protection strategy). Because bailors in
such circumstances usually have rather small stakes in the transaction
(once the value of the bailed good is discounted by the probability of loss
or destruction), it is not plausible to expect much ex ante contracting
over the precise terms of standard form disclaimers of liability. Protec-
tion thus seems a more plausible strategy in this context. In fact, we find
126. See Ayres & Gertner, Filling Gaps, supra note 10, at 89-90 (summarizing
literature).
127. See Posner, supra note 66, at 104-05 (explaining why the parties have a mutual
interest in minimizing the cost of performance under a contract).
128. See Brown, supra note 122, § 11.5, at 274.
129. The two most widely used devices are to characterize the relationship as a license
rather than a bailment, e.g., Allen v. Hyatt Regency-Nashville Hotel, 668 S.W.2d 286,
288-90 (Tenn. 1984) (discussing whether owner of car stolen from a self-park garage was a
bailor or a licensee), or to limit liability to a particular dollar amount of loss, e.g., Allright,
Inc. v. Elledge, 508 S.W.2d 864, 869 (Tex. App. 1974) (refusing to enforce contract
limiting liability of garage for loss or damage to car to $100). See generally A. Darby
Dickerson, Note, Bailor Beware: Limitations and Exclusions of Liability in Commercial
Bailments, 41 Vand. L. Rev. 129, 138-55 (1988).
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evidence of fairly widespread legislative intervention to regulate limita-
tions on liability on the part of bailees in these situations, 3 0 and some
evidence of judicial policing through doctrines such as
unconscionability. 13 1
Bailment also gives rise to relations that can be described as quasi-
multital. Consider in this connection cases involving misdelivery of
bailed goods. Misdelivery occurs when the bailee mistakenly hands the
property over to a third party without the bailor's consent. The bailor (in
the typical case) has a contractual relationship with the bailee. But the
bailor cannot enter into a contract with the third party, at least not at the
time the bailment takes place, because the identity of the third party at
that time is indefinite. The bailor's relationship with the third party will
be governed by the bailor's general in rem rights against "all the world."
Pursuant to these rights, the bailor is of course entitled to demand that
the third party return the goods or make good for their loss. But the
third party may be difficult to locate, or may be judgment-proof.
Although the bailor cannot contract directly with the third party, the
possibility of misdelivery is an issue that the bailor and bailee could ad-
dress by contract at the outset of their relationship. The parties could
specify the standard of care to which the bailee will be held in seeking to
prevent misdelivery, the damages that will be paid should misdelivery oc-
cur, and so forth. Notice, however, that both parties but especially the
bailor are likely to have incomplete information about the risk of misde-
livery, more so than with respect to the risk of loss and destruction of the
property. One problem is that there is a moral hazard dimension to mis-
delivery: Because misdelivery confers a benefit on a third party, the
bailee may be tempted to connive with a third party to "misdeliver" the
property, and it will be difficult for the bailor to prove that this has hap-
pened. At a more mundane level, the bailee will always have a better
sense for the type of controls it has in place to prevent misdelivery, and of
how difficult it will be to recover the property from the typical third party
to whom misdelivery may occur.
Given these informational asymmetries, it would not be surprising if
we found a greater degree of legal intervention in cases of misdelivery
130. Statutes often limit the ability of bailees who are common carriers, hotels, and
the like, to limit their liability, see 14 Am. Jur. 2d Carriers §§ 1255-67 (2000), and
sometimes prevent commercial parties such as auto parks from disclaiming or limiting
their liability by contract, see, e.g., Mass. Gen. L. ch. 231, § 85M (West 1972); Commodore
Leasing, Inc. v. Metro. Dist. Comm'n, 450 N.E.2d 1097, 1098 n.1 (Mass. App. Ct. 1983).
More general statutory provisions may also constrain the ability of commercial parties to
adopt liability limitations, see, e.g., Cal. Com. Code § 1102(3) (West Supp. 2001)
(providing that U.C.C. general obligation of good faith, diligence, reasonableness, and
care may not be disclaimed, but agreement can alter the standard to measure these duties
if not unreasonable).
131. See Carr v. Hoosier Photo Supplies, Inc., 441 N.E.2d 450, 454-56 (Ind. 1982)
(upholding limitation of liability of photo processor and distinguishing decisions finding
such limitations printed on receipts unconscionable).
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than with respect to ordinary loss and destruction of bailed goods. As it
turns out, the traditional rule is that bailees are strictly liable for misdeliv-
ery, as opposed to the standard of reasonable care that prevails with re-
spect to loss or destruction.13 2 Commentators have sometimes found the
higher standard of care applied in cases of misdelivery puzzling.13 3 The
difference cannot be explained in terms of the degree of harm to the
bailor. The bailor loses the property in either case. Indeed, the loss is if
anything less severe in the case of misdelivery, because there is some
chance that the property can be recovered from the third party who has
erroneously received it.
The higher standard of care that traditionally applies to misdelivery
begins to make more sense, however, once we realize that misdelivery is a
quasi-multital situation that entails greater uncertainty because of the in-
troduction of the indefinite third party. The rule of strict liability seeks to
correct for the unequal information between the bailor and bailee about
the risk of transfer to a third party. Strict liability here serves to protect
the bailor much in the way a penalty default rule protects the informa-
tionally disadvantaged party in the law of contracts.
If the strict liability standard were subject to waiver upon express ne-
gotiation of a contrary rule as part of the bailment agreement, then the
analogy to penalty default rules would be complete: The rule would ei-
ther force the bailee to disclose additional information about the risk of
misdelivery, or failing notice, would provide protection against the risk of
misdelivery. The case law, however, while admittedly not extensive, sug-
gests that the standard of strict liability for misdelivery is not subject to
waiver. Professor Helmholz reports in a recent survey of the cases that
bailees who have sought to take advantage of contract terms limiting lia-
bility in cases involving misdelivery "have generally failed. ' '134 In other
words, the law appears to adopt a protection strategy here rather than a
notice strategy, contrary to our general prediction about the expected
rules in quasi-multital situations.
At first blush, this seems anomalous. Given the contractual relation-
ship between the bailor and bailee, the bailor can in theory account for
the risk of misdelivery by adjusting the compensation of the bailee or
making arrangements for insurance. For example, a bailor who agrees to
a standard of negligence for misdelivery by a dry cleaning shop can ex-
pect to pay less for cleaning services than would be the case if the shop
132. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 234 (1965); Brown, supra note 122, at
§ 11.7.
133. See Helmholz, supra note 115, at 99 (stating that "[ilt is hard to see any good
reason" for the distinction). A number of cases have applied the reasonable care standard
to the misdelivery situation. See id. at 124-27 nn.127-39 (citing authorities). Although
Professor Helmholz, in a recent survey of the cases, found some movement in this
direction, he also reports that strict liability "remains the law applied in most of the
American cases." Id. at 129.
134. Id. at 131.
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were strictly liable for misdelivery. To be sure, because the identity of the
person to whom the property is misdelivered is indefinite ex ante, the risk
would be difficult to calculate. Shirts erroneously delivered to a neighbor
can be easily retrieved; shirts delivered to a stranger passing through
town will be gone forever. Thus, many bailors would not want to bear this
risk. Still, as long as attempts by bailees to limit their liability for misdeliv-
ery were subject to duties of especially prominent disclosure, modifica-
tions in the default rule would be permitted. 135
On further analysis, however, the immutable rule of strict liability-a
form of protection strategy-may be explainable in this context. Bail-
ments are usually routine transactions and most bailors have relatively
little at stake with respect to the risk of misdelivery of any particular
bailed good. Thus, it is doubtful that very many bailors would have an
incentive to inform themselves about benefits and costs of agreeing to a
modification of the default standard of care for misdelivery. In other
words, most misdelivery cases arise in what we have called compound-
paucital situations, pairing large numbers of bailors with small stakes in
each transaction against a bailee with much larger stakes in the aggre-
gate. If the misdelivery cases commonly have features that are com-
pound-paucital as well as quasi-multital, then the misdelivery problem
comes close to having all the elements of a pure in rem relation. A stan-
dardized protection strategy, rather than a notice strategy, is thus to be
expected.
3. In Rem Relations. - Cases involving the in rem rights of bailors are
difficult to uncover because, in the ordinary case where such rights are in
issue, the fact that the owner is also a bailor is likely to be irrelevant. For
example, suppose an owner consigns a painting to an art dealer for sale
and then the painting is stolen from the dealer by a third party. In a suit
by the owner to recover the painting from the third party, the fact that
the painting was subject to a bailment at the time of the sale is irrelevant
and will not enter into analysis of the rights of the respective parties. Still,
it is possible to detect the influence of the bailor's retained in rem rights
in decisions involving claims of conversion or contractual deviation by the
bailee. 136
The conversion and contractual deviation cases involve claims that
the bailee has acted directly contrary to the bailor's retained in rem
rights. This is easiest to see in connection with claims of conversion. The
bailee, by converting the property to his own use, is clearly violating the
duty to protect the bailor's retained in rem ownership rights. For all the
reasons usually given for treating many intentional torts more harshly
135. The hornbook rule is that all attempts to limit liability by bailees must be express
and ambiguities are construed in favor of the bailor. See 8A Am. Jur. 2d Bailments § 91
(1997). Thus, to some extent, existing law employs a strong default rule without regard to
whether the issue is negligent loss or destruction or misdelivery.
136. See Helmholz, supra note 115, at 113-24 (discussing theories of conversion and
contract deviation and cases invoking these doctrines).
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than torts of negligence, 13 7 it makes sense to seek to discourage this kind
of violation of the bailor's property rights by applying a rule of strict
liability.
Conversion also creates a problem of ostensible ownership. The
bailee, by consuming or selling the property, is in effect holding himself
forth to the world as a true owner. This gives rise to potential confusion
among third parties, causing them to incur higher information costs
about the status of property rights. To be sure, the law provides a mea-
sure of protection to third parties who purchase objects from bailees for
value without notice of the superior rights of the bailor. 138 Still, the ap-
plication of the bona fide purchaser rule in this context turns on specific
facts, such as lack of notice and whether the bailee is a merchant selling
the goods in the ordinary course of business, and thus leaves significant
residual uncertainty for third parties. 13 9 The more conversion by bailees,
the more residual uncertainty for third parties. This will cause third par-
ties to engage in more information gathering about title to property than
would be the case in a world with less conversion. These higher informa-
tion costs provide a further reason to discourage such behavior on the
part of bailees by making them strictly liable for conversion.
Somewhat less obviously, the contract deviation cases can also be
seen as entailing a direct violation of the bailor's retained in rem rights
and as creating potential confusion about ownership. These cases involve
bailees who have used the property in ways not contemplated by the bail-
ment contract. An owner, of course, is free to use property any way she
wants. A bailee is limited to using the property for the purposes defined
by the bailment agreement. A bailee who uses property in ways that devi-
ate from the agreement is acting like an owner rather than a bailee.
Whether such behavior will create confusion for third parties will depend
on the facts. But it is not implausible that in many cases-for example
where a museum allows a gallery to exhibit a painting of which the mu-
seum is merely a bailee-there is a problem of ostensible ownership. In
order to discourage this kind of behavior, it again may make sense for the
law to respond with a rule of strict liability for losses caused by contractual
deviation.
137. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure of Tort
Law 149-89 (1987) (analyzing intentional torts that involve deliberate wrongdoing or
recklessness and showing why harsher treatment is warranted than in case of negligence).
138. The general rule in America is that a bona fide purchaser cannot acquire title
from a thief. See Saul Levmore, Variety and Uniformity in the Treatment of the Good-
Faith Purchaser, 16 J. Legal Stud. 43, 57-58 (1987) [hereinafter Levmore, Variety and
Uniformity]. But the Uniform Commercial Code has relaxed this rule where the bona fide
purchaser acquires the property from someone to whom it has been "entrusted," for
example by bailment. See U.C.C. § 2-403(l)-(3) (1989 & Supp. 2000) (amended 1989);
see also Porter v. Wertz, 416 N.Y.S.2d 254, 257-58 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979) (discussing
application of 2-403(2) in a case involving bailment of a painting).
139. See U.C.C. § 2-403(2).
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If strict liability makes sense in cases of conversion and contractual
deviation, should the rule of strict liability in these cases be regarded as a
default rule or as an immutable rule? Given the general interest in dis-
couraging bailees from acting toward the property in such a way as to
create the appearance of ostensible ownership, an immutable rule would
appear to be appropriate here. Bailees who create false appearances of
ownership can cause confusion among a variety of third parties who deal
with the bailee, the bailor, or the property. Because of high transaction
costs, these third parties cannot negotiate offsetting adjustments to ac-
count for the additional confusion. Thus, arguably the higher standard
of care should not be subject to contractual modification.
The law appears to be largely in accord. It should come as no sur-
prise that the courts have held that liability for conversion cannot be
waived by contract.' 40 As Helmholz notes, "In such circumstances, bail-
ees will have committed an intentional act entirely inconsistent with their
undertaking as a bailee, and it would be unjust to allow them to pay less
than the full value of the goods in consequence."' 14 1
Liability for contractual deviation, in contrast, would seem as a mat-
ter of logic to be amenable to waiver, since strict liability in these cases is
based on a theory of breach of contract. If the contract waives liability for
these claims, then there would be no breach of contract and hence no
liability. Helmholz reports, however, that limitations on liability are gen-
erally not enforced in this context either. 142 Consistently with the osten-
sible ownership concern, judges have assumed that general clauses limit-
ing liability apply only to claims for loss and destruction of bailed
property, but not to claims for losses caused by deviation from contract.
In sum, the doctrinal pattern reflected in bailment law appears to be
largely although not entirely consistent with our hypotheses. When the
relationship is purely in personam-a claim by the bailor that the bailee
has lost or destroyed property-then the law tends to apply a general
default rule of reasonable care, subject to contractual modification by the
parties' agreement. This is the type of doctrine commonly associated
with the law of contracts. In intermediate cases involving compound-
paucital and quasi-multital relations we find, as expected, evidence of sub-
stitution of rules designed to protect bailors who have incomplete infor-
mation about risks. These rules all adopt a protection strategy rather
than a notice strategy, even in the cases of quasi-multital risks. This is
contrary to our general prediction, although the deviation can perhaps
be explained by the fact that the stakes in most bailments are too small to
sustain ex ante negotiations to account for such risks. Finally, when the
140. See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Higbee Co., 76 N.E.2d 404, 408-09 (Ohio Ct. App.
1947); see also William K Jones, Private Revision of Public Standards: Exculpatory
Agreements in Leases, 63 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 717, 730 (1988) (noting that exculpatory clause
will not insulate landlord from liability for intentional misbehavior).
141. Helmholz, supra note 115, at 132.
142. Id. at 131.
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situation most clearly implicates the retained in rem rights of the bailor,
we find as predicted that the law gravitates toward an immutable rule of
strict liability, in other words, a more bright-line rule characteristic of the
type of doctrine associated with the law of property.
B. Landlord-Tenant Law
A more complex institution that straddles the boundary between
contract and property is landlord-tenant law. As in the law of bailments,
there is a longstanding debate over whether leases should be classified as
a contract or as the conveyance of an estate in land, i.e., a property
right.14- This debate assumed considerable prominence in the 1960s and
1970s, as tenants' rights lawyers urged the wholesale revision of estab-
lished tenets of landlord-tenant law to provide greater protection for te-
nants, especially low-income tenants.1 44 A primary weapon in this cam-
paign was the contention that traditional rules of landlord-tenant law are
a vestige of outmoded "feudal" property concepts. Reformers urged that
these rules be discarded in favor of concepts associated with bilateral con-
tracts, as in the provisions governing sales of goods under the Uniform
Commercial Code. 145
The campaign was extraordinarily successful, at least for a time.
Spurred by the D.C. Circuit's decision in Javins v. First National Realty
Corp.,14 6 which fully endorsed the notion that existing landlord-tenant
rules are a product of outmoded feudalism, 147 an "implied warranty of
habitability" in residential leases spread rapidly in the early 1970s. 148
143. For overviews, see Roger A. Cunningham, The New Implied and Statutory
Warranties of Habitability in Residential Leases: From Contract to Status, 16 Urb. L. Ann.
3, 5-10 (1979) (chronicling rise of contract-type warranties of habitability); Mary Ann
Glendon, The Transformation of American Landlord-Tenant Law, 23 B.C. L. Rev. 503,
503-09 (1982).
144. See, e.g., Hicks, supra note 2, at 541-44 (discussing various remedies newly
available to urban tenants under contract theory of leases); Hiram H. Lesar, Landlord and
Tenant Reform, 35 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1279, 1289-90 (1960) (arguing for statutory and judicial
elimination of common law landlord-tenant rules in favor of contractual approach).
145. See, e.g., Glendon, supra note 143, at 503-05 (describing widespread belief
among jurists in the superiority of the contract model of lease but arguing that movement
toward contract happened earlier and is giving way to public regulation).
146. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
147. The court was emphatic in its condemnation of the property conception:
The assumption of landlord-tenant law, derived from feudal property law, that a
lease primarily conveyed to the tenant an interest in land may have been
reasonable in a rural, agrarian society . . . . But in the case of the modern
apartment dweller, the value of the lease is that it gives him a place to live.
Id. at 1074.
148. For examples of later decisions followingJavins, see, e.g., Park West Mgmt. Corp.
v. Mitchell, 391 N.E.2d 1288, 1291-95 (N.Y. 1979) ("A residential lease is essentially a sale
of shelter and necessarily encompasses those services which render the premises suitable
for the purpose for which they are leased."); Green v. Superior Court, 517 P.2d 1168,
1169-70 (Cal. 1974) ("[A] warranty of habitability is implied by law in residential leases in
California."); Marini v. Ireland, 265 A.2d 526, 534 (N.J. 1970) ("It is eminently fair and just
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Other innovations derived from contract law soon followed, such as a
general duty on the part of the landlord to mitigate damages when a
tenant defaults and abandons the premises. 149
The landlord-tenant law reform effort eventually lost steam.' 50 This
may have been due in part to the realization that the problems of low-
income tenants are more a function of general levels of employment and
income than rules of landlord-tenant law. Indeed, plausible arguments
were made that loading up on tenants' rights was not in the best interests
of low-income tenants as a class. This was because the new rights had the
potential to cause higher rents and a reduced supply of housing.15 1
Much turns on empirical issues such as the nature of the rental market,
the preferences and activities of marginal consumers, and landlords' abil-
ity to distinguish sophisticated and unsophisticated tenants, 1 52 but our
purpose in this section is merely to explain the pattern of legal interven-
tion in this area. For whatever reason, the courts drew up short of com-
pletely adopting a contract model for all situations, much to the dismay
of some commentators. 1 53 As a result, landlord-tenant law today remains
an amalgam of property-law and contract-law principles.
In retrospect, it is easy to see how certain elements of landlord-ten-
ant law were ripe for reform, and that the reform should take the form of
adopting modern contract precepts. Landlord-tenant relations have a
very large in personam aspect. Leases look like contracts, setting forth in
terms called covenants the description of the property, the length of the
term, the rent, the major promises about the condition of the property,
and so forth. These reciprocal obligations between the landlord and the
tenant can easily be seen as elements of a bilateral services contract.
Hence it is not surprising that standard contract doctrines such as mutual
to charge a landlord with the duty of warranting [a part of] a building ...rented for
residential purposes is fit for that purpose .... ); see also Cunningham, supra note 143, at
74-81 (listing cases finding implied warranty of habitability).
149. See, e.g., Austin Hill Country Realty, Inc. v. Palisades Plaza, Inc., 948 S.W.2d. 293,
295-300 (Tex. 1997); Schneiker v. Gordon, 732 P.2d 603, 610-12 (Colo. 1987); Sommer v.
Kridel, 378 A.2d 767, 769 (N.J. 1977).
150. See Gerald Korngold, Whatever Happened to Landlord-Tenant Law?, 77 Neb. L.
Rev. 703, 707-08 (1998).
151. See Charles J. Meyers, The Covenant of Habitability and the American Law
Institute, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 879, 889-97 (1975); see also Posner, supra note 66, at 514-18.
For a contrary argument, see Bruce Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing Markets on
Behalf of the Poor: Of Housing Codes, Housing Subsidies and Income Redistribution
Policy, 80 Yale L.J. 1093, 1093-1102 (1971) [hereinafter Ackerman, Regulating Slum
Housing]. But see Richard Craswell, Passing on the Costs of Legal Rules: Efficiency and
Distribution in Buyer-Seller Relationships, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 361, 380-85 (1991) (analyzing
and noting various interpretations of Ackerman's model and arguing that sellers' ability to
pass on costs is only relevant on a zero-sum redistributionist view).
152. See sources cited in supra note 111.
153. See, e.g., Robert H. Kelley, Any Reports of the Death of the Property Law
Paradigm for Leases Have Been Greatly Exaggerated, 41 Wayne L. Rev. 1563, 1568-72
(1995) (arguing that the "problem" is "courts that have stated that tenancies are to be
construed using the contract law paradigm apparently have not really meant it").
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dependency of covenants, the duty to mitigate damages, and implied war-
ranties of fitness can be adopted to resolve disputes between landlords
and tenants over the interpretation of these terms.' 54
On the other hand, it is also not surprising that courts did not adopt
a pure contract model of leases. A lease is at bottom a transfer of the
right to control the use and enjoyment of the premises from one party-
the landlord-to another-the tenant. 15 5 Indeed, probably the most im-
portant attribute of a lease from the tenant's perspective is the transfer of
in rem rights associated with ownership for the duration of the lease
term. These rights include the rights to exclude others from premises, to
use the premises as the tenant sees fit without interference from others
(subject to specific restrictions on particular uses in the lease), and to
transfer the lease interest to third parties (again, subject to specific lease
restrictions). In other words, from the tenant's perspective the largest
benefit of the in personam bargain known as a lease is the transfer of the
package of in rem rights generally associated with ownership. Given the
mixed nature of leases-they are at once contracts and conveyances of
ownership rights-we would expect courts to draw up short before en-
dorsing the proposal to make landlord-tenant law purely contractual. 156
As in the case of bailment law, our objective is not to determine
whether leases are properly classified as property or contract, but to test
whether the law in this area will take on the features of contract in those
areas where information costs are borne largely by the two parties con-
cerned (in personam rights), and will exhibit features of property law
where more widespread information costs are implicated (in rem rights).
Landlord-tenant law is complex and covers a multitude of issues. We
must therefore be less than comprehensive in our survey.
1. In Personam Relations. - We start by considering relations that ap-
pear to be wholly in personam, in the sense that they largely if not exclu-
sively affect the interests of the parties to the immediate lease-the land-
154. Many states have adopted one or more of these provisions. See, e.g., Medico-
Dental Bldg. Co. v. Horton & Converse, 132 P.2d 457, 462-65 (Cal. 1942) (adopting
mutual dependency of covenants); Sommer, 378 A.2d at 769 (adopting general duty of
landlord to mitigate damages); Hilder v. St. Peter, 478 A.2d 202, 208 (Vt. 1984) (adopting
implied warranty of habitability). The implied warranty of habitability has been adopted
most widely. See infra note 175.
155. See Olin L. Browder, The Taming of a Duty-The Tort Liability of Landlords, 81
Mich. L. Rev. 99, 100 (1982) (noting that "it is of course absurd" to contend that leases are
not in part conveyances of property rights).
156. For an example of how the "property" conception of leases can benefit even low-
income tenants, consider Grant v. Detroit Ass'n of Women's Clubs, 505 N.W.2d 254 (Mich.
1993). The club hired a caretaker as an employee at will, and gave him as his sole
compensation an interest that the court concluded was a lease in the premises. Id. at 255.
When the caretaker was fired, the court held that the lease was not automatically
terminated, but could be extinguished only by following the proper state law procedures
for terminating a leasehold. Id. at 259. In other words, the employment contract created
an interest that had the more enduring features of a property right, and this interest
outlasted the employment relationship.
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lord and the tenant. One issue that would appear to fall into this
category is the risk of physical damage to, or destruction of, the premises.
The common law rule here was defined by the law of waste. 157 The ten-
ant was under a duty to preserve the premises from damage or destruc-
tion and to return them to the landlord at the end of the lease in roughly
the same condition they were in at the beginning, reasonable wear and
tear excepted. Thus, the tenant had an implied duty to repair, unless the
premises were destroyed by a third party or an act of God. And the ten-
ant's duty to pay rent continued even in the event of a fire or other major
casualty that destroyed or severely impaired the value of the premises. 15
8
Dating from a period well before the landlord-tenant law reform
movement got underway, legislation has been adopted in nearly all juris-
dictions modifying this common law allocation of risk, at least with re-
spect to residential tenancies.1 59 These statutory reforms make sense as
attempts to identify the appropriate majoritarian rule under changing
circumstances. The old rule associated with the law of waste was probably
an accurate reflection of what most parties would negotiate for in a world
in which the paradigmatic lease was farmland and associated structures.
The tenant farmer was the proverbial 'jack of all trades" and worked on
site. The landlord was often an absentee owner, and was poorly situated
to make repairs or control for risks such as fire. 160 In contrast, in the
context of modern leases of residential property and especially apartment
rentals, the landlord is typically in a better position to make repairs and
assume the risk of major losses. Thus, the statutory reforms here reflect a
plausible calculus that the correct majoritarian rule requires a different
allocation of risk than it once did. 16 1
Note that both the original common law rule and the modern statu-
tory modifications are default rules. The traditional rule allocating the
risk of loss and destruction of the premises to the tenant was always un-
derstood to be subject to modification by contrary agreement in the
157. See 1 American Law of Property § 3.78, at 347 (1952).
158. See Paradine v. Jane, 82 Eng. Rep. 897, 897-98 (K.B. 1647).
159. See 1 Milton R. Friedman, Friedman on Leases § 9.2, at 517-28 (4th ed. 1997)
(providing a survey of the statutes, including history prior to the 1960s).
160. See Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, supra note 62, at 1373 n.291 (noting
that "[a] bsentee farm landlords appear to date back to the beginning of recorded history,"
discussing alternative landowner/occupant arrangement, and citing sources); see also, e.g.,
CorneliusJ. Moynihan, Introduction to the Law of Real Property 76 (2d ed. 1988) ("The
old rules that had their source in a rural agricultural society were found to be unsuited to
an urban society faced with a critical housing shortage."); Deborah Hodges Bell, Providing
Security of Tenure for Residential Tenants: Good Faith as a Limitation on the Landlord's
Right to Terminate, 19 Ga. L. Rev. 483, 486 (1985) (arguing that no-repair rule may have
suited earlier agricultural leases which, unlike residential leases, were largely characterized
as a conveyance of land).
161. See I Friedman, supra note 159, § 9.2, at 517; id. § 10.101, at 610 (summarizing
the argument for modifying the common law rule with respect to residential tenancies).
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lease. 162 Thus, under the traditional rule the parties were free to (and
often did) impose the duty to make repairs on the landlord, and the par-
ties were free to (and sometimes did) shift the risk of loss of rental value
due to destruction of the premises from the tenant to the landlord. Ac-
cording to the leading treatise, the statutes that change the common law
allocation of risk also universally provide that the rules are subject to
modification in the lease. 1 63 Thus, the new rules are also defaults, as we
would expect given the in personam nature of the issue.
A second in personam relationship concerns the remedies available
to landlord and tenant in the event of a breach by the other. The law
here is immensely complicated, and we can provide only the crudest out-
line of the major issues.
The early common law adopted the understanding that lease cove-
nants are independent.164 Thus, a breach of a covenant by the landlord,
for example, a covenant to supply manure to an agricultural tenant, did
not excuse the tenant from the covenant to pay rent.1 65 The tenant's
remedy was to continue paying rent and sue the landlord for damages.
Conversely, breach of a covenant by the tenant, such as the covenant to
pay rent, did not excuse the landlord from the covenant of quiet enjoy-
ment, that is, the promise to transfer undisturbed possession of the prem-
ises to the tenant for the duration of the term. The landlord's remedy
was to leave the tenant in possession until the term expired, and sue for
damages equal to unpaid rent.166
Predictably, the reformers assailed the common law rule of indepen-
dent covenants as a relic of feudalism. They urged that leases be treated
in this respect just like any other bilateral contract, in which covenants
are assumed to be dependent rather than independent. 16 7 Thus, a mate-
rial breach of a covenant by the landlord (e.g., to provide heat) would
give rise to a full menu of contract remedies on the part of the tenant,
including the possibility of rescission of the lease. On the other hand, if
the tenant defaulted on rent and abandoned the premises, the landlord
could not simply sit by and allow the claim for damages for unpaid rent to
mount. The landlord, like other promisees under the law of contract,
162. See Robert S. Schoshinski, American Law of Landlord and Tenant § 5:18, at 269
(1980).
163. See 1 Friedman, supra note 159, § 9.202, at 532-34.
164. See Paradine v. Jane, 82 Eng. Rep. 897, 897-98 (KB. 1647).
165. Cf. Sutton v. Temple, 152 Eng. Rep. 1108, 1112 (Ex. 1843) (holding that
contaminated manure pile and pasture that killed tenant's cattle did not excuse tenant
from obligation to pay rent).
166. See Schoshinski, supra note 162, § 6:1, at 377.
167. See, e.g., Hicks, supra note 2, at 464-69 (discussing rise of implied mutually
dependent lease covenants). But cf. Stephen A. Siegel, Is the Modern Lease a Contract or
a Conveyance?-A Historical Inquiry, 52 J. Urb. L. 649, 663-70 (1975) (arguing that
independence of lease covenants could "accomplish perfect justice").
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should have a duty to mitigate damages, for example by seeking a substi-
tute tenant.
168
The substance of the reform proposal was sound, but the characteri-
zation of the issue was overstated. The stark contrast between the reme-
dial rules associated with the seventeenth-century leases and those associ-
ated with modern bilateral contracts ignored the fact that the common
law in the intervening years had developed remedial doctrines, such as
constructive eviction and surrender-and-acceptance, that considerably
softened the hard edges of the original theory of independent cove-
nants. 169 Moreover, the doctrine of independent covenants had always
been regarded as a default rule subject to contractual modification. For
example, landlords have long included so-called "forfeiture" clauses in
leases that declare the tenant's right of possession forfeited upon nonpay-
ment of rent, and courts routinely enforce these clauses.' 70
Still, the reformers are probably correct that the remedial doctrine
associated with modern bilateral contracts represents a more plausible
majoritarian default than does the doctrine of independent covenants,
certainly with respect to residential tenancies, and perhaps for commer-
cial tenancies as well. 17 1 In other words, modern contract remedies are
closer to the package of remedies for which most parties would bargain if
they fully attended to the issue in negotiating the lease. Thus, concerns
about retroactivity aside, 72 it would be better to start with the assumption
that ordinary contract remedies apply, subject to negotiation of different
remedies by the parties, than to persist with the old defaults grounded in
independent covenants.
Both allocation of risk of loss and the dependence of covenants im-
plicate in personam relations and therefore do not present informational
problems to third parties. In both areas, we find evidence that the law
has shifted as the rule most parties would want has changed, yet we also
find that the law has consistently dealt with these issues through default
rules. Both findings are consistent with our general theory.
2. Intermediate Relations. - As in the case of bailment, we also see
relationships in landlord-tenant law that correspond to what we have
called the compound-paucital and quasi-multital situations. Leases of res-
idential property, especially in large apartment complexes, tend to be
168. See Sommer v. Kridel, 378 A.2d 767, 773 (N.J. 1977).
169. See 2 Friedman, supra note 159, § 16.302, at 1097-1115 (discussing surrender
and acceptance); 3 id. § 29.3, at 1635-59 (discussing constructive eviction).
170. See Schoshinski, supra note 162, § 6:1, at 380-82.
171. For an economic model of some of the considerations bearing on this question,
see Thomas J. Miceli et al., The Property-Contract Boundary: An Economic Analysis of
Leases, 3 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 165 (2001).
172. The main concern with switching defaults in this context is transitional.
Thousands of leases in every jurisdiction have been drafted with the traditional defaults in
mind, and many of these leases are still in force. See e.g., Julian v. Christopher, 575 A.2d
735, 739-41 (Md. 1998) (making change in landlord tenant law prospective only in
recognition of reliance on prior rule in drafting leases).
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standard form agreements. The landlord has a large stake in the legal
content of these leases; each tenant has a much smaller stake (in terms of
absolute dollars involved). Not surprisingly, the standard form leases
used in these circumstances tend to be drafted from a pro-landlord per-
spective. This would appear to be a classic instance of a compound-
paucital relationship, characterized by incomplete information, especially
on the part of the tenant.
The presence of this compound-paucital issue provides one possible
explanation for the emergence of the modern implied warranty of habita-
bility (IWH) in residential leases. The common law adopted a rule of
"caveat lessee" regarding the condition of the premises. Unless the prem-
ises contained some latent defect known to the landlord and not discov-
erable through reasonable inspection, the tenant took the premises "as
is." 173 The reformers attacked this rule relentlessly, with all the usual ar-
guments about how caveat lessee was the product of a bygone era when
leases were primarily agricultural, and did not make sense in the context
of modern residential tenancies.
The reformers achieved great success in reversing the doctrine of
caveat lessee, at least with respect to residential tenancies. 174 Drawing in
part on the U.C.C.'s implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for
purpose, and partly on legislated housing codes, all but a handful of
states have now rejected caveat lessee in favor of the fWH.175 This reform
effort would fit comfortably into the preceding analysis about switching
default rules to conform to probable majoritarian preferences, save for
one thing: Although the 1WH is subject to waiver under the Restatement
and in some jurisdictions,1 7 6 most courts, following the lead of the D.C.
Circuit, have held that the warranty is mandatory and not subject to mod-
ification by the parties.' 77
There are a variety of explanations for why courts have generally
made the IWH an immutable rather than a default rule, 178 including the
173. See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 167, at 672-73 (describing the origins and gradual
decline of the caveat lessee rule).
174. Most courts that have considered the issue have declined to extend the IWH to
commercial leases. See Schoshinski, supra note 162, § 3:29, at 147-48 & n.61 (citing
cases).
175. See I Friedman, supra note 159, § 10.101, at 614 n.17 (noting that all but six
states have adopted some form of the IWH).
176. See Restatement (Second) of Property, Landlord and Tenant, § 5.6 (1977)
(permitting knowing waiver by tenant if, inter alia, there is not "significant inequality of
bargaining power").
177. See Javins v. First Nat'l Realty, 428 F.2d 1071, 1082 n.58 (D.C. Cir. 1970) ("Any
private agreement to shift the duties would be illegal and unenforceable."). See generally
Edward Chase & E. Hunter Taylor, Jr., Landlord and Tenant: A Study in Property and
Contract, 30 Vill. L. Rev. 571, 642-46 (1985) (describing the developments in IH
doctrine following the Javins decision).
178. One is doctrinal. If the source and content of the IWH is the local housing code,
not an implied contractual term, then the IWH can be seen as, in effect, an implied private
right of action recognized by courts under a public regulatory law. Since on this theory the
[Vol. 101:773
THE PROPERTY/CONTRACT INTERFACE
possibility that the reform effort here is a misguided attempt to use legal
rules to modify the distribution of income.' 79 But one explanation would
be that the courts have in effect opted for a protection strategy, rather
than a notice strategy, based on the perception that contracting over the
issue is likely to be distorted by informational asymmetries. The argu-
ment would be that, given the relatively small dollar amounts at stake for
the tenant in a typical residential lease, it is unrealistic to expect prospec-
tive tenants to invest in acquiring information about the meaning of lease
terms, including waivers of the IWH, or thoroughly to investigate the con-
ditions of the premises.1 80 Certainly, it would not be cost effective for a
tenant to retain a private lawyer at market rates to review a lease (in con-
trast to the practice in most jurisdictions of having a lawyer review the
provisions of a commercial lease or a contract for the purchase of a house
or condominium) or to hire an architect to inspect the premises (again
in contrast to the practice in many jurisdictions with respect to the
purchase of existing homes). Thus, given the landlord's superior infor-
mation about the law and the facts regarding the quality of the premises,
and the low probability that it will be cost effective for tenants to acquire
sufficient information to negotiate over the issue, arguably it makes sense
to interpose minimum standards of quality and make those standards
nonwaivable.
We also see evidence of relations that are quasi-multital, particularly
those that arise when a nontransferring party (either the tenant or the
landlord) has rights against an indefinite but small number of persons to
whom the other party has transferred her interest. One example is the
landlord's transfer of the underlying property to a third party without the
tenant's consent. The established rule here is that the new owner takes
the property subject to all existing leases and lease terms.18 ' In effect, the
landlord's transferee steps into the shoes of the landlord and assumes all
of the landlord's obligations under existing leases toward the nontrans-
ferring tenant. The rule assumes that the tenant has a property right,
which has been carved out of the landlord's larger interest, typically a fee
simple. If leases were bilateral contracts and nothing more, then in the
IWH derives from positive law, it makes sense that it not be subject to contractual
modification.
179. For debate over whether mandatory quality standards can be used to achieve a
redistribution of income in favor of poor tenants, see generally Ackerman, Regulating
Slum Housing, supra note 151 (arguing that under certain restrictive conditions, such as
no exit by landlords from the market, redistribution is possible); Neil K. Komesar, Return
to Slumville: A Critique of the Ackerman Analysis of Housing Code Enforcement and the
Poor, 82 Yale L.J. 1175 (1973); Bruce Ackerman, More on Slum Housing and
Redistribution Policy: A Reply to Professor Komesar, 82 Yale L.J. 1194 (1973).
180. See Kennedy, supra note 111, at 599; Arthur Allen Leff, Contract as Thing, 19
Am. U. L. Rev. 131, 140-41 (1970) ("[I]n any sector of commerce where ... one party
could impose most of its own terms . . . there was nothing to prevent highly
disproportionate 'contracts' from being created.").
181. See 3 Friedman, supra note 159, § 36.1, at 1810; Schoshinski, supra note 162,
§ 8:3, at 539-40.
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event of a sale of the fee arguably the new owner could evict the tenant
(because the burden of the lease would not run with the land), and the
tenant would be left with nothing but a cause of action against the origi-
nal landlord for breach of contract.
Imposing the existing lease terms on the landlord's transferee clearly
performs a protection function. The rule is adverse to the information-
ally advantaged parties (the landlord and the landlord's transferee), who
would often prefer to allow the new landlord to renegotiate the lease, and
is protective of the informationally disadvantaged party (the tenant), who
knows nothing about the new landlord and is vulnerable to being held up
in any renegotiation because of sunk costs and other reliance interests
associated with the existing lease.
In addition, however, the rule that the landlord's transferee takes
subject to existing lease terms performs a notice function. It turns out
the rule is only a default, although a strong one: Lease clauses providing
that the lease terminates upon sale of the underlying fee to a third party
have been enforced by courts if they are prominently disclosed and have
received the affirmative assent of the tenant. 182 What the rule means in
practice, therefore, is that any landlord who contemplates the possibility
of a future transfer of the fee and who wants to allow the transferee to
terminate or renegotiate the lease must incorporate an express provision
in the original lease spelling out this contingency. The tenant is there-
fore put on notice that this may happen, and can either consent or not
consent to the inclusion of this provision in the original lease.
Treating the rule as a strong default rather than an immutable rule
probably makes sense in this context. It is true that subjecting the tenant
to early termination or forced renegotiation can be extremely disruptive
to the tenant's reliance interests. But there may be circumstances, as
where there is a vacancy in a building that is the subject of prolonged
negotiations for sale and conversion to another use, in which a tenant
can be induced (no doubt in exchange for reduced rent) to accept a
lease on these terms. Thus, the rule permits overrides-but only if the
tenant is clearly on notice at the time of the original lease and affirma-
tively consents to the override, signaling that the override is in the inter-
est of both parties.
The story is similar, although the legal mechanism for dealing with
incomplete information is different, when the tenant transfers the lease-
hold to a third party without the landlord's consent. The analysis of the
situation is symmetrical to that in the case of the sale of the fee subject to
a lease. The tenant and a third party have entered into a contract to
182. See Schoshinski, supra note 162, § 8:3, at 539; 1 Herbert Thorndike Tiffany, The
Law of Landlord and Tenant § 12, at 70-84 (1910). Although the caselaw is sparse, it also
appears that the default rule here is a strong one: Courts will be scrupulous about
requiring that the clause be unambiguous and prominently disclosed, and that the lessee
fully comprehend its import. See id. at 75 (suggesting that termination on sale must be
provided for with specificity and lease must provide for express notice to lessee).
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transfer the tenant's interest without the landlord's consent, and this
transfer is potentially threatening to the landlord's interests.1 8 3 The ten-
ant's transferee may be a poor credit risk, may trash the premises, or may
disrupt other tenants, for example. Viewed from the perspective of the
landlord, the tenant's transferee is part of the indefinite class of other
persons to whom the tenant may transfer his interest, and about whom
the landlord has no information before the transfer occurs.
In theory, the law might respond to this problem in a fashion analo-
gous to the rule about landlord transfers: It could prohibit all tenant
transfers unless the tenant has disclosed the possibility of a future transfer
when the original lease is negotiated, and has obtained the landlord's
consent to a mechanism for handling such transfers. This would protect
the nontransferring party (the landlord) and provide notice of the possi-
bility of future tenant transfers. But the law does not proceed in this
fashion. The default rule is that if the lease is silent on the issue, the
tenant can assign or sublet at any time to any transferee of the tenant's
choosing. 184
One possible explanation for putting the burden on the landlord
rather than the tenant to raise the issue of tenant transfers in the original
lease negotiations is familiar from our discussion of compound-paucital
relations: Tenants, especially residential tenants, may have too little at
stake to acquire the information necessary to initiate negotiation over the
issue of future tenant transfers. Landlords are likely to be more sophisti-
cated about the issue, and thus are generally capable of protecting them-
selves without the benefit of a penalty default rule. This is confirmed by
practice: The standard-form leases used by landlords routinely include
provisions requiring some kind of landlord consent before any tenant
transfer takes place.18 5
183. The landlord owns the reversion, which for present purposes can be said to
include both the present value of the future stream of rental payments and the value of the
fee after expiration of the lease-collectively, the amount the landlord could obtain by
selling the fee interest subject to the lease.
184. At common law, the tenant is usually free to transfer the leasehold by assignment
or sublease, unless the landlord has included a clause in the original lease expressly
forbidding such transfers. See 1 Friedman, supra note 159, § 7.2, at 290; Schoshinski,
supra note 162, § 8:10, at 552-53. Moreover, the emerging rule is that the landlord may
refuse to consent to a tenant transfer under a no-assignment clause only on grounds that
are commercially reasonable, unless the right to refuse for any reason has been expressly
reserved. See Julian v. Christopher, 575 A.2d 735, 738-41 (Md. 1990); Kendall v. Ernest
Pestana, Inc., 709 P.2d 837, 849 (Cal. 1985). Standing alone, these rules would not suggest
that the law shows any special solicitude for the interests of the nontransferring party, the
landlord. We argue below that the law does in fact show solicitude for landlords in the face
of tenant transfers, but it does so through the standardized rules that define the
consequences of subletting and assigning ex post, rather than by policing the agreement
between the landlord and tenant ex ante.
185. See 5 Thompson on Real Property § 44.08(c)(1), at 456-57 (David A. Thomas
ed., 1994).
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Nevertheless, the law does not rely entirely on landlord self-help
through the imposition of appropriately protective clauses in the original
lease. The law utilizes other devices for overcoming the informational
problems posed by tenant transfers, namely, standardizing the legal
forms in which tenant transfers take place, and imposing standardized
consequences that protect the landlord when transfers do occur. The law
recognizes only two forms of tenant transfer: assignment and sublease.
Courts sometimes say that the question whether a tenant transfer is an
assignment or sublease is to be determined by construing the "intentions"
of the parties. 186 But what they appear to mean by this is that the parties
are free to signal their intentions as to which of the two forms they have
adopted, not that they are free to customize a new form of transfer. In
practice, courts follow standardized rules for identifying assignments and
subleases. A complete transfer of the tenant's interest is almost always
deemed to be an assignment; a partial transfer is almost always deemed to
be a sublease.1 8 7
Moreover, each of the two options has standardized consequences
that are generally protective of the landlord's interests. If the transfer is
an assignment, then the assignee is deemed to be bound by all material
covenants of the original lease-even though there is no privity of con-
tract between landlord and assignee.' 88 The transferee in effect steps
into the shoes of the transferring tenant, and must abide by all material
promises of the original lease. If the transfer is a sublease, then the origi-
nal tenant is deemed to be bound to perform all covenants of the original
lease-notwithstanding the transfer of possession to the subtenant.'8 9
The original tenant in this case continues to be liable for the perform-
ance of all promises in the original lease. In either case, the rules incor-
porate a guarantee of performance of the material terms of the original
lease, thereby protecting the interests of the nontransferring party-the
landlord. It is possible that the standardized rules of assignment and sub-
letting could be modified by very explicit language in the original lease,
but examples of this happening are hard to find.190
In short, the law follows a curiously different path with respect to
tenant transfers. But in the end, it reaches a similar result to the one that
186. See, e.g., Ernst v. Conditt, 390 S.W.2d 703, 707 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1964) (noting
that the intentions of the contracting parties are the primary basis for distinguishing an
assignment of a lease from a sublease); Jaber v. Miller, 239 S.W.2d 760, 764 (Ark. 1951)
(holding that "the intention of the parties is to govern in determining whether an
instrument is an assignment or a sublease").
187. See 1 Friedman, supra note 159, § 7.401, at 362-63; Schoshinski, supra note 162,
§ 8:10, at 553.
188. See 2 Powell on Real Property § 17.04[2] [a] (1994).
189. See id.
190. In Roman law, transfers by the usufructuary (the Roman analogue of the tenant)
to third parties were prohibited altogether. See Richard A. Epstein, Why Restrain
Alienation?, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 970, 983-84 (1985). The common law has substantially
relaxed this rule, but still insists on a strong default imposing standardized duties.
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prevails in the area of landlord transfers: The law adopts rules that serve
to protect the interests of the nontransferring party (here the landlord),
but does so in a way that allows for mutually advantageous adjustments in
the original relationship.
The standardized rules of assignment and subletting serve other
functions as well. They reduce the amount of information third parties
must assimilate in order to assess the consequences of stepping into the
shoes of the tenant. In addition, those evaluating leaseholds in general
will have less information to process if there are only two forms of tenant
transfer; these information costs borne by the rest of the world generally
are lessened by standardization. Once again, third-party effects and
standardization go hand in hand.
3. In Rem Relations. - On occasion, landlord-tenant law deploys even
more standardized rules of the type associated with pure property rights.
We will consider two examples.
One mandatory rule is easily accounted for under our framework:
The tenant enjoys the same general right to exclude trespassory invasions
from the premises, as defined by the ad coelum rule,19 1 as does the holder
of any other possessory interest in property. The case law that enforces
this understanding is difficult to uncover, because the landlord-tenant di-
mension is irrelevant to the issue. For example, if a tenant leases a park-
ing space, and a third party repeatedly parks her car in that space, the
tenant may sue in trespass, seeking an order requiring the third party to
stop interfering with the parking space. In this lawsuit, the fact that the
tenant holds the right to the parking space by lease rather than fee sim-
ple is irrelevant, and nothing in the analysis of the issue will turn on this
fact. 19 2 Nevertheless, the understanding is clear, given that the lease rep-
resents a transfer of the landlord's in rem rights of ownership to the ten-
ant during the term of the lease.
The only real issues that arise concern the tenant's right to exclude
the landlord herself.193 A covenant of quiet enjoyment is implied in
every lease, and this generally prohibits the landlord or someone acting
at her direction from interfering with the tenant's possession. Although
authority is sparse, an attempt by the landlord to override the covenant
by a provision in the lease would almost certainly be unenforceable; such
a provision would contradict the very notion of a lease.' 9 4 However,
more narrowly drafted exceptions to the tenant's right to exclude, such
as a covenant permitting the landlord to show the premises to prospective
191. See supra note 98.
192. See 2 Powell, supra note 188, § 16B.02[2] ("Once initial possession is established
. . . it is clearly the tenant's responsibility to ward off trespassers.").
193. See 1 Friedman, supra note 159, § 4.202, at 95-100.
194. Cf. 3 Friedman, supra note 159, § 29.303, at 1658 (discussing decision
invalidating a lease clause purporting to waive liability for constructive eviction, which rests
on the covenant of quiet enjoyment).
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tenants before expiration of the lease term or to inspect the premises for
needed repairs, have been upheld.' 95
Somewhat more difficult to explain is the law's recognition of only
four types of leases-the term of years, the periodic tenancy, the tenancy
at will, and the tenancy at sufferance.' 9 6 The parties are expected to con-
form their agreement to one of the recognized categories, which have
standardized definitions and consequences spelled out in every horn-
book. Contractual modification is not permitted; if the parties create a
novel type of lease, it will be categorized as being of one of the four rec-
ognized types, presumably the one that most closely approximates what
the parties intended. This limitation on the recognized number of lease
forms is a manifestation of the numerus clausus principle, about which we
have previously written. 197
If the only interests at stake were those of the original contracting
parties, then such standardization would make little sense. If the land-
lord and tenant wish to enter into a lease defined on some other basis-a
tenancy "for the duration of the war" is the classic example 9 8-why not
let them? The tenant may have a unique need for such a customized
lease term-for example, to secure warehouse space related to the supply
of war material-and the landlord may be perfectly willing to oblige.
Classifying the tenancy for the duration of the war as either a periodic
tenancy or a tenancy at will thus frustrates the intentions of the parties
and makes it harder for them to accomplish their purposes. 199
195. See Tiffany, supra note 182, § 3(b)(2), at 9-13.
196. See 2 Powell, supra note 188, §§ 16.03-06; Schoshinski, supra note 162,
§§ 2:1-2:26, at 30-83.
197. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 9, at 13, 22-23.
198. See, e.g., Nat'l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Kalis, 191 F.2d 739, 740-41 (8th Cir. 1951)
(holding that a lease which ends upon the signing of the peace treaty ending World War II
does not create a valid tenancy for years because although the signing of such a treaty is
certain there is substantial uncertainty as to when it will occur); Lace v. Chantler, [1944]
K.B. 368 (C.A.) (same).
199. Most courts that have considered the effect of language purporting to create a
lease for the duration of the war have held that this creates either a tenancy at will or a
periodic tenancy, not a term of years. See, e.g., Nat'l Bellas Hess, 191 F.2d at 740 (finding
tenancy at will); Stanmeyer v. Davis, 53 N.E.2d 22, 25 (111. App. Ct. 1944) (finding tenancy
at will); Michael Tuck Found. v. Hazelcorn, 65 N.Y.S.2d 387 (N.Y. Mun. Ct. 1946) (finding
tenancy at will); Lace, [1944] K.B. at 369 (finding periodic tenancy). Those courts that
have upheld such conveyances as a term of years have done so either by redefining the
meaning of a term of years, see Smith's Transfer & Storage Co. v. Hawkins, 50 A.2d 267,
268 (D.C. 1946) (holding that lease for the duration of the war was a valid term of years
because a term of years does not require a certain date of termination, only certainty that it
will terminate at some date), or by recharacterizing the agreement of the parties, see Great
N. Ry Co. v. Arnold, 33 T.L.R. 114, 115 (K.B. 1916) (enforcing lease for duration of war on
the theory that the parties' agreement was the functional equivalent of a lease for 999 years
"terminable with the conclusion of the war"). Thus, none of these decisions squarely takes
issue with the proposition that there are only four types of leasehold estates; they disagree
only over the proper classification of a lease for the duration of the war within this fixed
universe of permitted types.
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The problem with permitting such customized lease terms is that
they would increase the costs that third parties must incur in understand-
ing the property rights that exist in the society and are available for po-
tential exchange. For example, potential purchasers of the landlord's re-
version, or potential assignees or subtenants of the tenant's interest,
would incur higher measurement costs in ascertaining the nature of a
lease interest if customized lease terms were permitted. Similarly, credi-
tors of the landlord or the tenant will be able to process information
about the nature of the interest of the debtor more easily if leases come
in standardized legal packages. Finally, prospective future tenants will
benefit from lease standardization, because they can more readily deter-
mine when or if a particular property will be available to lease in the
future. The point is not simply that higher costs will be incurred when
actual instances of customized leases are encountered. All third parties
will incur higher measurement costs if any customization is permitted,
since all must then investigate in each case to see if such a special interest
has been created. 20 0
To sum up, landlord-tenant law conforms fairly closely to our hy-
potheses. We find that in personam relations are governed by rules that
shift over time in ways that plausibly reflect changing majoritarian prefer-
ences, but these rules are always defaults. Moreover, consistent with our
surmise that the law will often adopt a protection strategy in the com-
pound-paucital situation, the modern rule that addresses the condition of
the premises, the IWH, can plausibly be viewed as a form of protection
strategy adopted in a context where tenants remain rationally ignorant
and are vulnerable to strategic behavior by landlords. We also find rules
that serve the dual function of protection and notice in the quasi-multital
situations created by landlord and tenant transfers to third parties. The
in rem aspects of landlord-tenant law are similar to the in rem aspects of
fee simple ownership: We find standardized forms and bright-line rules
of exclusion.
C. Security Interests
Security interests also lie at the intersection of property and contract.
There has long been controversy over whether a security interest is a con-
tract to convey an interest in property upon the occurrence of a future
contingency-nonpayment of debt-or whether it is an inchoate prop-
200. Consider the problems that a potential purchaser of the underlying fee or a
prospective tenant would incur in determining when a customized tenancy "for the
duration of the war" will end. Does it end upon armistice, on demobilization, or only with
the signing of a peace treaty? Who is to make the determination that the war has ended?
Since there will be no body of precedent resolving these ambiguities, the adoption of such
an idiosyncratic lease term clearly compounds the measurement costs that must be
incurred by a variety of third parties. The intrusion of the numerus dausus principle into
an institution that is otherwise highly in personam thus makes sense as a means of
reducing third-party information costs.
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erty right that springs into a full possessory right upon the occurrence of
the future contingency.2 0 1 Clearly security interests have aspects of both
property and contract, and thus satisfy our definition of a borderline in-
stitution. It should be noted that, perhaps more than the other areas of
law we examine, security interests present a number of challenging puz-
zles that have led to a large literature. 20 2 The costs and benefits of secur-
ity interests have been quite controversial in a number of respects, and it
is not our purpose to enter these debates here. Instead, as before, we will
show in this Section that both the contours of present law and the pat-
terns of criticism by commentators reflect an implicit concern with infor-
mation costs. 20 3 The pattern of standardization following from the in-
volvement of third parties broadly holds.
When a lender makes a loan to a debtor, the lender may take a secur-
ity interest in property (collateral) of the debtor. The security interest is
created by the security agreement, a species of contract that is, not sur-
prisingly, interpreted according to contract principles. The security in-
terest gives the lender two rights that an unsecured lender does not have.
First, the lender has what is called a "property right" or "repossessory
right," which means that upon default the lender can seize the collateral
without having to resort to judicial process. 20 4 Second, a secured lender
has a "priority right," which means that under state law, the lender can
enjoy this property right in the face of competing claims of purchasers,
transferees, and other creditors. 20 5 Bankruptcy may stay or suspend these
rights, and we return to standardization in bankruptcy later.20 6
201. See Julia Patterson Forrester, Bankruptcy Takings, 51 Fla. L. Rev. 851, 873-77
(1999) (documenting controversy over property status of security interests and taking
position that they are property interests even for takings purposes).
202. This even includes the question of why firms issue security and whether this is a
net social good. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk &Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the
Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 Yale L.J. 857, 862 n.23 (1996) (collecting
literature on priority of secured debt).
203. As we will see, the commentary taken as a whole sometimes makes different and
more fine grained distinctions than does current law. For our purposes, the important
thing to note is that these proposals are consistent with the expectations of our
information-cost theory.
204. See Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Cases, Problems, and Materials on
Security Interests in Personal Property 1, 67 (1984) [hereinafter Baird &Jackson, Security
Interests]. Under the Uniform Commercial Code, a security interest is a property interest.
U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (2000).
205. Baird &Jackson, Security Interests, supra note 204, at 1, 67.
206. See infra notes 239-41 and accompanying text. Where a debtor is insolvent, the
exercise of the property right is stayed under bankruptcy law, and the priority right is
suspended, but in place of the state law priority right, the Bankruptcy Code requires that
the secured loan be paid before certain other interests up to the value of the collateral.
See 11 U.S.C. §§ 361-64 (2000). In practice, secured creditors may not be paid full value.
See, e.g., Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 202, at 911-13.
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A security interest may be taken in personal or real property. Under
the U.C.C. as enacted in all states, 20 7 a party with a security interest in
personal property has priority over unsecured parties and over later-cre-
ated security interests unless the later security interest is filed or perfected
before the earlier one. 20 8 Perfection normally involves a filing of the fi-
nancing statement in the prescribed place, 20 9 or taking possession of the
collateral,2 10 with the filing system being reminiscent of title filings in real
estate. Likewise, mortgages of real property are subject to the filing re-
quirements of the state in which the property is located. These systems
vary but all of them require some form of notice for the benefit of poten-
tial subsequent purchasers and lenders.
The parties affected by security interests can be usefully classified in
terms of the third-party interests that they do or do not implicate. First,
the parties to the security agreement themselves, with respect to issues
relating to the agreement, are in an in personam relationship. A borrows
from B and gives B a security interest. If this is A's first loan from any
source, then A and B may at this stage take actions that affect others (and
each other) but are not yet affected by actions of others.
Second come the intermediate cases, which can be of the com-
pound-paucital or the quasi-multital sort. Compound-paucital issues arise
where one lender enters into a large number of similar small-stakes con-
tracts with debtors (as happens in consumer finance). More characteristi-
cally complicated in the area of security interests are what we call quasi-
multital issues. These mainly involve the rights of parties affected only
indirectly by the security agreement. Future lenders to A may be affected
by the existence and terms of the security agreement. In addition, any
future loans they make can impair B's ability to collect on the original
loan. Furthermore, either party might assign its interest in the property
207. Article 9, that part of the U.C.C. governing security interests in personal property
and fixtures, has been revised and is in the process of being enacted by the states. Revised
Article 9 is scheduled to become effective on July 1, 2001. See Steven L. Harris & Charles
W. Mooney, Jr., Introduction to the Symposium on UCC Revised Article 9, 74 Chi.-Kent L.
Rev. 857, 857 (1999).
208. U.C.C. § 9-312(5). This assumes that there is no intervening period in which the
secured party who is first to file or perfect left the security interest unperfected and
unfiled. Revised Article 9 moves in the direction of a nontemporal perfection hierarchy
based in part on the method of perfection. See Randal C. Picker, Perfection Hierarchies
and Nontemporal Priority Rules, 74 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1157, 1158-59 (1999).
209. The prescribed place is often different under Revised Article 9, and the new
system is different in that the priority rules do not depend entirely on time. Under old
Article 9, the rule was first to file or perfect, U.C.C. § 9-312(5), but under the new rules
possession by control receives extra priority. U.C.C. app. XVI §§ 9-104 to 107 (setting forth
provisions of the revised U.C.C. Article 9 providing for establishment of control over
deposit account, electronic chattel paper, investment property, and letter-of-credit rights);
U.C.C. app. XVI §§ 9-327 to 330 (setting forth provisions of the revised U.C.C. Article 9
providing priority rules relating to the foregoing types of property).
210. Exceptions include the automatic perfection of purchase money security
interests. See U.C.C. §§ 9-107, 9-312(3) to (4).
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to third parties. Thus, in addition to the original parties, at least two
other groups-future lenders and assignees-are within what we might
call the "zone of privity"; these parties all deal directly or indirectly with A
or B.2 11 Under circumstances to be discussed shortly, all such parties
have an incentive to take into account the effect of the security interest
on the value of all present and future rights in the collateral. Conse-
quently, aspects of the security agreement that hurt the future lenders or
assignees are likely to be capitalized into the value of the rights in the
hands of the decisionmakers (A and B).
Third and finally, some third parties are not in a contractual rela-
tionship with A and B, even indirectly; they have a purely in rem relation-
ship with A and B. These include in rem dutyholders trying to avoid vio-
lating the property rights of either A or B,2 12 as well as involuntary
creditors, especially tort creditors, of A.213 The security agreement be-
tween A and B could impinge on the rights and affect the behavior of
these third parties.21 4 This class of third parties also includes those who
engage in secured lending with parties other than A and B and with refer-
ence to assets not owned by A. The mere possibility that A and B might
have invented an idiosyncratic security interest will raise the cost of
processing security interests having nothing directly to do with A and B's
transaction. That is, as with property interests generally, the possibility of
creating new and idiosyncratic security interests raises information costs
to others generally. The question then becomes whether it is worthwhile
to standardize the ways of taking security and who-private parties them-
selves, intermediaries, or the government-can best supply such
standards.2' 5
1. In Personam Relations. - The relationship between A and B is in
personam and with respect to this relationship we would expect to find
211. We introduced the notion of a zone of privity in this sense in our earlier article.
See Merrill & Smith, supra note 9, at 28.
212. This would include those who might damage the property or possibly bailees of
the property. See Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Possession and Ownership: An
Examination of the Scope of Article 9, 35 Stan. L. Rev. 175, 177-78 (1983) [hereinafter
Baird &Jackson, Possession and Ownership].
213. A variety of commentators have noted the special problems associated with
involuntary (especially tort) creditors. See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 202, at 882-83;
Lynn M. LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor's Bargain, 80 Va. L. Rev. 1887, 1898-99 (1994);
Alan Schwartz, Taking the Analysis of Security Seriously, 80 Va. L. Rev. 2073, 2085-86
(1994) [hereinafter Schwartz, Taking the Analysis]; James H. Scott, Jr., Bankruptcy,
Secured Debt, and Optimal Capital Structure, 32J. Fin. 1, 2-3 (1977); Paul M. Shupack,
Solving the Puzzle of Secured Transactions, 41 Rutgers L. Rev. 1067, 1094-95 (1989).
214. Under a regime of complete freedom to customize, as compared with a system
that provides for some degree of standardization of in rem rights, potential tortfeasors and
tort victims both might have too much incentive to take precautions that minimize their
losses from nonstandard rights. See, e.g., Schwartz, Taking the Analysis, supra note 213, at
2085 ("If the injurer is not fully insured and if actual victims will get little in the injurer's
bankruptcy, then potential victims may take excessive precautions to avoid harm.").
215. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 9, at 49-51.
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that the law adopts legal rules typical of the law of contract. It may be
that A and B wish to communicate with each other at low cost and that
using a standard vocabulary and proposing standard devices to govern
their relationship is advantageous. But the benefits and costs of doing so
are internal to A and B. It is a complicated question in any given type of
transaction whether the costs of communicating fall ultimately on one
party or the other,2 t 6 and it is certainly the case that outsiders like courts
will sometimes be called upon to interpret the agreement. But none of
these problems with security interests-considering A and B and possibly
courts as the only affected parties-goes much if at all beyond similar
problems in contracts generally. Thus, as far as A and B are concerned
we would not expect any greater degree of standardization than normally
found in contract law.21 7 Not surprisingly, we find that security interests
are generally interpreted in accordance with contract principles.2 18
Where the law imposes terms or mandates notice to the world, this is
justified mainly as protection of parties other than A and B.2 19
2. Intermediate Relations. - As with our other institutions, the inter-
mediate cases in the area of security interests can be of the compound-
paucital or the quasi-multital type. With regard to the former, it is quite
common for lenders to enter into a large number of similar secured
transactions with consumers, as for example in financing the purchase of
automobiles and major appliances. In these sorts of transactions, individ-
ual consumers do not have a large incentive to investigate the fine points
of the credit agreement. There is a wide range of range of possible mar-
ket-based solutions to the problem, including reliance on lenders with
216. For some studies that focus on which party in a transaction will undertake and/
or bear the costs of producing information, see Yoram Barzel, Measurement Cost and the
Organization of Markets, 25 J.L. & Econ. 27, 28 & n.3 (1982); Victor P. Goldberg, The
Gold Ring Problem, 47 U. Toronto L.J. 469, 480 (1997); Roy W. Kenney & Benjamin Klein,
The Economics of Block Booking, 26J.L. & Econ. 497, 518-19 (1983).
217. Even potential problems such as wasteful efforts at signaling the quality of
projects through security interests are not really unique to security interests; the potential
for signaling to be privately beneficial but socially wasteful (rather than cost-effectively
informative) is a theoretical possibility in other two-party transactions. See, e.g., Philippe
Aghion & Benjamin Hermalin, Legal Restrictions on Private Contracts Can Enhance
Efficiency, 6 J.L. Econ. & Org. 381, 382 (1990) (describing how prohibition of signaling
has potential to enhance welfare); Ayres & Gertner, Contractual Inefficiency, supra note
94, at 761 (describing how argument for default rules that force information out of parties
"is strongest when transaction costs are small"). Whether a given example of signaling is
wasteful is difficult to tell, Schwartz, Taking the Analysis, supra note 213, at 2085, and the
tendency has been to overestimate the waste associated with information costs where
markets encourage devices to reduce wasteful information production, see Yoram Barzel,
Some Fallacies in the Interpretation of Information Costs, 20J.L. & Econ. 291, 292 (1977).
218. U.C.C. § 9-201 (2000) ("Except as otherwise provided by this Act a security
agreement is effective according to its terms between the parties, against purchasers of the
collateral and against creditors.").
219. See Baird & Jackson, Possession and Ownership, supra note 212, at 177-78
(arguing that "judges and legislators should be sensitive to the costs imposed on third
parties by the separation of ownership and possession whenever these costs exist").
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reputations for honesty, following the lead of sophisticated marginal con-
sumers, or seeking out the advice of consumer organizations and rating
agencies. But it is probably no coincidence that here, as in landlord-ten-
ant law, we find consumer-protection laws that inject standardized duties
into contractual relations designed to protect informationally disadvan-
taged parties. 220
In the other type of intermediate area-what we call quasi-multital
relations-the notice strategy generally predominates over the protection
strategy. With respect to future lenders to A or future assignees of A's or
B's property interest, the argument for some type of standardized form of
notice of the existence of the security interest is widely recognized, al-
though not entirely uncontroversial. 2 1 The large literature on security
interests has explored the informational effects of security interests on
later (and earlier) creditors. Other intermediate cases arise with assign-
ments and purchases.
For all these parties, especially later creditors, there is clearly a need
for information about the security interest. The mandatory rules for
perfecting security interests in personal property furnish notice to other
creditors in much the same way that recording systems in real estate
do. 2 2 2 As in other contexts in which legal rules impose a standardized
form of notice, such rules are justified to the extent that the needed in-
formation will not be supplied privately.2 23
Whether such information would in fact be provided without legally
standardized notice is the subject of a lively debate in the literature. It
has been argued that if borrowers without security interests have an in-
centive to advertise this fact and if they can furnish credible information
(e.g. from opening their books and files), then there is no need for
mandatory rules of priority, 224 and perhaps not even for a rule of con-
structive notice-by-filing (or of possession).225 These proposals make the
most sense in contexts in which the concern of transactors for the mar-
ketability of their assets will give them sufficient incentive to standardize
without government intervention. Even if mandatory rules are not strictly
220. For a survey and discussion of mandatory rules in consumer finance, see Richard
Hynes & Eric Posner, The Law and Economics of Consumer Finance, passim (John M. Olin
Law & Economics, Working Paper No. 117, 2d Series, Feb. 20, 2001).
221. Compare Baird &Jackson, Possession and Ownership, supra note 212, at 182-83
(endorsing filing system as cost-effective method of furnishing notice to later creditors)
with Alan Schwartz, A Theory of Loan Priorities, 18 J. Legal Stud. 209, 220-22, 249-59
(1989) [hereinafter Schwartz, A Theory] (arguing for abandoning filing and relying on
contract with respect to priority among creditors).
222. See, e.g., Baird &Jackson, Possession and Ownership, supra note 212, at 183.
223. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 9, at 49-51.
224. Schwartz, A Theory, supra note 221, at 218-26 (arguing for the dispensibility of
notice function of filing system and presenting model of separating equilibrium in credit
markets); George G. Triantis, Secured Debt Under Conditions of Imperfect Information,
21 J. Legal Stud. 225, 249-50 (1992) (discussing borrower incentives to communicate
private information given imperfect information in the market for security interests).
225. See Schwartz, A Theory, supra note 221, at 220-22.
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needed here, however, the law might supply focal points in order to facili-
tate the process of coordination. In other contexts involving small-scale
interests, the need for stronger legal pressure to standardize is likely to be
greater. 226
In our framework, this debate reflects the intermediate nature of the
information problem. Where the interests involved go beyond the in per-
sonam, we expect a greater degree of legal intervention to supply either
notice or protection (or both) to parties with incomplete information.
And this is by and large what we find in the legal rules governing security
interests, with the emphasis here on notice. The notice requirements
and the priority rules tend not to constrain substantively what can be
done with security interests, because the creditors could in principle con-
tract for different priority.2 2 7 But the basic rules of priority cannot be
varied by contract; the requirements for perfection and the resolution of
remaining conflicts among security interests are handled by standardized
mandatory rules.22 8 We do not suggest that the system in its current form
provides exactly the optimal level of default strength. But the system
does seem clearly to be aimed at providing third parties with information.
As for later purchasers, security interests (like bailments and leases)
divide ownership in such a way that third parties may have difficulty dis-
covering or processing the rights. 229 These issues are particularly acute
where a third party is trying to acquire all the rights in the asset in ques-
tion. Protections for third-party purchasers, especially where information
costs are high, are also a feature of the law of security interests. Later
purchasers, unlike later creditors, may find it impracticable to do credit
226. The repossessory right may be more important in this regard than the priority
right (the latter being the focus of attention). Consider trade creditors, who shade off into
involuntary creditors. In some cases of "nonadjusting creditors" it will not be worth it for
good types to signal that they are good types to lenders. So if there is a pooling
equilibrium, it makes sense for the law to standardize, because parties will not be affected
by the impact on the nonadjusting creditors of nonstandard security interests.
227. This is only a tendency because the law does not facilitate some agreements.
Negative pledge covenants, for example, are usually unenforceable against third parties,
which make such covenants of little practical use. See Carl S. Bjerre, Secured Transactions
Inside Out: Negative Pledge Covenants, Property and Perfection, 84 Cornell L. Rev. 305,
306-07 (1999) (critiquing current negative covenant doctrine and proposing that negative
covenants be made enforceable against subsequent perfecting secured parties). Some
scholars have criticized the system for this, and have suggested remedial proposals for
notice through perfection. See id.
228. See U.C.C. §§ 9-312 to 9-315 (2000). The concern with third-party information
costs is distinct from the issue of whether full priority for security interests in bankruptcy
imposes an externality on nonadjusting creditors. See, e.g., Bebchuk & Fried, supra note
202, at 891-903 (discussing inefficiencies created by full priority); Steven L. Schwarcz, The
Easy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 47 Duke L.J. 425, 485-88
(1997) (arguing that secured debt actually benefits all creditors, even secured creditors);
Symposium, The Priority of Secured Debt, 82 Cornell L. Rev. 1279 (1997).
229. Baird &Jackson, Possession and Ownership, supra note 212, at 177-78.
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checks and evaluate disclosed financial information. 23 0 As expected, the
legal rules here take the form of strong defaults; security interests can be
maintained but only through taking steps designed to ensure notice.
The problems faced by third-party purchasers also help explain the
U.C.C.'s provisions that a person with voidable title has the power to
transfer good title to a good faith purchaser for value,2 3 ' and a merchant
who is "entrust[ed]" with goods of the kind in which the merchant deals
has the power to transfer "all rights of the entruster [e.g., a bailor] to a
buyer" acting in good faith and without notice of the superior title.23 2
These rules in effect impose a rule of strict liability on the true owner
subject to a defense of prior notice to the third party purchaser. Cru-
cially, as Richard Epstein points out, the defense of notice does not hold
the third party to a negligence standard. The third party need not have
undertaken all cost effective steps at investigating the transferor's owner-
ship; to benefit from the rule of strict liability on owners, the third party
need only not ignore the obvious (e.g. jewelry offered at a fraction of its
value).233 Again, we are not arguing that these rules are the best solution
to the problem of the third-party purchaser. 234 But they are quite consis-
tent with the kinds of solutions we find in other areas where intermedi-
ate-level information-cost problems arise. Here, as elsewhere, the law
adopts rules designed to protect parties with incomplete information and
to create incentives for informationally advantaged parties to provide
notice.23 5
Finally, the asset-partitioning function of security interests also helps
to lower information costs by reducing the overall monitoring costs asso-
ciated with secured lending. Security interests focus a creditor's monitor-
ing on selected assets for which that creditor may have an advantage in
monitoring, thereby promoting efficiency. 23 6 But such focused monitor-
230. Schwartz, A Theory, supra note 221, at 223. For this reason, Schwartz advocates
adopting a first-in-time rule for disputes between creditors but retaining the filing system
for conflicts between creditors and purchasers. Id.
231. U.C.C. § 2-403(1).
232. U.C.C. § 2-403(2). The "entrustment" rule speaks of a "buyer in the ordinary
course of business." Id. To be a "buyer in the ordinary course of business" requires a
good-faith purchase and a lack of knowledge that the sale violates ownership rights or a
security interest. Id. § 1-201(9).
233. Epstein, Inducement, supra note 120, at 15-16.
234. As Saul Levmore has pointed out, the difficulty of the problem is confirmed by
the fact that there is no uniform solution across legal systems. See Saul Levmore, Variety
and Uniformity in the Treatment of the Good-Faith Purchaser, 16J. Legal Stud. 43, 44-45,
60 (1987).
235. Even more strikingly, the rules of negotiability are designed to promote reliance
on the part of third parties by, in our terms, minimizing the need to incur the costs of
measuring reliability. Negotiability is correspondingly a highly standardized area,
featuring mandatory rules not subject to customization even with actual notice. See U.C.C.
§ 3-104 (defining negotiable instrument).
236. See, e.g., Thomas H. Jackson & Anthony T. Kronman, Secured Financing and
Priorities Among Creditors, 88 Yale L.J. 1143, 1152-61 (1979) (discussing the benefits of
security interests in focusing monitoring efforts, taking advantage of monitoring
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ing will only work if assets are truly segregated, because otherwise value
can only be protected (and hence captured) by more extensive monitor-
ing.237 As with organizational law and devices like trusts, this asset-parti-
tioning effect is an essential contribution of the legal rules that govern
security interests; it would be prohibitive for creditors to contract individ-
ually with every party with whom they might otherwise come into con-
flict. 23 8 In our terms, asset partitioning creates a regime to reduce the
costs associated with quasi-multital rights and duties; the potential con-
flicts here are between parties who are ex ante not definitely specifiable.
As expected, in these contexts such asset-partitioning devices have a
strong default character.
Similar issues arise in the choice of bankruptcy regime. Commenta-
tors have had difficulty explaining why the present bankruptcy regime
should be mandatory, and suggestions have recently been made to allow
more contracting in this area.239 But interestingly this has taken the form
of proposing a menu approach: Only a small and finite number of re-
gimes would be available in order to avoid confusion and costly informa-
tion gathering on the part of potential transactors. 240 The benefits here
advantages, and thereby lowering monitoring costs); Saul Levmore, Monitors and
Freeriders in Commercial and Corporate Settings, 92 Yale L.J. 49, 53-59 (1982) (providing
general model of creditor monitoring of "focal points").
237. Specialized monitoring and segregation of assets are closely related; the former
can only occur if the value available to the creditor from the asset in question is not
impacted by other firm risk that is difficult to detect. On asset substitution and risk
substitution more generally, see Hideki Kanda & Saul Levmore, Explaining Creditor
Priorities, 80 Va. L. Rev. 2103, 2123-27 (1994).
238. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational
Law, 110 Yale L.J. 387, 406-23 (2000). This does not mean that the problem is not also
contractual nor that harms by one creditor to another cannot be internalized. See Randal
C. Picker, Security Interests, Misbehavior, and Common Pools, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 645,
647-48 (1992) (noting that creditors may structure relationships with debtors so as to
mitigate common pool problems).
239. See, e.g., Robert K. Rasmussen, Debtor's Choice: A Menu Approach to
Corporate Bankruptcy, 71 Tex. L. Rev. 51, 54-55 (1992) (arguing that bankruptcy law is a
function of the contract between a firm's investors and its creditors, so firms should have a
choice of bankruptcy options); Schwartz, Contract Theory, supra note 4, at 1822-26, 1831
(stating that prohibition on contracting for bankruptcy systems is inefficient, and
providing a model in which debtors and creditors contract for bankruptcy systems they
prefer). But see, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki, Contract Bankruptcy: A Reply to Alan Schwartz,
109 Yale L.J. 317, 339-40 (1999) (arguing that Schwartz's bankruptcy contracting model is
feasible only in extremely limited scenarios). LoPucki and Schwartz's debate continues in
the same volume. Alan Schwartz, Bankruptcy Contracting Reviewed, 109 Yale L.J. 343
(1999) (defending proposal for bankruptcy contracting); Lynn M. LoPucki, Bankruptcy
Contracting Revised: A Reply to Alan Schwartz's New Model, 109 Yale L.J. 365 (critiquing
Shwartz's "revised" bankruptcy contracting model).
240. Rasmussen, supra note 239, at 53, 65-66, 100; see also Thomas H. Jackson &
Robert E. Scott, On the Nature of Bankruptcy: An Essay on Bankruptcy Sharing and the
Creditors' Bargain, 75 Va. L. Rev. 155, 203 (1989) (noting "extraordinary benefits" of
limiting bankruptcy regimes to "a few model forms" and arguing that benefits of
standardized rules of bankruptcy suggest some restrictions on freedom to opt out). Under
Rasmussen's proposal, it is not completely clear whether contracting outside the menu
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would be clearest in the case of small and nonadjusting creditors and
least clear in the case of large and repeat creditors; these latter parties
may need no more state-supplied standardization than do contracting
parties generally.
3. In Rem Relations. - With respect to more distant third parties-
those not even in indirect privity with A and B-the law tends to be
mandatory in an uncontroversial way. Those parties with a true in rem
relationship with A and B fall into three classes: tort and other
nonadjusting creditors, potential violators of the property rights of A and
B, and other market participants. With respect to tort creditors, com-
mentators see some benefit in rules designed to afford protection; tort
creditors cannot bargain with A and B and may take excessive precau-
tions to avoid injury.2 4 1 Likewise, to the extent that other creditors are
nonadjusting they may have a similar need for protective rules.
Potential violators of the property rights of the debtor-owner and the
secured party (A and B, respectively) do not figure much in the litera-
ture. This is not surprising, because these actors do not present any
problems unique to security interests. Moreover, from the in rem
dutyholder's point of view, the knowledge needed to avoid violating the
rights of the owner and the secured party is not much different from that
required to respect an unencumbered fee-simple owner's rights to an as-
set. Destroying the asset is not allowed in either case, and we do not allow
security interests to expand the general in rem duties of respect for
property. 242
With respect to other market participants, the question of whether
the law needs to mandate standards as always depends on the incentives
of A and B to standardize. If the only entities supplying secured credit
(the Bs) were sophisticated institutions concerned about the marketabil-
ity of these interests (for example, through sales on secondary markets),
then arguably legal standardization of priorities and repossessory rights
would be unnecessary. But insofar as small-scale lenders and informal
security devices enter the picture (as inevitably they do), then even the
sophisticated lenders will benefit from some legal standardization. The
costs of uncovering and comprehending security interests will drop if all
market participants can safely ignore the possibility that novel types of
lending practices may be construed by courts as being valid.
would be allowed, but it seems that if it were, it would be subject to a requirement of notice
that the menu is not being used.
241. See supra note 213 and sources cited therein; see also Schwartz, A Theory, supra
note 221, at 223 (listing the ways in which creditors, but not later buyers, protect
themselves against uncertainty).
242. Where problems of potential third-party violations of property rights to the
collateral do become more troublesome, as where A puts the property into the hands of a
bailee, then we are back into the category of intermediate cases-the quasi-multital rights
and duties-discussed in the previous subsection.
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Although most previous literature has framed the issues in security
interests in terms of notice-and whether and when parties to a security
agreement will have sufficient incentive to reveal the correct amount of
information-notice and standardization are complementary methods of
reducing information costs and they may well prove to be substitutes at
the margin. Many have noted the similarity of security interests to certain
leases and bailments, and the question is why each gets different treat-
ment. For example, proposals abound to require the recordation of
leases. 243 In our terms, even though short-term leases are mostly not sub-
ject to recordation requirements, they are heavily standardized, in accor-
dance with the numerus clausus principle. 244 The questions are how close
security interests and leases are as substitutes for transactors, and whether
the information problems should be solved similarly. Part of this inquiry
should include for each method of dividing property a comparison of the
frustration costs of standardizing versus the costs of furnishing notice.
The problem is finding the right combination of standardization and no-
tice given the range of information problems and the substitutability of
methods of dividing property.
To sum up, security interests implicate a range of issues from purely
in personam problems, through intermediate cases, to in rem issues. As
we move along this spectrum, information costs become more wide-
spread and internalization of them becomes more urgent. As expected,
we find that rising information costs to third parties and increased stand-
ardization go hand in hand. In the intermediate cases, notice seems to
predominate over protection, perhaps because security interests impli-
cate relatively large stakes, making the acquisition of additional informa-
tion generally a cost effective strategy.
D. Trusts
Our final boundary institution-the trust-is the creation of the An-
glo-American law of equity. 2 4 5 A trust involves three parties: the settlor,
the trustee, and the beneficiary. The settlor conveys property to the trus-
tee, who then manages it as a fiduciary for the benefit of the beneficiary.
The trustee holds the "legal" title to the property; the beneficiary is said
to hold the "equitable" title. The property that forms the corpus of the
trust is typically held in fee simple; today, the most common assets are
securities. 246 The equitable interests of the beneficiaries, in contrast, are
often divided in more exotic ways, tracking the building blocks of the
243. See, e.g., Baird &Jackson, Possession and Ownership, supra note 212, at 187-89
(making proposal to incorporate leases in Article 9's filing rules); see also id. at 189 n.46
(summarizing literature on both sides of the issue).
244. See supra Part III.B; Merrill & Smith, supra note 9, at 11 (asserting that the
numerus clausus principle limits the number of types of possible leases).
245. For the basics, see George T. Bogert, Trusts 1-8 (6th ed. 1987).
246. See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Law 236 (1922)
("Wealth, in a commercial age, is made up largely of promises."); Langbein, Contractarian
2001]
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
estate system-various combinations of life estates, remainders, and con-
current interests. Trusts are used today not only in the transmission of
family wealth, where trustees are often individuals or local banks or
branches of large banks, but also in the management of charitable institu-
tions, pension funds, mutual funds, and asset securitization, where trust-
ees are normally large banks or financial institutions. 247
Legal scholars have long debated whether trusts are more properly
categorized as a contract-based or a property-based institution. 248 Be-
cause these kinds of debates are our main criterion for identifying institu-
tions along the property/contract interface, trusts clearly qualify.
Indeed trusts, like our other three institutions, partake of both in
personam and in rem relations. A trust involves the transfer of the pack-
age of in rem rights associated with ownership from the settlor to the
trustee. The trustee exercises managerial authority over the trust corpus,
much in the way an owner would: The trustee exercises the right to ex-
clude others, determines when and if to transfer the assets of the trust to
third parties, and so forth. 249 The key difference between a trust and
ordinary ownership is that the trustee is subject to a complicated set of
duties, tantamount to a third-party beneficiary contract, that requires that
the beneficial value of the property be devoted to the welfare of the bene-
ficiary. Thus, we can think of a trust as the transfer of in rem rights asso-
ciated with ownership, subject to a set of in personam duties designed to
fulfill the settlor's intentions toward the beneficiary.
1. In Personam Relations. - Langbein and Hansmann and Mattei
have recently explained the functional equivalence between trust law and
contract law insofar as the rules that govern the core relationships among
the settlor, trustee, and beneficiary are concerned. 250 For example, they
Basis, supra note 4, at 637-43 (discussing how the trust has shifted from a conveyancing
device for freehold land to a management device for holding financial assets).
247. John H. Langbein, The Secret Life of the Trust: The Trust as an Instrument of
Commerce, 107 Yale LJ. 165, 177-78 (1997) (documenting the importance of commercial
trusts, which contain over 90% of the assets held in trusts).
248. Maitland and Scott squared off on the issue, the former adopting the contract
view, the latter the property position. See Langbein, Contractarian Basis, supra note 4, at
644-46 (reviewing debate between Maitland and Scott). More recently,John Langbein has
revived the debate. Although acknowledging that "[t]rust is a hybrid of contract and
property," id. at 669, Langbein maintains that at bottom "[t]rusts are contracts." Id. at 627.
Henry Hansmann and Ugo Mattei have responded that although the core relationship
among the settlor, trustee, and beneficiary is primarily contractual, trust law employs rules
that could not be replicated by the law of contract insofar as third-party interests enter the
picture, such as those of creditors of the trustee. See Henry Hansmann & Ugo Mattei, The
Functions of Trust Law: A Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis, 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
434, 454-59 (1998). Thus the debate continues, although in a more sophisticated form
than before.
249. The main attribute missing from the trustee's bundle of rights is the right to use
the property for the trustee's individual benefit. The beneficial use belongs, by reason of
the third-party beneficiary contract, to the beneficiary.
250. Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 248, at 447-50; Langbein, Contractarian Basis,
supra note 4, at 650-69.
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note that the principal fiduciary duties of the trustee-the duties of loy-
alty and prudence-are expressly recognized by the Restatement and
other authorities as being default rules subject to contractual modifica-
tion.25 1 Thus, viewed from an internal perspective, the relations among
parties to a trust agreement are governed by legal rules that track the law
of contract. We do not attempt to replicate or elaborate on this analysis.
We would only note that the rights and duties that exist among the core
participants in a trust are in personam: These rights and duties attach to
small numbers of persons who are specifically identified. Thus, our gen-
eral theory would predict that these rights and duties would be articu-
lated in essentially contractual terms, as it turns out they are.
2. Intermediate Relations. - Things start to get more complicated
when we turn our attention to relationships that can be characterized as
being compound-paucital or quasi-multital. Compound-paucital rela-
tions do not usually arise in trusts for purposes of traditional family plan-
ning and intergenerational wealth transmission purposes. These instru-
ments tend to be customized to each particular set of circumstances. On
the other hand, the trust form is also used today in circumstances that
involve large numbers of similarly situated beneficiaries. Examples would
include corporate pension funds managed for the benefit of large num-
bers of employees, mutual funds owned by thousands of investors, and
securitized assets such as securitized mortgages or accounts receivable
sold to large numbers of investors. In each of these situations it is plausi-
ble to say that there is incomplete information as between the settlor or
trustee of the fund or the asset on the one hand, and the numerous bene-
ficiaries or investors on the other.
In such compound-paucital situations, our theory suggests that we
should find evidence that the law governing such trusts deviates from that
which characterizes purely in personam obligations. In particular, we
would expect to find greater use of the protection strategy and the notice
strategy to overcome informational asymmetries. In fact, we see evidence
of both strategies at work. With respect to employee pension plans, the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), the federal statute
that governs employee benefit plans, imposes nonwaivable fiduciary du-
ties rather than default duties. 252 This reflects a pure protection ap-
proach. Mutual funds and to a lesser degree securitization are also regu-
lated, although the regulatory schemes here tend to take the form of
251. Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 248, at 449-50; Langbein, Contractarian Basis,
supra note 4, at 655-60.
252. The statute provides, subject to narrow exceptions, that "any provision in an
agreement or instrument which purports to relieve a fiduciary from responsibility or
liability for any responsibility, obligation, or duty under this part shall be void as against
public policy." 29 U.S.C. § 1110(a) (2000).
2001]
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
mandatory information disclosure rather than nonwaivable fiduciary du-
ties. 253 In other words, here we find a version of the notice strategy.
What accounts for the use of protection strategy in some compound-
paucital settings and the notice strategy in others? Perhaps one explana-
tion is that there is sufficient demand for monitoring of mutual funds
and securitized assets that information disclosure-notice-is all that is
required to overcome the problem of incomplete information. With suf-
ficient disclosure, the market will generate private intermediaries who
will engage in monitoring for a fee (such as Morningstar), thereby largely
correcting for the informational asymmetry. Corporate pension funds, in
contrast, may not operate on a sufficient scale to make private monitor-
ing services economically viable. This, in turn, suggests that the protec-
tion strategy (as with ERISA's nonwaivable duties) may be the strategy of
choice for compound-paucital situations only within a certain range of
circumstances: The size of the individual stakes must be sufficiently small
to make ex ante contracting economically infeasible, and the number of
beneficiaries must also be sufficiently small to preclude the development
of a market for private intermediaries that can provide equivalent
protection.
Trusts also give rise to relations that can be described as quasi-mul-
tital. For example, the trustee can become indebted to a third party, and
issues can arise about whether the third party can satisfy the debt out of
trust assets to which the trustee has legal but not equitable title.25 4 Other
issues can arise about whether the trustee may enter into contracts with
third parties for the benefit of the trust and can draw upon trust assets in
order to discharge these obligations.2 55 Each of these situations is quasi-
multital, in that the identity of the third-party creditor is indefinite ex
ante (i.e., when the trust is created and the "third-party beneficiary con-
tract" is being drafted among the three principal actors), but the number
of such creditors is likely to be small.
As Hansmann and Mattei observe, trust law deviates in significant
ways from ordinary contract law in these (quasi-multital) situations.256
For example, the individual creditors of the trustee can reach trust assets
to satisfy the trustee's personal debts, unless the trustee has registered the
trust property as being held "in trust." This looks like a classic penalty
253. Mutual funds are regulated under the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15
U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-64; and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to
80b-21; securitization is regulated under the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa;
and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-7811. See, e.g., James D. Cox,
Robert W. Hillman, & Donald C. Langevoort, Securities Regulation: Cases and Materials
14-20 (1991) (discussing these Acts); Joseph C. Shenker & Anthony J. Colletta, Asset
Securitization: Evolution, Current Issues and New Frontiers, 69 Tex. L. Rev. 1369, 1408-13
(1991) (summarizing recent developments in securities laws). Each of these statutory
schemes relies generally on information disclosure rather than mandatory rules.
254. See Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 248, at 454-58.
255. See id. at 447-51, 459-63.
256. See id. at 471-72.
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default rule: The rule is adverse to the informationally advantaged par-
ties (the settlor, trustee, and beneficiary) and protective of the informa-
tionally disadvantaged party (the third-party creditor). But the rule can
be avoided by providing a form of notice to potential creditors, in effect
signaling to the third party that the trust assets are not available to satisfy
the individual debts of the trustee. 257 This notice regime works hand in
hand with the relatively simple and standardized structure of the trust to
reduce the information-cost burden on third parties.
Similarly, when the trustee enters into contracts on behalf of the
trust, the trustee will be held personally liable for performance under
those contracts, unless the trustee signs the contract "as trustee for X and
not individually."258 Again, the rule operates like a penalty default. The
informationally disadvantaged third party is protected, but the trustee
can override the rule by making appropriate disclosures alerting the third
party that recourse is limited to trust assets only. This rule also lessens the
need of individuals generally to inquire into the possible trustee status of
potential contracting partners.
3. In Rem Relations. - As in the case of our other borderline institu-
tions, pure in rem situations are hard to uncover within the specialized
rules of trust law. Again, however, this is deceptive. Because the trust
entails the transfer of full legal title over assets to the trustee, the trustee
exercises most of the bundle of in rem rights associated with these assets.
Thus, when issues arise that implicate the in rem rights associated with
the trust assets, the fact that the assets are held in trust is generally irrele-
vant to the resolution of these issues. For example, the trustee can sue to
evict trespassers from trust property, unaffected by the fact that the trus-
tee holds the property in trust rather than outright. It is thus not surpris-
ing that Bogert and Scott do not include sections in their treatises on
trust law dealing with these sorts of issues. 259 The issues are there, but
since they have no unique trust aspect they are not dealt with as a feature
of trust law.
Where we do encounter in rem issues in trust law, the rules conform
to the predicted pattern. Thus, with respect to liability for torts against
third parties committed by the trustee in the course of administering the
trust, the rule is that the trustee is held personally liable for such torts to
the same extent as if she were the fee simple owner of the trust prop-
erty.260 Tort creditors are obviously not in a position to distinguish be-
tween trustee and nontrustee tortfeasors. Since contracting is not possi-
ble with respect to future tort creditors, the law uses an immutable rule of
protection here. Relief for the trustee comes, if at all, only if the trustee
has the foresight to include a clause in the original trust document per-
257. See id. at 454-59.
258. Id. at 459-61 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 265 cmt. a (1959)).
259. George T. Bogert, Trusts (6th ed. 1987); Austin Wakeman Scott & William
Franklin Fratcher, The Law of Trusts (4th ed. 1988).
260. See 3A Scott, supra note 259, at § 264.
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mitting indemnification for tort liability.26 1 Thus, a harm that implicates
a large and indefinite number of persons (potential tort victims) is taken
care of through the mechanism of an in personam arrangement among
the three parties to the trust, but only after assuring that the rights of the
tort victim are not affected by the existence of the trust.
There is another general consequence of the in rem dimension of
the trust that is relevant to our larger theme about the importance of
third-party information costs. The trust as an institution dramatically
reduces the information costs of having a system of property rights that
includes exotic interests such as life estates, remainders, possibilities of
reverter, and executory interests. If life estates and remainders were com-
monly held as legal interests, 262 then third parties dealing with property
owners would face substantial risks that any particular parcel would be
subject to an undisclosed future interest.263 Of course, title searches
would reveal these interests with respect to real estate. But independent
contractors and trade creditors who deal with ostensible fee simple own-
ers of real property will not ordinarily find it economically worthwhile to
undertake a title search before providing services. 264 And future interests
in personal property would not be revealed by title searches, since most
personal property is not subject to any organized registry. 265
The popularity of the trust as a means of managing property for the
benefit of one or more beneficiaries has rendered the third-party infor-
261. See id.
262. Today the great majority of future interests are created in trusts rather than as
legal interests. See Jesse Dukeminier & James E. Krier, Property 290 (4th ed. 1998).
263. Property subject to an undisclosed future interest such as a possibility of reverter
is worth much less than a equivalent parcel of property owned in fee simple, because of the
uncertainty about when if ever the interest will vest. Hence the encumbered property
would yield much less to creditors in the event of seizure for nonpayment of debts.
264. See Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Kelton, 285 P.2d 168 (Ariz. 1955)
(holding that contractor is not deemed to have constructive notice of buried cable that was
subject of recorded right of way because those with no interest in the title are not bound to
search title to land); Statler Mfg., Inc. v. Brown, 691 S.W.2d 445 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985)
(holding no constructive notice to contractor of properly recorded easement for aircraft
right of way). Title searches, even if done, provide far from complete protection against
surprise. D. Barlow Burke, Jr., American Conveyancing Patterns: Past Improvements and
Current Debates 103-04, 120 n.2 (1978) (noting the many risks that American recording
systems give rise to and how little protection a title search provides, and citing literature).
On the cost of title searches under various systems, see generally Joseph T. Janczyk, An
Economic Analysis of the Land Title Systems for Transferring Real Property, 6 J. Legal
Stud. 213, 215-26 (1977) (comparing recording system with Torrens system and
concluding latter is more efficient); Joseph T. Janczyk, Land Title Systems, Scale of
Operations, and Operating and Conversion Costs, 8 J. Legal Stud. 569, 570-75, 582-83
(1979) (evaluating costs of various land title systems and arguing Torrens system should be
adopted).
265. Douglas Baird & Thomas Jackson, Information, Uncertainty, and the Transfer of
Property, 13J. Legal Stud. 299, 306 (1984) (arguing that recording systems for establishing
title to personal property are rare because informational advantages are usually not worth
the costs); see also id. at 303-04 (noting that "[f]iling systems are not.., equally suited to
all kinds of property," and discussing why).
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mation costs associated with such exotic interests far more managea-
ble. 26 6 The corpus of the trust can be bought and sold, invested and
reinvested, leased and mortgaged, in the sound discretion of the trustee
as if the property were an undivided fee simple. 267 The complexities of
dividing the fruits of these efforts among different generations and clas-
ses need not trouble the third parties who deal with the trustee as the
manager of the trust corpus. The division is a concern only of the settlor,
the trustee, and the beneficiaries, and is dealt with among them as a mat-
ter of in personam obligation. In effect, the trust is a brilliant device that
allows for considerable customization of beneficial interests using the
building blocks of the old common law-thereby reducing the frustration
costs associated with strict regimentation of property forms-while at the
same time consolidating the assets used to fund these beneficial interests
in a form that minimizes third-party information costs.
In this respect, the trust acts like other forms of organization law.
The trust's essential function is similar to that of forms of business organi-
zation such as limited partnerships and corporations: Trusts partition as-
sets in such a way that third-party creditors need not measure all the
credit risk of the assets of the participants involved. 268 Each of these or-
ganizational forms also permits greater standardization in the forms of
ownership of basic assets and hence lowers third-party information
costs.
2 6 9
E. Summary
Each of the four institutions we have examined involves some combi-
nation of in personam and in rem relations. Bailment involves the in
personam transfer of one incident in the bundle of in rem rights-the
right of possession-from the bailor to the bailee. Landlord-tenant law
involves the in personam transfer of the full menu of in rem rights associ-
266. This point is made indirectly by legal scholars who have argued for a mandatory
rule that all exotic future interests (such as remainders, possibilities of reverter, or
executory interests) be held in trust. See William F. Fratcher, A Modest Proposal for
Trimming the Claws of Legal Future Interests, 1972 Duke L.J. 517, 549-55; Ronald
Maudsley, Escaping the Tyranny of Common Law Estates, 42 Mo. L. Rev. 355, 366-67
(1977). The trust alleviates the information costs otherwise imposed on third parties by
the existence of these interests. The fact that most exotic interests created today are (for
convenience and tax reasons) held in trust, see supra note 262, helps explain why the legal
system has been able to tolerate the continued theoretical possibility of creating such
interests.
267. Indeed, in some markets, such as those for securitized assets, trusts may be the
only way to establish a secondary market and sell these interests.
268. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 238, at 412-13.
269. Each of these forms, including the commercial uses of the trust, will ordinarily
be used in contexts in which marketability is a primary concern, such as in publicly traded
corporations. The need to assure marketability means that there will be great pressure to
adopt standard forms in any event. Thus, it may be that in these contexts the functions of
the legal rules serve mainly to supply focal points around which more spontaneous
standardization will develop. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 9, at 47 & n.169.
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ated with property from the landlord to the tenant for a temporary pe-
riod. Security interests arise with an in personam agreement between a
debtor and a creditor to make a transfer of the full bundle of in rem
rights to the creditor upon the happening of a future contingent event,
nonpayment of the debt. And trusts entail the transfer of the full collec-
tion of in rem rights in property from the settlor to the trustee, subject to
an in personam obligation on the part of the trustee to devote the prop-
erty to the benefit of the beneficiary. The mixture of in personam and in
rem obligations in each case allows us to study how the legal rules associ-
ated with each institution vary as the legal relations shift from in per-
sonam problems, through intermediate cases, to in rem issues.
Taken together, the legal doctrine associated with our four institu-
tions provides significant corroboration of the specific hypotheses we set
forth at the beginning of this Part about the relationship between the
structure of legal rights and third-party information costs. Most strik-
ingly, where we find legal relations that are purely in personam, the legal
doctrine quite consistently takes the form associated with contract law-
default rules that facilitate agreements. In the relatively few areas where
the legal relations are purely in rem, we also consistently find that the
doctrine adopts the form characteristic of property law-immutable
bright-line rules. Moreover, we find substantial evidence that the rela-
tions we have labeled compound-paucital are characterized by the legal
rules that incorporate a protection strategy designed to overcome
problems of incomplete information, and we find evidence that what we
have called quasi-multital situations are likely to be dominated by legal
doctrines concerned with notice. Finally, as expected we find a tendency
for protective and even notice rules to become more difficult to contract
around-more standardized-as duty holders become more numerous
and indefinite and so closer to the true in rem situation.
To be sure, we have seen deviations in certain circumstances from
the specific predictions we set forth for the intermediate situations:
Sometimes compound-paucital relations are associated with a notice strat-
egy (as in the law governing mutual funds and securitized assets) and
sometimes quasi-multital relations are associated with a protection strat-
egy (as in the law governing misdelivery of bailed goods). Yet even where
we find such deviations, they can be plausibly explained by the idea that
notice and protection are substitute doctrines in the intermediate areas,
depending on whether the development of additional information is
likely to be a cost effective solution for problems of incomplete informa-
tion in any particular context.
A final word is appropriate about the relative paucity of examples of
unique legal doctrines that reflect the in rem relations associated with
each of our institutions. On reflection, this paucity should not be surpris-
ing. We have theorized that in rem rights will be strongly standardized
and will incorporate rules for defining resources that are easily under-
stood by a large and indefinite collection of dutyholders. If this is cor-
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rect, then we should expect to find the same basic rules for in rem rela-
tions across all institutions. This is in fact more or less what we find: The
rules that apply to the in rem dimension of bailed goods are the same as
the rules that apply to the in rem dimension of full ownership of goods;
the rules that apply to the in rem dimension of leaseholds are the same as
the rules that apply to the in rem dimension of fee simple ownership; and
so forth. Where we find variation among the institutions is with respect
to the default rules that govern the in personam relations and the inter-
mediate situations. This is again to be expected, given that in personam
relations impose few information costs on third parties, and hence can
accommodate a greater diversity of default rules both across institutions
and even within any particular institution.
CONCLUSION
We end where we started, with the question of whether there is some
fundamental distinction between property rights and contract rights, or if
it is just a matter of repackaging and relabeling. We have argued that at
root there is a fundamental difference: The difference corresponds to
the distinction between in rem rights and in personam rights, viewed as
species of exclusion and governance strategies for controlling the use of
resources. This distinction has been obscured by prolonged neglect of
the study of in rem rights by legal scholars. Yet once we unpack the fea-
tures of in rem rights, and the foundation of both in rem and in per-
sonam rights in different strategies of exclusion and governance, we can
also see why the boundary between property and contract has seemed so
fluid. Exclusion and governance are end points along a spectrum of strat-
egies for the control of resource uses, and the differentiating elements of
in rem as opposed to in personam rights are present to a greater or lesser
degree in different situations. Thus, there are intermediate cases that
partake of some of the features of property rights and some of the fea-
tures of contract.
We do not suggest that our framework will supply the answer to all
dilemmas about the line of demarcation between contract and property,
such as whether contract rights are "property" for constitutional law pur-
poses. 270 Other distinctions besides in personam and in rem are also im-
portant in demarcating the sphere of contract and property. Sometimes,
for example, the distinction between "liability rules" and "property
rules"-whether a right can be taken upon the payment of money dam-
ages or only with the rightholder's consent-will loom large.2 71 At other
times the distinction between rights that expire with the contracting par-
ties and those that run automatically to successors in interest will be of
270. For some tentative thoughts about this issue, see Merrill, Landscape, supra note
2, at 990-95.
271. This is the familiar property rule/liability rule distinction. See Guido Calabresi
& A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the
Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089, 1092 (1972).
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central importance. 272 We do believe, however, that the distinction be-
tween in personam and in rem rights "is absolutely vital to grasping le-
gally recognized practices like property, '273 and has been overlooked for
far too long in both the legal and the economic literature.
Our central point has been to emphasize the importance of the in-
formation-cost differences associated with in personam and in rem rights.
In personam rights require a small number of identified parties to assimi-
late a comparatively large amount of information about their respective
rights and duties. In rem rights require a large and indefinite number of
persons to assimilate a comparatively small amount of information about
their respective rights and duties. Because of these differences, the legal
rules associated with in personam rights permit a high degree of cus-
tomization of rights and duties, and emphasize the importance of disclos-
ing information particular to the parties to the in personam agreement.
The legal rules associated with in rem rights, in contrast, are standardized
and immutable, and focus on gross proxies like boundaries that are easy
to observe and grasp by a large and heterogeneous population of
dutyholders.
We have sought to test these propositions by examining four institu-
tions that exist along the property/contract interface, where the inherent
differences between in personam and in rem rights should be under the
maximum stress. By and large we find that even within these institutions,
situations that correspond to in personam rights are governed by legal
rules that are very contract-like and flexible, and situations that corre-
spond to in rem rights are governed by rules that are very property-like
and standardized. Not all the details match up with our more focused
predictions. But the overall pattern seems clearly to conform to the infor-
mation-cost requirements associated with in personam and in rem rights.
This we think confirms our central proposition, which is that information
costs are key to understanding the features of a system of property rights.
272. This is the familiar issue of whether a right "runs with the land," and is critical in
distinguishing between property and contract rights in the law of servitudes. See generally
Clark, supra note 53, passim (offering an overview of rights which run with land); Stewart
E. Sterk, Freedom From Freedom of Contract: The Enduring Value of Servitude
Restrictions, 70 Iowa L. Rev. 615, 615-17 (1985) (reviewing the policy reasons behind
existing servitude law, and recognizing the functional component of existing restrictions);
A. Dan Tarlock, Touch and Concern is Dead, Long Live the Doctrine, 77 Neb. L. Rev. 804,
805 (1998) (offering a history of the "touch and concern" doctrine and criticizing the
proposed 3d Restatement rules).
273. Penner, Idea of Property, supra note 44, at 30.
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